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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Introductory Remarks 
The United States Supreme Court took a slight breather from 
patent-law issues in 2008.  After issuing three patent-law decisions in 
2007 (including KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.),1 the Court 
 
 1. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007). 
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issued just one patent-law decision in 2008—Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Electronics, Inc.2
Despite the Supreme Court’s slower pace, however, the Court’s 
influence loomed large in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in 2008.  In a number of cases, the Federal Circuit 
continued to work through the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
recent precedents, most notably KSR and the Supreme Court’s  
2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.3  The Federal 
Circuit’s continued efforts to apply these cases in different 
technological and competitive settings may be setting the stage for 
further elaboration from the Supreme Court on the standard for 
obviousness and the availability of injunctive relief in patent 
infringement cases. 
The Federal Circuit also, in two en banc decisions, preemptively 
reevaluated some of its own precedents, considering how they 
measured up against older (but still binding) Supreme Court case 
law.4  In In re Bilski,5 the Federal Circuit considered its 35 U.S.C. § 101 
patentable-subject-matter jurisprudence against previous Supreme 
Court decisions such as Diamond v. Diehr6 and Gottschalk v. Benson.7  
And in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,8 the Federal Circuit went 
back even further in the annals of Supreme Court jurisprudence and 
revised its own design patent case law in light of the Supreme Court’s 
1871 decision in Gorham Co. v. White.9
1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit continued to assess and apply the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
which rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test in favor of a more 
flexible approach for determining whether a patent claim is 
obvious.10  Using the TSM test, a patent claim was proved obvious if 
 
 2. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008); see infra Section I.B 
(discussing the Court’s decision in Quanta). 
 3. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 4. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008).
 5. 545 F.3d at 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 6. 450 U.S. 185, 209 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1 (1981). 
 7. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 673 (1972). 
 8. 543 F.3d at 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 9. 81 U.S. 511 (1871); see Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1664 (analyzing the Court’s decision in Gorham).  For a more detailed 
discussion of Egyptian Goddess, see infra Section 1.A.4.
 10. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007). 
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“‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ 
can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the 
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.”11  In rejecting 
the Federal Circuit’s strict application of the TSM test, the Supreme 
Court noted that its decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.12 provided for 
a more expansive and flexible approach to the obviousness 
question.13
Although the Supreme Court did not set forth a particular test in 
KSR, it did offer some guiding principles, such as caution in granting 
patents “based on the combination of elements found in the prior 
art” from known methods where the combination yields no more 
than predictable results.14  The Federal Circuit in 2008 applied this 
principle in Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp.,15 finding a “textbook 
case” of obviousness because the asserted claims involved a 
combination of prior art teachings to yield predictable results.16  The 
court applied the same principle to reach a similar conclusion in 
Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd.17
In addition, several of the Federal Circuit’s cases in 2008 dealt with 
the ramifications of underlying district court findings that applied the 
TSM test or KSR in the immediate wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  In these cases, the court offered additional applications of 
the directives of KSR, such as, “‘if a technique has been used to 
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using 
the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or 
her skill.’”18  The court also, for example, clarified the post-KSR 
standard for determining obviousness in the context of particular 
fields of patents, such as those regarding chemical compounds.19
 
 11. Id. at 407, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citation omitted). 
 12. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966). 
 13. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 14. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 15. 520 F.3d 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 16. Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 17. 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding the combination of prior art made 
the patent obvious). 
 18. Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310, 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1623, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1396). 
 19. See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court consults the counsel of KSR that 
‘any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and 
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the 
manner claimed.’” (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1397)). 
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2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
The Federal Circuit also continued in 2008 to delineate the 
requirements for obtaining injunctive relief upon a finding of 
infringement in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,20 but left unanswered several questions raised by 
the 2006 decision.  The court expressly left open the question of 
whether there remained any presumption of irreparable injury upon 
a finding of patent infringement.21  Reviewing the facts of each case 
presented in detail, the Federal Circuit did not reverse in any of the 
multiple appeals from the denial of a permanent injunction based on 
the district court’s analysis of the eBay factors,22 and even confirmed 
that it is within a district court’s discretion in appropriate cases to 
dissolve an injunction granted pre-eBay on the basis that the 
injunction is no longer equitable in light of that decision.23  The 
Federal Circuit did reverse the grant of one permanent injunction, 
however, where the damages awarded to the plaintiff already 
included payment of a “market entry fee” that was equivalent to an 
ongoing royalty payment.24  The court also clarified that the eBay 
decision does not preclude the award of an injunction where the 
plaintiff does not practice the asserted patents, but that the 
remaining facts of each particular case must be taken into account.25
3. Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson 
The Federal Circuit in 2008 revisited two Supreme Court cases 
from over a quarter century ago in its en banc decision in In re Bilski,26 
clarifying the test for determining what constitutes a patentable 
process under § 101 and rejecting the court’s own tests set forth in 
 
 20. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 21. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1090, 1098 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 
683, 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that eBay did 
not resolve the issue). 
 22. Under the factors set forth in eBay, 
A plaintiff must demonstrate:  (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate 
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction. 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 23. Amado, 517 F.3d at 1359–62, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094–97 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 24. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1653 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (commenting that the patentee’s right to receive 
royalty payments negates the claim of irreparable injury by the patent infringement). 
 25. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 26. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.27 and In re 
Alappat.28  In In re Bilski, the court harkened back to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson, which 
“enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is 
tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application 
of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle 
itself.”29  Applying that test, known as the 
“machine-or-transformation” test, a process is patent-eligible under  
§ 101 if it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or it transforms 
an article into a different state or thing.30
The Federal Circuit’s decision left many questions open to future 
cases.  The court, for example, did not set limits of how machine 
implementation of a process may affect patent-eligibility and did not 
specify “whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a 
process claim to a particular machine.”31  The implications of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision on patent applicants and patent holders 
will emerge in the courts—including perhaps the Supreme Court—in 
2009 and beyond. 
4. Gorham Co. v. White 
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit changed 
the standard for determining when a design patent is infringed.32  In 
a unanimous en banc decision, the Federal Circuit aided design 
patent plaintiffs by abandoning the Federal Circuit’s requirement 
that plaintiffs show the “point of novelty” prong; instead, the Federal 
Circuit held that design patent plaintiffs need to meet only the 
“ordinary observer” test,33 first established by the Supreme Court in 
1871 in Gorham Co. v. White.34
A design patent covers the ornamental, rather than the useful, 
aspects of a product.  The “ordinary observer” test from Gorham 
defines infringement of design patents in terms of whether “in the 
eye of an ordinary observer . . . two designs are substantially the 
same,” thereby deceiving the observer and “inducing him to purchase 
 
 27. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 28. 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 29. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 30. Id. at 955, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 31. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 32. 543 F.3d 665, 678, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting the point of novelty test after much discussion and analysis of earlier case 
law).
 33. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 34. 81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
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one supposing it to be the other.”35  The “ordinary observer” test thus 
establishes a standard for design patent infringement similar to the 
“likelihood of confusion” standard for trademark-infringement 
cases.36
Over time, however, the Federal Circuit added an additional “point 
of novelty” requirement.  A design patent plaintiff now had to prove 
not only substantial similarity under Gorham’s “ordinary observer” 
test, but also that the accused device contained “substantially the 
same points of novelty that distinguished the patented design from 
the prior art.”37  The “point of novelty” test was intended to prevent a 
finding of infringement simply because two products generally 
looked similar, even though the accused device did not contain the 
novel design feature or features that allowed the patentee to obtain 
the patent.38  The “point of novelty” test, however, made proving 
infringement difficult in many cases because a design patent may 
have many points of novelty and a defendant could avoid 
infringement simply by omitting one of them.39
In Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit returned to Gorham, 
unanimously ruling that the “ordinary observer” is the sole test to 
determine design patent infringement.40  The Federal Circuit, 
however, tried to prevent findings of infringement based solely on 
similarity without reference to the novelty that justified the patent:  
the court required that that the ordinary observer in the Gorham test 
be someone with knowledge of the prior art.41  The Federal Circuit 
said that such familiarity with the prior art will allow a meaningful 
comparison of the accused devices with the patented claim.42  Such an 
approach, said the court, maintains the “focus on those aspects of a 
design which render the design different from prior art designs,”43 
 
 35. Id. at 528. 
 36. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 682, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671 (noting that 
an ordinary consumer would not be confused by the similarities between the two 
products).
 37. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 
1118, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 38. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 97, 109 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inserting a novelty requirement into previous 
infringement tests). 
 39. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 
(acknowledging the difficulty that the more points of novelty an item possesses, the 
easier it is for another producer to infringe the patent). 
 40. Id. at 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 41. Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 42. Id. at 674, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 43. Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (quoting Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. 
Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1928 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995)). 
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while at the same time avoiding “the risk of assigning exaggerated 
importance to small differences between the claimed and accused 
designs relating to an insignificant feature simply because that 
feature can be characterized as a point of novelty.”44
B. The U.S. Supreme Court:  Quanta Decision 
In June 2008, the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc.45 issued a unanimous decision that sought to clarify the 
law of patent exhaustion.46  Specifically, the Court held that the 
“authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent 
exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder 
from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.”47
The doctrine of patent exhaustion, or the “first-sale doctrine,” 
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates 
(“exhausts”) all patent rights to that item.48  That is, if a patentee sells 
a patented article to a purchaser, the purchaser has the rights like 
any owner of personal property over that particular article—the right 
to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it—unrestricted by 
any patent rights of the patentee.49  A subsequent downstream 
purchaser of the item, likewise, obtains the same rights to control its 
disposition.50
Before Quanta, the Federal Circuit had limited the 
patent-exhaustion doctrine in two significant ways.  In Mallinckrodt, 
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.,51 the Federal Circuit had held that exhaustion 
would be triggered—and a patentee’s infringement action barred—
only if the patentee’s sale of the patented item was unconditional.52  
Thus, under the so-called “conditional-sales doctrine,” patentees 
could, to avoid exhaustion, condition sales of patented articles on the 
purchaser agreeing to conditions, such as field-of-use or single-use 
restrictions.53  If the purchaser failed to follow those conditions, the 
patentee could enforce the conditions through a patent infringement 
 
 44. Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667–68. 
 45. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008). 
 46. Id. at 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 47. Id. at 2122, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 48. Id. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 49. ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS:  BLACK-LETTER LAW AND 
COMMENTARY § 31.6 (2007). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 52. Id. at 706, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178. 
 53. See id. at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180  (holding that prohibiting a 
purchaser from reusing a patented medical device was enforceable under patent 
law).   
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action (not just through an action under state contract law).54  Also, 
the Federal Circuit had previously held that a patentee’s sale of an 
item would exhaust the patentee’s rights only as to a patent’s 
apparatus claims; the patentee would retain all rights under its 
method claims.55
In Quanta, LG Electronics, Inc. (“LGE”) entered into a broad 
cross-license agreement with Intel, Inc.56  LGE licensed to Intel a 
large portfolio of patents covering aspects of computer systems.57  The 
license agreement authorized Intel to “make, use, sell (directly or 
indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of” Intel 
products that practice the LGE patents.58  The license agreement 
explicitly stated that it did not extend a license to any third party to 
combine licensed products with unlicensed products.59  In a separate 
master agreement, LGE also required Intel to inform its purchasers 
that Intel’s license from LGE did not authorize the purchasers to 
combine the licensed Intel products with unlicensed non-Intel 
products.60
Quanta Computer, Inc. purchased chips and chipsets from Intel 
and—despite Intel’s warning that Quanta had no license from LGE 
to combine Intel and non-Intel products—combined them with other 
components to make computers that infringed LGE’s system and 
method patents.61  LGE sued Quanta for infringement of its 
apparatus and method patents.62  Quanta raised a patent-exhaustion 
defense.  The district court and the Federal Circuit rejected the 
defense.63  The Federal Circuit held that the exhaustion defense did 
not apply to method claims and that, in any event, LGE’s license was 
limited and did not authorize the sale of Intel products for use with 
non-Intel products.64
On review via writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in a 
unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas.  The Supreme Court 
 
 54. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 55. See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924, 223 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1675 (2008) (“The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held [below] that the doctrine does not 
apply to method patents at all . . . .”). 
 56. 128 S. Ct. at 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 57. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 58. Id. at 2114, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 59. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 60. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77. 
 61. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77. 
 62. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77. 
 63. Id. at 2114–15, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 64. Id. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
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considered three questions:  (1) whether the patent-exhaustion 
doctrine applied to method patents; (2) to what extent a product 
must embody a patent to trigger exhaustion; and (3) what constitutes 
an authorized first sale sufficient to trigger exhaustion.65
The Court quickly dispensed with the first question, holding that 
method claims are exhaustible.66  The Court stated that it had long 
held that the exhaustion doctrine applies not only to product 
claims.67  Moreover, and perhaps more central to the Court’s 
thinking, Justice Thomas pointed out that “[e]liminating exhaustion 
for method patents would seriously undermine the exhaustion 
doctrine” because patent drafters could shield items from exhaustion 
by redrafting apparatus claims as method claims.68
The Court then considered “the extent to which a product must 
embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion.”69  The Court relied 
heavily on the test it articulated in United States v. Univis Lens Co.,70 a 
1942 decision that, the Court said, “governs this case.”71  In Univis, the 
Court held that the sale of a product that does not fully practice the 
patent at issue can still trigger patent exhaustion if its “only 
reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent and [it] 
‘embodie[s] essential features of [the] patented invention.’”72  The 
Court determined that the Intel chips and chipsets met this standard 
and triggered the exhaustion doctrine because they “all but 
completely practice the patent.”73  Although the chips and chipsets 
were not capable, by themselves, of infringing LGE’s patent claims, 
they nonetheless “substantially embodie[d] the patent because the 
only step necessary to practice the patent is the application of 
common processes or the addition of standard parts.”74  Everything 
inventive about each patent was embodied in the Intel chips and 
chipsets; infringement required only a “common and noninventive” 
final step.75
 
 65. Id. at 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 66. See id. at 2117, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678–79 (“Nothing in this Court’s 
approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that method patents 
cannot be exhausted.”). 
 67. See id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 
316 U.S. 241, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 
309 U.S. 436, 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 614 (1940)). 
 68. See id. at 2117–18, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 69. Id. at 2118, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 70. 316 U.S. 241, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 404 (1942). 
 71. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2119, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 72. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (third alteration in original) (citing Univis, 
316 U.S. at 249–51, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 407). 
 73. Id. at 2120, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 74. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 75. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
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Finally, the Court considered whether Intel’s sale of products to 
Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights.76  The Court noted that 
exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder, 
but the Court found that Intel’s sales to Quanta were authorized.77  
Notwithstanding Intel’s obligation under the master agreement that 
it notify purchasers that they did not have a license to combine 
licensed Intel products with unlicensed non-Intel products, the Court 
found it dispositive that nothing in the license agreement restricted 
Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who 
intended to combine them with non-Intel parts.78  The Court said that 
the license agreement did not condition Intel’s authority to sell its 
products on whether Intel gave, or Quanta complied with, the notice 
required under the master agreement.79  In short, “[n]o conditions 
limited Intel’s authority to sell products substantially embodying the 
patents.”80
The Court did remark in a footnote that, although the 
patent-exhaustion doctrine prevented LGE from asserting its patent 
rights against Quanta, “the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta 
does not necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights.”81  The Court 
“express[ed] no opinion on whether contract damages might be 
available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent 
damages.”82
Some commentators have suggested that, in the wake of Quanta, a 
patentee may try to retain patent-law remedies by imposing, in license 
agreements with manufacturers, conditions on the manufacturers’ 
authority to sell patented items.83  The patentee could then argue that 
sales in violation of those conditions were unauthorized and that 
patent exhaustion would not restrict the patentee’s remedies.84
Quanta did not directly address the continued viability of the 
Federal Circuit’s conditional-sales doctrine, which, as noted above, 
allows patentees to enforce, through the patent laws, conditions on 
 
 76. Id. at 2121, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 77. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 78. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 79. Id. at 2121–22, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 80. Id. at 2122, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 81. Id. at 2122 n.7, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 n.7 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 n.7. 
 83. See David J. Cavanaugh & Owen K. Allen, High Court Sees a Lot More Exhaustion, 
LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2008, at 14–15 (noting that, in the wake of Quanta, “patent law 
now provides less certain protection for patentees' efforts to control products after 
they are sold,” and advising patentees that they would be well advised to take care to 
ensure that “downstream rights are preserved to the fullest extent” in future 
licensing agreements).  
 84. See id. 
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direct purchasers’ use of patented items.  Although the Solicitor 
General had broadly asked the Supreme Court to reject the Federal 
Circuit’s conditional-sales precedent,85 the Supreme Court did not 
directly address the issue or even mention the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Mallinckrodt, instead focusing on Intel’s status as a licensee 
whose sales of the patented item were unrestricted by LGE’s license 
agreement. 
C. The Executive Branch:  The Rules Promulgated by the U.S. Patent 
 and Trademark Office 
In 2008, the most significant development, with regard to United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO” or “PTO”) rules, 
concerned rules published by the USPTO on August 21, 2007.86  
These rules would have made a number of controversial revisions 
relating to patent prosecution.  Two key aspects of the revised rules 
involved limitations on the number of continuation applications and 
the number of claims in an application.87  In particular, the revised 
rules provided that an applicant seeking to file more than two 
continuation or continuation-in-part applications, or more than one 
request for continued examination, must present a showing as to why 
an amendment, argument, or evidence sought to be entered could 
not have been previously submitted.88  The revised rules also required 
an applicant to file an examination support document covering all of 
the claims in any application containing more than five independent 
claims or twenty-five total claims.89
On October 31, 2007, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia preliminarily enjoined the USPTO from 
putting its new patent prosecution rules into effect.90  On April 1, 
2008, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
and voided the USPTO’s final rules (“Final Rules”) in the two 
consolidated cases, Tafas v. Dudas and SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. 
Dudas.91  The court determined that the rules were “‘not in 
 
 85. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at  
18–24, 26–30, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2009) (No. 06-937). 
 86. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2008).  For background 
information on the rules adopted in 2007, see generally 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 
21, 2007). 
 87. 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716–44 (Aug. 21, 2007). 
 88. Id. at 46,719–20. 
 89. Id. at 46,721–22. 
 90. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (E.D. Va. 
2007). 
 91. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (E.D. Va. 
2008). 
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accordance with law’ and ‘in excess of [the] statutory jurisdiction 
[and] authority’” of the USPTO.92  Contrary to the USPTO’s 
arguments, Senior Judge Cacheris found that the Final Rules were 
substantive in nature and thus beyond the rulemaking power of the 
USPTO.93  While the USPTO argued that the rules fell within their 
rulemaking authority and were procedural in nature, the court found 
that the Final Rules were not procedural rules and did not relate only 
to application processing.94  Instead, the Final Rules were found to be 
“substantive rules that change existing law and alter the rights of 
applicants such as [GlaxoSmithKline] and Tafas under the Patent 
Act.”95  The rules “constitute a drastic departure from the terms of the 
Patent Act as they are presently understood.”96  This case was 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, and oral arguments were heard on 
December 5, 2008.97
Unrelated USPTO rules became effective on September 15, 2008.98  
These rules clarified that “[r]egistration as a patent practitioner does 
not itself entitle an individual to practice before the Office in 
trademark matters.”99  The rules also stated that, as before, any party 
presenting any paper to the USPTO is certifying that the statements 
made in such paper, to the best of the party’s knowledge, are true, 
and that such paper is not being submitted frivolously or for any 
improper purpose.100  The new rules extended this certification to all 
papers presented to a hearing officer in a disciplinary proceeding.101  
Furthermore, while violations of this section may “jeopardize the 
probative value of the paper,” under the new rules, they no longer 
threaten the validity of an entire application or of any issued patents 
or registered trademarks.102  The old rule (37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(1)) 
stated that with the presentation of any paper to the USPTO, the 
party presenting such paper was certifying that, to the best of the 
party’s knowledge, all statements made therein were true, and that 
 
 92. Id. at 811, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006)). 
 93. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 94. Id. at 813, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
 95. Id. at 814, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
 96. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
 97. Digital Recording of Oral Argument, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed. 
Cir. Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2008-
1352.mp3. 
 98. Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,650 (Aug. 14, 2008) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 41). 
 99. Id. at 47,670 (revising 37 C.F.R. § 11.14(a) (2008)). 
 100. Id. at 47,652. 
 101. Id. at 47,653. 
 102. Id. 
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violations of the rule “may jeopardize the validity of the application 
or document, or the validity or enforceability of any patent, 
trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom.”103  The 
new rule (37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(1)) states that violations of this rule 
“may jeopardize the probative value of the paper.”104  The new rules 
also govern the conduct of investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings before the USPTO.105  The rules establish the 
disciplinary jurisdiction of the USPTO and establish explicit grounds 
for discipline.106
On June 10, 2008, the USPTO published new rules regarding the 
formatting and content of appeal briefs.107  These rules, which were 
set to take effect on December 10, 2008, were delayed pending review 
by the Office of Management and Budget.108
D. The Legislative Branch:  The Patent Reform Act of 2007 
 and the Patent Reform Act of 2008 
At the beginning of 2008, congressional patent reform appeared 
imminent.  On September 7, 2007, the House of Representatives 
easily passed House Bill 1908, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, with a 
vote of 220 (ayes) to 175 (nays).109  A somewhat similar reform bill in 
the Senate, Senate Bill 1145, had already passed the Senate’s 
Committee on the Judiciary on July 19, 2007.110  At the end of 2007, 
Senator Patrick Leahy, the sponsor of Senate Bill 1145, encouraged 
the House and Senate to reach a compromise in early 2008 with “the 
goal of favorable Senate action as early as the floor schedule permits” 
on a patent reform package.111  On January 24, 2008, Senate Bill 1145 
was placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar.112
The possibility of passing Senate Bill 1145 disappeared in 2008, 
however, after facing considerable opposition.  Opponents of the 
bill’s provisions included the USPTO,113 the Bush Administration,114 
 
 103. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(1) (2008). 
 104. 73 Fed. Reg. at 47,653. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 73 Fed. Reg. 32,938 (June 10, 2008). 
 108. 73 Fed. Reg. 74,972–01 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
 109. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 110. S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 111. 153 CONG. REC. S15898, S15899 (Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 112. S. 1145. 
 113. Donna Young, FDA, Congress To Jointly Form Follow-on Biologics Proposal, 
BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 11, 2008.  This article reported on the media statement 
made by Jon Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property at the 
USPTO, on Feb. 5, 2008.  Id.  In his statement, Mr. Dudas claimed that the reform 
package “undermines innovation, particularly in the damages provision” and would 
be damaging to the biotech industry, universities, and small inventors.  Id. 
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major labor unions (such as the AFL-CIO),115 universities,116 and 
representatives from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries, among others.117  At the end of 2008, Congress ultimately 
proved unable to institute patent reform. 
 
 114. Letter from Carlos M. Gutierrez, Sec’y of Commerce, to Patrick Leahy, U.S. 
Senator (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/ 
110/S1145Apr0308.pdf.  In the letter, Mr. Gutierrez expressed the Bush 
Administration’s position on patent reform efforts.  The Administration expressed 
strong opposition to changes in the doctrine of inequitable conduct that would 
lessen the penalties for such actions without enactment of applicant quality 
submissions designed to improve application quality.  Id. at 1.  In addition, the 
Administration stated its “overriding concern” regarding Congress’s revisions to the 
damages statutes, in particular, decreasing the discretion granted to judges in 
awarding damages.  Id. at 2; see also Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant 
Sec’y of Legislation and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator 
(Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/ 
110/S1145020408.pdf (detailing opposition to damages provisions in S. 1145, as 
reported on January 24, 2008, as well as other areas of concern). 
 115. See Letter from Bldg. & Constr. Trade Dep’t et al. to U.S. Senator (Feb. 6, 
2008), available at http://www.popa.org/pdf/misc/reform1-06feb2008.pdf (voicing 
opposition of labor unions to provisions on damages, post-grant opposition 
proceedings, and mandatory publication of applications). 
 116. See, e.g., Letter from Abbot et al. to John Cornyn, U.S. Senator (Jan. 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter Abbot letter], available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/ 
patent_docs/files/cornyn_letter.pdf (stating the opinions of Texas employers and 
U.S. patent holders opposing damages, post-grant opposition, and venue provisions, 
among others); Letter from Lee T. Todd, Jr., President, Univ. of Kentucky, et al. to 
Mitch McConnell & Jim Bunning, U.S. Senators (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Todd 
letter], available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/ 
mcconnellbunning_letter.pdf (expressing various parties’ opinions against damages, 
post-grant opposition, venue, and applicant quality provisions). 
 117. See, e.g., Cornyn letter, supra note 116; Todd letter, supra note 116; see also 
Letter from Adroit Med. et al. to Lamar Alexander & Bob Corker, U.S. Senators (Jan. 
29, 2008), available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/ 
files/alexandercorker_letter.pdf (noting concern with damages provisions and 
post-grant opposition procedures of S. 1145); Letter from AstraZeneca Pharm. LP et 
al. to Arlen Specter & Robert P. Casey, Jr., U.S. Senators, (Jan. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/spectercasey_letter.pdf 
(protesting proposed provisions relating to damages, post-grant opposition, 
inequitable conduct, and applicant quality submissions); Letter from Night 
Operations Sys. et al. to Henry Reid & John Ensign, U.S. Senators (Jan. 23, 2008), 
available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/reidensign_ 
letter.pdf (arguing against damages, post-grant opposition, and venue provisions, 
among others); Letter from Abbott et al. to Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator (Jan. 
22, 2008), available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/ 
hutchinson_letter.pdf (disagreeing with damages, post-grant opposition, and 
inequitable conduct provisions); Letter from AbTech Indus., Inc. et al. to John 
McCain & Jon Kyl, U.S. Senators (Jan. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/mccainkyl_letter.pdf 
(same); Letter from Amaix et al. to Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator (Dec. 18, 2007), 
available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/allard_letter.pdf 
(same); Letter from The Coca-Cola Co. et al. to Saxby Chambliss & Johnny Isakson, 
U.S. Senators (Dec. 12, 2007), available at  http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/ 
patent_docs/files/chamblissisakson_letter.pdf (same); MEDICAL DEVICE 
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007 WILL STIFLE 
INNOVATION IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at 
http://www.medicaldevices.org/public/documents/MDMAPatentReform.pdf 
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Congress has been actively proposing patent reform legislation 
since at least 2005.118  The reform efforts are designed to institute the 
most substantial change in the patent laws since the passage of the 
Patent Act in 1952.119  For example, the goals of reform stated during 
the 2008 introduction of Senate Bill 1145 were lofty: 
(i) to improve patent quality and the patent application process; 
(ii) to improve and clarify several aspects of patent litigation, 
including the creation of a less expensive, more expeditious 
administrative alternative to litigating patent validity issues; and 
(iii) to make the United States’ patent system, where it is useful to 
do so, more consistent with patent systems throughout the rest of 
the industrialized world.120
To accomplish these goals, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, as 
proposed in the Senate in 2008 and passed by the House in 2007, 
provided for the United States to convert from a first-to-invent system 
to a first-to-file system, thereby harmonizing the U.S. patent system 
with the rest of the patent systems in the world.121  In addition, both 
the Senate and House reform bills would have created an 
administrative system for challenging patents more quickly and 
cheaply after their issuance (a “post-grant opposition” proceeding).122
The proposed reform also affected the calculation of reasonable 
royalty damages.123  House Bill 1908 required that the royalty be 
 
(expressing concern over apportionment of damages, post-grant opposition 
proceedings, PTO rule-making authority, and inequitable conduct provisions). 
 118. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 119. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, pt. 1, at 4 (2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The 
time has come for Congress to reconsider the 50 year old patent statute and how it is 
currently being applied.”).  As Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy noted shortly 
after entry of S. 1145 in 2008, 
The last time the patent system was significantly changed, the structure of 
DNA had not been discovered; gasoline was around 27 cents a gallon; and we 
had not yet sent a man to the moon. . . . [W]e are living in the Information 
Age, and the products and processes that are being patented are changing as 
quickly as the times themselves. 
Orrin Hatch & Patrick Leahy, Editorial, Meaningful Patent Reform, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2008, at A19; see also 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 120. S. REP. NO. 110-259, pt. 1, at 5. 
 121. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2008). 
 122. H.R. 1908 § 6; S. 1145 § 5.  H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 proposed different post-
grant opposition procedures.  The House bill had a first window review period 
during which the patent would not be entitled to a presumption of validity and the 
burden of proof would be that of preponderance of the evidence rather than clear 
and convincing evidence.  H.R. 1908 § 6(f)(1).  The Senate bill proposed two 
windows.  S. 1145 § 5(c)(1).  A patent would not be entitled to a presumption of 
validity in the first window and the standard of proof would be preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id.  For the second window, the presumption of validity would exist and 
invalidity would require proof by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
 123. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); S. 1145 § 4(a). 
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calculated by apportionment or the entire market value rule; only as 
a last resort could the fact finder use the familiar Georgia Pacific Corp. 
v. United States Plywood Corp.124 factors used to calculate a reasonable 
royalty.125  In Senate Bill 1145, as introduced in 2008, reasonable 
royalties were to be calculated using the entire market value rule, an 
established market royalty, or if neither of those provisions were 
appropriate, through an apportionment method.126
A variety of other changes rounded out the reform packages of the 
Patent Act of 2007, including modification of the current law relating 
to the best mode requirement,127 inequitable conduct,128 and venue,129 
as well as the creation of additional disclosure obligations for patent 
applicants in an effort to increase the quality of patents.130
Patent reform has generated a number of divergent views on the 
best ways to improve the current patent-law system.  The most 
recognized competing factions are technology industries, such as 
software and semiconductor developers, and the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries. 
In very general terms, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries typically favor reform that strengthens the rights of the 
patent holder.  According to researchers, these industries tend to 
have only a few patents that cover key inventions, and innovation is 
extremely expensive compared to the cost of copying.131  As a result, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies seek to protect their 
patent rights by discouraging infringement and minimizing 
mechanisms for challenging their patents.132  The biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical sector has therefore primarily opposed efforts by 
 
 124. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 125. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) at 238 (listing fourteen factors taken from leading cases which can be used to 
help determine the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license). 
 126. S. 1145 § 4(a). 
 127. H.R. 1908 § 13. 
 128. H.R. 1908 § 12(b); S. 1145 § 12. 
 129. H.R. 1908 § 11(a); S. 1145 § 8(a). 
 130. H.R. 1908 §12 (a); S. 1145 § 11. 
 131. See Wendy Schact, Patent Reform:  Issues in the Biomedical and Software Industries, 
27 BIOTECH. L. REP. 153, 156 (2008) (noting that patents could be important to the 
pharmaceutical industry due the ease in which such products can be replicated). 
 132. See supra note 117 (listing letters from pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies to members of Congress advocating for the protection of their patent 
rights in proposed legislation); Donna Young, Analysts Say Patent Reform Will Harm 
Biotech, Add Costs, BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 15, 2008.  Biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies also favor lessening the penalty associated with 
inequitable conduct given the time and expense associated with litigating such 
claims; congressional attempts to merely codify existing inequitable conduct law have 
met with resistance from these groups.  Id. 
  
766 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
Congress to reduce damage awards, which act to deter 
infringement.133  In addition, post-grant opposition proceedings are 
viewed unfavorably by the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industry given that the goal of such proceedings is to make 
invalidation of patents faster and less burdensome to patent 
challengers.134
The high-tech industry, on the other hand, faces different 
problems.  For this sector, companies tend to have a large number of 
patents that cover relatively minor changes to existing technologies.135  
The products sold by such companies are the result of a number of 
prior patented inventions.136  As a result, technology companies are 
concerned with facing damages for infringement that are based on 
the sale of the total product rather than the contribution to that 
product made by the (typically small and relatively insignificant) 
infringing inventive portion of the product.137  To combat the 
problems of “overcompensation” for infringement, technology 
companies favor apportionment of damages and other methods of 
cabining the potential damages awards in infringement suits.138  In 
addition, because of the speed at which inventions in the high-tech 
industry become obsolete, technology companies also favor rapid, 
streamlined systems for invalidating patents, such as administrative 
post-grant opposition proceedings with lower burdens of proof.139
Despite the contentiousness of patent reform, there is continued 
interest in 2009 for the reforms proposed by House Bill 1908 and 
 
 133. Young, supra note 132. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Schact, supra note 131, at 158 (reporting that new products in software 
development can embody numerous patentable inventions). 
 136. Id. at 159. 
 137. See Coalition for Patent Fairness Thinks Patent Reform Is Near, 
http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2008/04/02/coalition-for-patent-fairness-thinks-
patent-reform-is-near/ (Apr. 2, 2008) (noting that high-tech companies would like to 
see a lessening of nuisance suits against their companies); see also Grant Gross, 
Microsoft Asserts Patents, Wants Weaker System, PC WORLD, May 7, 2007, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/131984/microsoft_asserts_patents_wants_weaker_s
ystem.html (reporting that Microsoft has argued against the ease in which patent 
holders can sue infringers resulting in the shut down of product lines which contain 
a small part of patented equipment or code), available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/131984/microsoft_asserts_patents_wants_weaker_s
ystem.html; Coalition for Patent Fairness,, http://www.patentfairness.org/ 
learn/what/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (proposing that damage awards based on 
common sense standards should be part of comprehensive patent reform 
legislation). 
 138. See Gross, supra note 137 (discussing how proposed patent reform legislation, 
supported by Microsoft, would limit damages based on the number of patents within 
a product). 
 139. Id.   
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Senate Bill 1145.140  Along with Senate Bill 1145, a revised reform 
bill—the Patent Reform Act of 2008 (Senate Bill 3600)—was 
introduced to the Senate in the fall of 2008 for consideration in 
2009.141  Like the Patent Reform Act of 2007, the Patent Reform Act 
of 2008 proposes changes to damages law142 and creates a post-grant 
review proceeding.143  Elimination of the first-to-invent system144 and 
even the “on-sale” and “public use” provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 are 
proposed.145  Other revisions in Senate Bill 3600 would affect venue,146 
inequitable conduct,147 and applicant submission standards.148
II. DECISIONS RELATING TO JURISDICTION AND ASSERTABILITY 
 OF CLAIMS 
A. Justiciability 
1. Standing 
Before a federal court may decide the merits of a case, a plaintiff 
must first establish that he or she has standing to sue.149  A patentee’s 
standing to sue for patent infringement is derived from the Patent 
Act,150 which states that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action 
for infringement of his patent.”151
 
 140. Obama Supports Patent Reform But Bill May Face Delays, DRUG INDUS. DAILY, Nov. 
13, 2008, http://www.fdanews.com/newsletter/article?issueId=12140&articleId= 
112187. 
 141. S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); 154 CONG. REC. S9982 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (introducing S. 3600 in 2008 “to allow Senators and 
interested parties the time to consider these alternatives as we prepare for the patent 
reform debate in the next Congress.”) 
 142. S. 3600 § 4(a).  The damages provision in S. 3600 focuses on strengthening 
the “gatekeeper” role of the court.  154 CONG. REC. S9983 (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
While the damages section of S. 3600 codifies the principle that all relevant factors 
should be considered in reaching a reasonable royalty (S. 3600 § 4(a)), the 
legislation also provides that certain methods of calculating reasonable royalties, 
such as standardized measures of damages (“rules of thumb”) and royalties paid on 
comparable patents, should only be considered in limited circumstances.  Id. 
 143. S. 3600 § 5. 
 144. S. 3600 § 2(a). 
 145. S. 3600 § 2(b). 
 146. S. 3600 § 8. 
 147. S. 3600 § 11. 
 148. S. 3600 § 10. 
 149. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (explaining that standing 
ensures both the party and the dispute are properly before the court and surveying 
Article III and prudential standing requirements). 
 150. 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); see also Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo 
Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1376, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(determining that appellees had standing to sue as licensees of six U.S. patents). 
 151. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
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In Akazawa v. Link New Technology International, Inc.,152 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a party purporting to own 
patent rights transferred by way of intestacy has standing to sue.153  
Any assignment of a patent or an interest in a patent must be in 
writing.154  The inventor of the patent at issue in Akazawa, however, 
died intestate without a written will.155  The inventor’s heirs 
subsequently assigned their interest in the patent to a third party, 
who then assigned all rights to Akira.156  When Akira later brought 
suit against Link New Technology, Link moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the initial intestate transfer was not a 
valid assignment of patent rights.157  Link reasoned—and the district 
court agreed—that because no valid assignment had occurred 
ownership of the patent remained vested in the estate and Akira had 
no standing to sue.158
Akira appealed, and the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s 
decision.159  The court observed that 35 U.S.C. § 261 is not the only 
method for transferring ownership of a patent.160  A change of 
ownership may also be dictated by operation of law.161  Accordingly, 
when a patent owner dies, the jurisdiction’s law of intestacy will 
determine who then owns the patent.162
Moreover, because state law typically governs patent ownership 
rather than federal patent law, ownership of the patent at issue 
required interpretation of Japanese intestacy law.163  The Federal 
Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the trial court with 
instructions to interpret Japanese law to determine whether Akira 
had standing to bring suit.164
The Federal Circuit also had occasion in 2008 to address the 
reoccurring issue of a patent co-owner’s standing to bring suit where 
the co-owner has failed to join all other owners of the patent.  In 
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,165 Lucent brought suit against 
Gateway, Dell, and Microsoft for infringement of patents relating to 
 
 152. 520 F.3d 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 153. Id. at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 154. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
 155. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 156. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 157. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 158. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 159. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 160. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281. 
 161. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281. 
 162. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282. 
 163. Id. at 1357–58, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282. 
 164. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
 165. 543 F.3d 710, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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MP3 sound encoding.166  Lucent had developed the patents while 
party to a joint development agreement with a German company, 
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft.167  Lucent, however, had failed to join 
Fraunhofer to the suit.168
After the jury found the defendants liable for infringement, the 
court set aside the verdict and granted the defendants judgment as a 
matter of law.169  The court found that, as a matter of law, Fraunhofer 
was a co-owner of one of the patents-in-suit as a result of the joint 
development agreement.170  Because a patent co-owner must join all 
other owners in order to sue for patent infringement, Lucent lacked 
standing to assert claims related to this patent against the 
defendants.171
Lucent appealed, arguing in part that the joint development 
agreement impermissibly attempted to assign joint ownership to only 
some of the claims.172  Because a patentee may only assign title to an 
entire patent, such a partial assignment would be impermissible.173
The Federal Circuit rejected Lucent’s interpretation of the joint 
development agreement and affirmed the district court’s ruling.174  
The court noted that while “patent rights cannot be split between 
claims,” an inventor of less than all of the claims in a patent is 
nevertheless a co-owner of all claims in the patent.175  Because Lucent 
had chosen to file its patent applications in a manner that 
contradicted Lucent’s interpretation of the development agreement, 
Fraunhofer was a co-owner of the patent at issue notwithstanding the 
terms of that agreement.176  Accordingly, Lucent lacked standing to 
assert the patent absent the presence of Fraunhofer.177
A patentee’s failure to join all co-owners may not always be an error 
of its own making.  In DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced 
Media, L.P.,178 a co-inventor of the patent at issue developed the 
invention while covered by an employment agreement with 
Schlumberger Technology Corporation (“Schlumberger”).179  This 
 
 166. Id. at 713, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 167. Id. at 714–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483–84. 
 168. Id. at 721, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 169. Id. at 712, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 170. Id. at 716, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 171. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 172. Id. at 720, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 173. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 174. Id. at 722, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 175. Id. at 721, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 176. Id. at 722, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 177. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 178. 517 F.3d 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 179. Id. at 1286, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
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employment agreement purported to “grant and assign” to 
Schlumberger all rights to inventions falling within the scope of 
inventor’s employment.180  The invention at issue, however, related to 
the computer simulation of sporting events while Schlumberger was 
involved in oil wells.181  When the patent owner, DDB Technologies, 
L.L.C., later sought to enforce the patent against MLB Advanced 
Media, L.P. (“MLBAM”), MLBAM acquired from Schlumberger all 
rights and interests that it might have in the patent along with a 
retroactive license.182  MLBAM moved to dismiss the action, claiming 
that DDB had failed to join its purported co-owner, Schlumberger, 
for the portion of its claim covering the period leading up to the 
lawsuit and that DDB was legally precluded from suing its purported 
co-owner, MLBAM, for ongoing infringement.183  After finding that 
the co-inventor’s rights to the patent had been automatically divested 
at the time of invention by the employment agreement, the district 
court granted MLBAM’s motion.184
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed in part in a 
decision that touched on a number of issues relating to an employer’s 
ownership of a device invented during an employee’s time of 
employment.185  First, Judges Dyk and Clevenger, who made up the 
majority, determined that interpretation of a contract provision 
purporting to automatically assign a patent was a matter of federal, 
rather than state, law.186  Second, the court differentiated between 
those employment contracts that automatically grant all rights to 
future inventions187 and employment contracts that merely oblige the 
inventor to grant rights in the future.188  Third, the court determined 
that whether the patent at issue fell within the scope of the 
employment agreement was a matter of state law.189  Finally, the court 
applied Federal Circuit law in concluding that the plaintiff should be 
 
 180. Id. at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 181. Id. at 1287, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 182. Id. at 1288, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 183. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 184. Id. at 1288–89, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945–46. 
 185. Id. at 1289–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–50. 
 186. Id. at 1289–90, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–47. 
 187. Id. at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947; see also, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v. 
Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1512 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (finding that, in the contract at issue, the inventor agreed to grant, and did 
expressly grant, all rights in future inventions). 
 188. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947; see also, 
e.g., Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1581, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1513, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that where the contract provided that “all rights 
. . . ‘will be assigned’ by [inventor] to [client],” the contract merely obliged the 
inventor to grant rights in the future). 
 189. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
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permitted additional discovery on the issue of whether the patents 
fell within the scope of the employment agreement.190  The court 
therefore remanded for further discovery on this issue.191
In dissent, Judge Newman differed with the majority on a number 
of substantive and procedural issues.192  According to Judge Newman, 
the majority had engaged in “grievous overreaching . . . contrary to 
law and precedent” in finding that federal law controlled the 
interpretation of the contract merely because standing was 
involved.193  Judge Newman argued that “[s]tate statutory and 
common law have long been recognized as governing the ownership 
of patent property.”194  Accordingly, Judge Newman wrote, “There is 
no authority for preempting state law, no authority for eliminating 
state law principles of property ownership, no authority for divesting 
state authority to determine rights and obligations set by employment 
contract, no authority for rejecting the extensive state precedent of 
law and procedure governing these issues.”195
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority’s holding that DDB 
could not forcibly join Schlumberger.196  Judge Newman stated that 
not only does the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 
permitting involuntary joinder make no exception for patent cases,197 
but that it has long been established that involuntary joinder may be 
used in an infringement action.198
Finally, Judge Newman was critical of the majority on the issue of 
whether the employment contract applied as a matter for 
“jurisdictional discovery.”199  Treating this issue as jurisdictional, 
according to Judge Newman, directly contradicted the Supreme 
Court’s recent admonition in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.200 that the 
 
 190. Id. at 1292, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 191. Id. at 1293–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949–50. 
 192. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 1296, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 194. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 195. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 196. Id. at 1297–98, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53. 
 197. Id. at 1297, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2) 
(“If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person 
be made a party.  A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a 
defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.”). 
 198. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1297–98, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53 
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 
U.S. 459, 468–69 (1926); Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 223 (1874). 
 199. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1298, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
 200. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
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Federal Circuit should stop treating threshold facts as jurisdictional 
unless directed otherwise by Congress.201
Standing issues may also arise when the plaintiff is a licensee, 
rather than the patent owner.202  In order to have constitutional 
standing to bring an infringement action, the plaintiff must either be 
the patent owner or an exclusive licensee.203  “To be an exclusive 
licensee for standing purposes, a party must have received not only 
the right to practice the invention within a given territory, but also 
the patentee’s express or implied promise that others shall be 
excluded from practicing the invention within that territory.”204
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.,205 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s denial of leave to amend to add a licensee, MEI, as 
a co-plaintiff to Mars’s patent infringement complaint.206  Mars 
claimed that MEI had an exclusive license to practice the patents-in-
suit in the United States and therefore had standing to sue.207  Mars, 
however, had also granted a second subsidiary a license to practice 
the patents-in-suit anywhere in the world.208  Accordingly, MEI could 
not possibly have had an implied, de facto exclusive license and 
therefore could not be joined as a co-plaintiff in the suit.209
The Federal Circuit also determined that the history of licenses to 
the patents-at-issue raised additional standing issues.  For a portion of 
the time period for which Mars sought damages, Mars had 
transferred to MEI title to the patent.210  The plaintiff in an 
infringement action, however, “must be the person or persons in 
whom the legal title to the patent resided at the time of the 
 
 201. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1298–99, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (observing that when a 
court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction because a threshold fact has not been 
established the result is an unrefined disposition that should not have a precedential 
effect). 
 202. See, e.g., Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1341, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that exclusive license, the exclusive right 
to license, and the right to sublicense are important aspects of exclusionary rights); 
Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 
1937 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that without joinder of patentee, a licensee 
normally does not have standing to sue). 
 203. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1367, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1076, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 653 (2008).  
 204. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 205. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 206. Id. at 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 207. Id. at 1367–68, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84. 
 208. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 209. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 210. Because neither Mars nor MEI challenged the district court’s determination 
that MEI lacked standing for this period, the Federal Circuit did not address the 
issue on appeal.  Id. at 1372 n.4, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086 n.4. 
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infringement.”211  Although Mars lacked title for a portion of the 
relevant period, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed an earlier decision 
that a patentee who has transferred legal title to another during the 
time of infringement can under some circumstances cure the 
resulting jurisdictional defect by reacquiring title to the patent before 
final judgment.212  Here, Mars and MEI had executed an agreement 
that the district court interpreted as transferring title back to Mars.213  
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Applying New York contract law, the 
court determined that MEI only purported to transfer back to Mars 
“the right to sue for past infringement.”214  Under established Federal 
Circuit precedent, however, such an attempted assignment does not 
convey either title or standing in an infringement action.215  
Accordingly, Mars itself lacked standing for the period in which it 
had transferred ownership to MEI.216
2. Mootness 
The exercise of federal judicial power pursuant to Article III of the 
United States Constitution requires the existence of an ongoing case 
or controversy.217  “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 
them.”218
In Samsung Electronics Co. v. Rambus, Inc.,219 the Federal Circuit had 
an opportunity to address the effect an offer for full relief has on a 
court’s power to entertain a claim for attorney fees.220  Samsung 
sought a declaratory judgment “that the patents at issue were invalid, 
unenforceable, and not infringed.”221  After losing a procedural 
motion, Rambus filed covenants not to sue, dropped its 
counterclaims, and offered to pay Samsung’s attorney fees in order to 
avoid having the court publish adverse findings from an earlier, 
related case.222  Samsung refused this offer for full relief and persisted 
 
 211. Id. at 1370, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (quoting Crown Die & Tool Co. v. 
Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923)). 
 212. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084–85. 
 213. Id. at 1363–64, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079–80. 
 214. Id. at 1371–72, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 215. Id. at 1371, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086 (citing Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 
499 F.3d 1332, 1342, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 216. Id. at 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 217. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also Liner v. Jafco, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (noting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction to review 
moot cases). 
 218. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
 219. 523 F.3d 1374, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 220. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 221. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 222. Id. at 1377, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06. 
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with its motion for attorney fees, which the trial court denied.223  
Although the court denied the only relief Samsung sought, it 
nevertheless found the case exceptional and issued the unpublished 
spoliation findings from the previous litigation.224
The Federal Circuit vacated this order and remanded with 
instructions to dismiss the case.225  According to the court, “An offer 
for full relief moots a claim for attorney fees.”226  The court explained 
that exceptionality is not a separate sanction, but rather is a 
precondition for the imposition of attorney fees.227  Accordingly, 
“[a]fter Rambus offered the entire amount of attorney fees in 
dispute, the case became moot.”228  Because there was no longer an 
active controversy, the district court’s writing constituted an 
impermissible advisory opinion that the Federal Circuit was required 
to vacate.229
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over “all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”230  Although broad, this grant does not relieve the 
federal courts from the obligation to ensure that subject matter 
jurisdiction exists in any particular case.231
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,232 the Supreme 
Court established a two-part test for determining whether federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a patent case pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).233  Under this test, a court must ask whether a 
well-pleaded complaint establishes either that:  (1) “federal patent 
law creates the cause of action”; or (2) “the plaintiff’s right to relief 
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal 
patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the 
well-pleaded claims.”234
 
 223. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 224. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 225. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 226. Id. at 1379, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 227. Id. at 1379–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 228. Id. at 1380, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 229. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 230. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503–16 
(2006) (distinguishing between the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts and 
the essential elements of a federal claim for relief and ultimately holding that, if 
Congress did not make a statutory limitation jurisdictional, the courts should not 
treat it as such). 
 231. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (2006). 
 232. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988). 
 233. Id. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113. 
 234. Id., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113. 
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The answer to the question of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over a patent dispute will often be clear.235  In ExcelStor 
Technology, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH,236 the plaintiff brought an 
action in federal district court claiming fraud and breach of contract 
in relation to a patent licensing agreement.237  Although these claims 
arose under state law of contract and fraud, the plaintiff argued that 
the federal court’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction was triggered 
by the plaintiff’s citation to the “patent exhaustion” doctrine.238  The 
district court disagreed and dismissed the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, stating that patent exhaustion is a defense 
to patent infringement and not a cause of action sufficient to confer 
federal jurisdiction over the case.239  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
applied the Christianson two-part test for determining whether 
jurisdiction exists under § 1338 and affirmed, stating that ExcelStor’s 
claims did not “arise under” the patent laws but merely invoked a 
defense to a hypothetical claim of patent infringement.240
A court, however, may sometimes find itself facing a close question 
of whether a certain threshold fact is (1) an element of the claim that 
must be established on the merits, or (2) a jurisdictional limitation 
on the court’s power to hear the controversy.241  Recently, in Arbaugh, 
the Supreme Court provided guidance for determining whether a 
threshold fact represents a jurisdictional limitation or whether it is 
simply an element of the claim:  “[W]hen Congress does not rank a 
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat 
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”242
The Federal Circuit first had opportunity to apply Arbaugh in 
2008.243  In Litecubes, L.L.C. v. Northern Lights Products, Inc.,244 the court 
 
 235. See, e.g., Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 24–25 (1913) (stating 
that the plaintiff “obviously . . . sued upon the patent law,” while also observing that 
“the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and 
therefore does determine whether he will bring a ‘suit arising under’ the patent or 
other law of the United States by his declaration or bill”); Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc., 
291 F.3d 1324, 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacating the 
trial court’s order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over an action 
for patent infringement). 
 236. 541 F.3d 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 237. Id. at 1375, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 238. Id. at 1375–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061–62. 
 239. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 240. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 241. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (“Whether a 
disputed matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally both) is 
sometimes a close question.” (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 
361 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 242. Id. at 515–16. 
 243. Cf. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. United States, 469 F.3d 968, 972–73 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (finding Arbaugh inapplicable). 
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addressed whether failure to prove that allegedly infringing activity 
took place in the United States divests the federal courts of subject 
matter jurisdiction over a patent infringement action.245  The 
Canadian defendant in Litecubes, GlowProducts.com 
(“GlowProducts”), imported novelty items from Chinese 
manufacturers for sale in North America, including the United 
States.246  The suit proceeded to trial, at which point the jury found 
GlowProducts liable for willful infringement.247
GlowProducts subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
its acts of infringement had occurred outside the United States and 
that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.248  The 
district court accepted GlowProducts’ characterization of the issue as 
jurisdictional, but denied the motion on the ground that sufficient 
evidence supported the finding that GlowProducts had imported the 
products into the United States.249
The Federal Circuit subsequently affirmed the denial of the motion 
to dismiss, but on different grounds than those that the district court 
found persuasive.250  Noting that “[t]here is no absolute rule 
prohibiting the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes,” the Federal 
Circuit explained that “[w]hether Congress did extend any particular 
statute to reach extraterritorial activity is simply a question of 
statutory interpretation.”251  Under the rule laid out by the Arbaugh 
Court, however, only those facts clearly identified by Congress as 
creating a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope count as 
jurisdictional.252  Congress had not so identified the location 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 271.253  Accordingly, the location of an 
allegedly infringing act is properly considered an element of the 
claim for patent infringement rather than a prerequisite for subject 
matter jurisdiction.254
 
 244. 523 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1753 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 245. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755. 
 246. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756. 
 247. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756. 
 248. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.  For GlowProducts to be liable for 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006), it had to have been shown to have 
either imported into the United States or made, used, offered for sale, or sold 
LiteCube’s invention in the United States.  Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1757. 
 249. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756–57. 
 250. Id. at 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762. 
 251. Id. at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760. 
 252. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516–17 (2006). 
 253. Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759. 
 254. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759–60.  Although Arbaugh provided a bright 
line answer to this issue, the Federal Circuit nevertheless engaged in an extensive 
discussion of “whether there is something unique about a limitation that determines 
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C. Declaratory Judgments 
1. The Federal Circuit’s declaratory judgment precedents post-MedImmune 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued several decisions applying the 
guidance set forth by the Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.255  In MedImmune, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension of suit” test256 and “set 
forth the correct standard for jurisdiction over a declaratory 
judgment action.”257  In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment, “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, 
[must] show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties 
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”258  “In short, ‘all the 
circumstances’ must show a controversy.”259
In Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc.,260 the Federal 
Circuit applied this “all the circumstances” test and reversed the 
district court’s grant of MOSAID’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction over Micron’s declaratory judgment 
action.261  Micron, a manufacturer of dynamic random access memory 
(“DRAM”), and its three largest competitors accounted for more than 
seventy-five percent of worldwide DRAM sales.262  Several years before 
Micron filed its declaratory judgment complaint, MOSAID, who 
owned several patents in the DRAM field, sent Micron a number of 
warning letters strongly encouraging Micron to take a license to these 
patents.263  When neither Micron nor its competitors took MOSAID 
up on its offer, MOSAID brought separate suits against two of 
Micron’s three major DRAM competitors and became involved in a 
declaratory judgment action with the third.264  All three cases settled 
when the DRAM manufacturers entered into licensing agreements 
 
the extraterritorial scope of a statute.”  Id. at 1363–66, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760–
62.  The court concluded there is not.  Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760. 
 255. 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007). 
 256. Id. at 132 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 n.11. 
 257. Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (establishing a standard for declaratory judgment). 
 258. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229; see also Micron,  
518 F.3d at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (confirming the standard established 
in MedImmune requiring that “all the circumstances” show a controversy). 
 259. Micron, 518 F.3d at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
 260. Id. at 897, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 261. Id. at 899, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
 262. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
 263. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
 264. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
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with MOSAID.265  MOSAID subsequently announced during an 
analyst conference call “its intent to return to court again soon on 
these patents promising to be ‘unrelenting in the assertion of [its] 
patent portfolio.’”266
Micron, the only remaining major DRAM manufacturer left for 
MOSAID to target, thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a declaration of non-infringement.267  The district court, in an 
order issued prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, 
found no reasonable apprehension of suit and dismissed the action.268
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the standard laid out in 
MedImmune and determined there was in fact an actual controversy 
between the parties:  MOSAID had threatened Micron, had sued 
each of the other leading DRAM chip manufacturers, and had 
recently made public statements that it intended to continue an 
aggressive litigation strategy.269
In Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc.,270 the Federal Circuit resolved a 
question it determined was left open in MedImmune.271  Prior to 
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit applied a two-prong test to determine 
the existence of declaratory judgment authority.272  Under this test: 
 There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the 
patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of 
the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement 
suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff 
which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by 
the declaratory judgment plaintiff with the intent to conduct such 
activity.273
Rather than viewing MedImmune as rejecting entirely this two-prong 
approach, the Cat Tech court found that only the first prong—
whether there is a reasonable apprehension of suit—had been 
overruled.274  The second prong, “whether there has been meaningful 
preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity,” continues to 
 
 265. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
 266. Id. at 900, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040. 
 267. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040. 
 268. Id. at 900, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040. 
 269. Id. at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
 270. 528 F.3d 871, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 271. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065. 
 272. Id. at 879, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. 
Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 273. Teva Pharms., 395 F.3d at 1332, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.  But see id. at 
1339–42, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1088, 1099–101 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Federal Circuit had never before required this test to be satisfied in order for there 
to be a justiciable case or controversy). 
 274. Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 879–80, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–71. 
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be an “important element” in determining whether jurisdiction exists 
to issue a declaratory judgment.275  The Cat Tech court confirmed that 
MedImmune requires a court to consider the “totality of 
circumstances,” but concluded that “[i]f a declaratory judgment 
plaintiff has not taken significant, concrete steps to conduct 
infringing activity, the dispute is neither ‘immediate’ nor ‘real’ and 
the requirements for justiciability have not been met.”276
The court accordingly asked “whether there had been ‘meaningful 
preparation’ to conduct potentially infringing activity,”277 and 
concluded there had been.278
First, Tubemaster had taken all possible steps towards 
manufacturing the devices at issue, generating AutoCAD drawings for 
each device to the point that the devices were ready for production 
once a customer order was received.279  Accordingly, the 
constitutional requirement of “immediacy” was met.280
Second, the court noted that whether a patent dispute is “real” “is 
often related to the extent to which the technology in question is 
‘substantially fixed’ as opposed to ‘fluid and indeterminate’ at the 
time declaratory relief is sought.”281  Because Tubemaster had taken 
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity to the point 
that it did not expect to make “substantial modifications” to its 
designs after the beginning of production, the court found the reality 
requirement satisfied.282
Cat Tech nevertheless argued that because Tubemaster had not yet 
disclosed or advertised the products to potential customers, no actual 
controversy yet existed.283  The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Although a 
lack of such activity may indicate a lack of “immediacy,” the court 
stated that MedImmune commands that all the circumstances be 
considered when making a justiciability determination.284  Pursuant to 
this command, “[w]here, as here, there is cogent evidence that a 
 
 275. Id. at 880, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 276. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 277. Id. at 879, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (citing DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397, 1401, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718, 1721 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736,  
6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 278. Id. at 881–83, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73. 
 279. Because every order required further customization, Tubemaster could go no 
further with its preparation.  Id. at 881–82, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 280. Cat Tech, 538 F.3d at 882, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73. 
 281. Id. at 882, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 282. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 283. Id. at 883, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 284. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)). 
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declaratory plaintiff has made meaningful preparation to conduct 
potentially infringing activity, a showing that the plaintiff has 
prepared draft sales literature or otherwise disclosed its products to 
potential customers is not an indispensable prerequisite.”285  The 
court therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of declaratory 
judgment.286
2. Mootness and FDA-listed drugs covered by multiple patents 
The Federal Circuit further clarified in Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.287 that the issues of standing, 
ripeness, and mootness would guide its application of the all-the-
circumstances test in the pharmaceutical context.288  In Caraco, Forest 
Labs, the manufacturer of the brand name drug Lexapro, brought 
suit against generic drug manufacturer Caraco for infringement of 
one of two patents covering Lexapro after Caraco filed an 
abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approval of a generic version of the drug.289  
Caraco subsequently sued Forest for a declaratory judgment that the 
second patent covering Lexapro was either unenforceable or not 
infringed.290  In response, Forest granted to Caraco a covenant not to 
sue for infringement of the second patent at issue, but refused to 
concede that the patent was invalid or not infringed by Caraco’s 
proposed drug.291  The district court dismissed the suit on the ground 
that because there was a covenant not to sue “there’s not going to be 
any loss, there’s no threat of lawsuit.”292
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the all-the-circumstances 
test and found an actual controversy existed between Caraco and 
Forest.293  Although the covenant not to sue eliminated any 
reasonable apprehension of suit on the patent, it did not render 
Caraco’s declaratory judgment action moot because such an 
agreement did not remove the regulatory barriers preventing Caraco 
from marketing its generic version of Lexapro.294
 
 285. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 286. Id. at 874, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 287. 527 F.3d 1278, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 288. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289. 
 289. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 290. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 291. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296. 
 292. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (quoting Transcript of Hearing on 
Motion to Dismiss at 31, Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (No. 2007-
1404) (emphasis added)). 
 293. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290. 
 294. Id. at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
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Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,295 “which governs the [FDA]’s . . . 
approval of new and generic drugs,”296 Caraco could only begin to 
market its generic version of Lexapro after either (1) the patents 
covering the drug expired or (2) all the patents covering Lexapro 
were found either invalid or not infringed by the ANDA.297
Accordingly, Forest’s covenant not to sue did not eliminate the 
controversy between the parties and the action therefore presented 
an ongoing Article III case or controversy.298  Indeed, if courts 
permitted brand name drug manufacturers to moot claims of patent 
invalidity through covenants not to sue, a manufacturer could, in 
certain circumstances, prevent its competitors from entering the 
market until after the potentially invalid patents expired.299
The Federal Circuit further clarified Caraco in Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.,300 a case which the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged presented similar facts.301  Like the defendant in 
Caraco, the plaintiff in Janssen brought suit against a generic 
manufacturer, Apotex, for infringement of one of three patents 
covering a brand name drug, Risperdal.302  Apotex subsequently 
sought a declaratory judgment that the remaining two patents 
covering Risperdal were either invalid or not infringed.303  Unlike in 
Caraco, however, Apotex stipulated that the patent on which Janssen 
 
 295. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) 
(2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)). 
 296. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290. 
 297. If Caraco had been the first manufacturer to file an ANDA related to 
Lexapro, it could have begun to market its drug if it successfully defended against 
Forest’s pending patent infringement suit.  Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.  
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first ANDA filer alleging invalidity or 
noninfringement of the patents covering a drug will obtain a 180-day period of 
exclusivity if the allegations prove true.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2006).  Another 
manufacturer, however, had both filed an ANDA before Caraco and lost the 
resulting patent infringement suit, resulting in an injunction barring the 
manufacturer from marketing its Lexapro bioequivalent.  Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1286–
87, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–94.  Accordingly, the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act prevented Caraco from marketing its drug unless it obtained a court 
judgment of invalidity or noninfringement.  Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1295. 
 298. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 299. Id. at 1284–85, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292–93. 
 300. 540 F.3d 1353, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 301. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085 (“We agree with the parties that if 
Apotex had not stipulated to the validity of the ‘663 patent, then Caraco would have 
been controlling.”); id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085 (“The key difference 
between Caraco and this case is that the harm that gave rise to the jurisdiction over 
the declaratory judgment claim in Caraco ceased to exist once Apotex stipulated to 
the validity, in-fringement, and enforceability of the ‘663 patent.”). 
 302. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 303. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
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sued was valid and enforceable.304  Janssen moved the court to dismiss 
Apotex’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court 
granted the motion.305  The Federal Circuit affirmed.306  According to 
the Federal Circuit, Apotex’s admission that one of the three patents 
covering Risperdal was valid was sufficient to differentiate the case 
from Caraco.307  Because Apotex, unlike Caraco, “stipulated to the 
validity, infringement, and enforceability of [one] patent . . . . Apotex 
cannot claim that at the time of the district court’s dismissal it was 
being excluded from selling a noninfringing product by an invalid 
patent.”308  Even if Apotex succeeded on its declaratory judgment 
claims, it would still be unable to obtain FDA approval until after the 
remaining patent expired.309
3. Sufficient injury 
Although MedImmune eliminated the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” requirement for establishing declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction, it did not change the court’s “long-standing 
rule that the existence of a patent is not sufficient to establish 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”310  In Prasco, LLC v. Medicis 
Pharmaceutical Corp.,311 the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 
declaratory judgment action brought by Prasco against a competitor 
who had previously brought an infringement suit against it based on 
an unrelated patent.312  Relying on both Cat Tech and Caraco, the 
court emphasized that whether an Article III controversy exists 
cannot be determined through the application of a bright-line rule, 
but instead requires an analysis of particular facts of the case, 
including an inquiry into standing, ripeness, and a lack of 
mootness.313
The court proceeded to provide three examples of ways a patentee 
can cause an injury sufficient to establish a justiciable controversy:  by 
(1) “creating a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit”;  
(2) “demanding the right to royalty payments”; or (3) “creating a 
 
 304. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 305. Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84. 
 306. Id. at 1363–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88. 
 307. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085–86. 
 308. Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085–86. 
 309. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 310. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1675, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 311. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 312. Id. at 1333, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 313. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
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barrier to the regulatory approval of a product that is necessary for 
marketing.”314
In Prasco, the patentee had taken no actions at all related to the 
product at issue.315  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that Prasco failed to allege “a controversy of 
sufficient ‘immediacy and reality’ to create a justiciable 
controversy.”316
D. Appellate Jurisdiction and Reviewability of Judgments 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal from 
a final decision of a federal district court if the district court’s 
jurisdiction was based either in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1338.317
Inherent in the court’s appellate role is the traditional power to 
issue a writ of mandamus in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction.318  
The Federal Circuit therefore has jurisdiction to hear and decide a 
petition for a writ of mandamus in any case that falls within the 
purview of § 1338.319
The remedy of mandamus, however, “is available only in 
extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or 
usurpation of judicial power.”320  Accordingly, a party seeking the writ 
“bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining 
the relief desired and that the right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear 
and indisputable.’”321  Because no other means of attaining the relief 
desired must be available, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that it 
may deny the writ even if the request raises an issue that would 
otherwise qualify as reversible error on direct appeal.322
 
 314. Id. at 1339, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680–81. 
 315. Id. at 1340, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 316. Id. at 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 317. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court 
of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole 
or in part, on section 1338 of this title . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 318. In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1351, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, 2001 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 319. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001 (quoting In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 973, 
228 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 450, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 320. In re Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 1004, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1843, 1843–44 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 464,  
7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 321. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (citation omitted) (quoting Allied Chem. 
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).  
 322. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 
737, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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In In re Roche Molecular Systems Inc.,323 Roche filed a petition with the 
Federal Circuit seeking a writ of mandamus directing the district 
court to enter judgment in its favor.324  Roche argued the writ was 
warranted because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for 
infringement of the patent at issue.325  Such an allegation, however, 
clearly can be, and often is, addressed on appeal.326  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit denied the petition, finding that Roche had failed to 
show that the relief it sought could not be obtained after entry of 
final judgment.327  Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the writ was 
warranted because “the posture of the dispute is significantly 
changed” by the purported error below and to continue the litigation 
under this purported error “is as inappropriate as it is unnecessary.”328
Of course, an entry of final judgment does not always ensure the 
Federal Circuit can address an issue raised on appeal.  For example, a 
party wishing to appeal a decision of the district court must file a 
notice of appeal within the period specified by the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.329  Failure to file a document properly styled as 
a “notice of appeal,” however, will not always be fatal to a party’s 
appeal.  For example, in International Rectifiers Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,330 
the appellant failed to timely file a properly styled notice of appeal, 
filing instead a motion to stay the permanent injunction pending 
appeal.331  The Federal Circuit took the appeal, but first addressed the 
threshold question of whether it had appellate jurisdiction.332  Relying 
on Smith v. Barry,333 the Federal Circuit looked to whether the 
document filed provided the notice required by Rule 3 of the Federal 
 
 323. Id. at 1003, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 324. Id. at 1004, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 325. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 326. See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac 
Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(addressing on appeal the alleged infringer’s allegation that patentees lacked 
standing because the inventor failed to properly execute a required license).  But see 
Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, No. 2:06-CV-440, 2008 WL 4491894, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 
10, 2008) (granting permission to appeal an order that denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing where the district court certified the order for 
permissive appeal on the ground that an immediate appeal “may materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the litigation”). 
 327. In re Roche, 516 F.3d at 1004–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 328. Id. at 1009, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 329. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 
4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed 
with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is 
entered.”). 
 330. 515 F.3d 1354, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 331. Id. at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 332. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 333. 502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992). 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure.334  Because the appellant’s document 
(a) specified the party or parties taking the appeal, (b) designated 
the judgment being appealed, and (c) named the court to which the 
appeal was being taken, the court found the document met the 
requirements of Rule 3, construed the motion as a notice of appeal, 
and proceeded to decide the merits of the appeal.335
In iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc.,336 the Federal Circuit considered a 
matter of first impression:  whether a district court’s recitation of the 
“no just cause for delay” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b) as to one or more, but not all, claims is sufficient to certify an 
issue for immediate appeal.  The court concluded that it is not.337  
iLOR had sued Google for infringement of its patent and moved for 
a preliminary injunction, and Google had filed counterclaims seeking 
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and 
unenforceability of the patent.338  The district court ultimately 
granted Google’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement 
and denied iLOR’s motion for preliminary injunction.339  In so doing, 
it entered an Order which stated, “[T]his Order is FINAL AND 
APPEALABLE and THERE IS NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY.”340  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s 
judgment did not dispose of all of Google’s counterclaims.341  
Accordingly, the question of whether the district court had properly 
certified the decision for immediate appeal remained.342  The district 
court had not cited Rule 54(b) and had not described any 
circumstances justifying immediate appeal.343  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the district court’s use of the “no just reason for 
delay” language of Rule 54(b), the Federal Circuit adopted the 
“consensus view” that “bare recitation of the ‘no just reason for delay’ 
standard of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by itself, to properly certify 
an issue for immediate appeal.”344   
 
 334. Int’l Rectifiers Corp., 515 F.3d at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 335. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 336. 550 F.3d 1067, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 337. Id. at 1071, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 338. Id. at 1069, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 339. Id. at 1070, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 340. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 341. Id. at 1072, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 342.  Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 343. Id. at 1073, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01. 
 344. Id. at 1072, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
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Likewise, a party may be barred from appealing a judgment by the 
trial court if the party has prevailed below.345  In Symantec Corp. v. 
Computer Associates International, Inc.,346 the Federal Circuit reiterated 
the rule that “a properly filed cross-appeal requires that, upon 
acceptance of appellee’s argument, our determination would result 
in a reversal or modification of the judgment rather than an 
affirmance.”347  The district court had granted Computer Associates 
(“CA”) summary judgment of non-infringement.348  When Symantec 
appealed, CA cross-appealed the trial court’s finding that the 
doctrine of laches did not bar the scope of Symantec’s potential 
recovery in the event that the court had found CA to have 
infringed.349  Because acceptance of CA’s argument would have had 
no effect on the district court’s judgment of non-infringement, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed the cross-appeal as improper.350  The court 
proceeded to review CA’s mis-styled laches arguments as an 
alternative ground for sustaining the judgment.351
The Federal Circuit may also find its ability to review the final 
judgment of the trial court restricted where the dispute, although an 
actual case or controversy below, becomes moot by the time of 
appeal.  Accordingly, “[w]here the controversy between the parties 
has ended, the case becomes moot and will be dismissed, ‘however 
convenient it might be to have decided the question’ for future 
cases.’”352  For example, in Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Industry 
Co. v. International Trade Commission,353 the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) had determined that the appellants’ products 
infringed two separate patents and that this infringement justified a 
general exclusion order barring importation of the products into the 
United States.354  The appellants sought Federal Circuit review of the 
ITC’s decision, but only as to a subset of the overall claims it had 
been found to have infringed.355  Given that these unappealed 
 
 345. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1294,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1457–58 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Bailey v. Dart Container 
Corp., 292 F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 346. Id. at 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449. 
 347. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457–58. 
 348. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 349. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 350. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 351. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 352. Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 535 
F.3d 1322, 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)). 
 353. Id. at 1322, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. 
 354. Id. at 1325, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592. 
 355. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595. 
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findings of infringement, standing alone, supported the general 
exclusion order, the court asked the parties to prepare responses on 
the issue of mootness.356  After considering the oral arguments, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that a live controversy still existed.357  
Because the patents-in-suit bore different dates of expiration and the 
finding of infringement challenged on appeal involved a later-
expiring patent, a reversal of the ITC’s decision would allow the 
appellants to begin importing their products at an earlier date.358  
Accordingly, this portion of the appeal was not moot.359
Even if a judgment is final and the resulting appeal is timely filed 
and still presents a live controversy, the court may nevertheless be 
unable to address the substantive issues on appeal.  In Jang v. Boston 
Scientific Corp.,360 the trial court adopted a consent judgment proposed 
by the parties after a claim construction order adverse to the plaintiff 
had been issued.361  As part of the stipulated judgment, the parties 
agreed the plaintiff could not prove infringement under the claim 
construction adopted by the court, but preserved the plaintiff’s right 
to appeal the court’s construction.362  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
found itself unable to address the substantive issues presented by the 
parties.363  Although the court was willing and able to review 
“stipulated judgments based on claim construction when the 
judgments were entered with the express purpose of obtaining 
appellate review of the claim construction,” any such judgment “must 
satisfy the same standards of appellate jurisdiction as any other 
judgment entered by the district court.”364  Accordingly, a stipulated 
judgment must allow the court “to ascertain the basis for the 
judgment challenged on appeal.”365
The consent judgment at issue in Jang suffered from ambiguities 
that prevented it from meeting this standard.366  First, the parties had 
failed to identify which of the multiple claim construction rulings 
 
 356. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595. 
 357. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 358. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 359. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 360. 532 F.3d 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 361. Id. at 1332–33, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 362. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 363. Id. at 1335–36, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 364. Id. at 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462 (citing United States v. Proctor & 
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276,  
85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791, 1794 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ventana Med. Sys. Inc. v. 
Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1177, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1316 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1363, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 365. Id. at 1334–35, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
 366. Id. at 1335–36, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
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affected the issue of infringement.367  Without such an identification, 
the Federal Circuit concluded, the court risked issuing an advisory 
opinion that did not actually address the infringement controversy 
between the parties.368  Second, the parties failed to provide any 
factual context for the claim construction issues presented.369  
Because “a remand for clarification is appropriate where a judgment 
is ambiguous,”370 the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court 
for further clarification of these issues.371
E. Personal Jurisdiction 
Even if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
case, the court may not exercise this power over a particular party 
unless two criteria are met:  (1) “jurisdiction must exist under the 
forum state’s long-arm statute”; and (2) “the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction must be consistent with the limitations of the due process 
clause.”372  The first inquiry is controlled by the law of the forum while 
the second inquiry is guided by federal law.373
In Medical Solutions, Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC,374 the Federal 
Circuit was required to decide whether activities at a trade show 
constituted a “use” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)375 such that personal 
jurisdiction would be proper under the District of Columbia’s long-
arm statute.376  The court explained that whether a patented item had 
been “used” is a highly case-specific inquiry, but that “[t]he ordinary 
meaning of ‘use’” is “to put into action or service.”377  After noting 
that a number of trial courts had held that “‘the mere demonstration 
or display of an accused product, even in an obviously commercial 
atmosphere’ is not an act of infringement for purposes of section 
 
 367. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 368. Id. at 1336–37, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463–64. 
 369. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464. 
 370. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 371. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 372. Med. Solutions, Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1139,  
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Trintec Indus. Inc. v. Pedre 
Promotional Prods., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1279 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1589 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005)). 
 373. Id. at 1139, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 374. Id. at 1136, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 375. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 376. Med. Solutions, 541 F.3d at 1139, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 377. Id. at 1141, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research In 
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1789 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
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271(a),”378 the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the display 
and demonstration of aspects of the accused item did not amount to 
a “use” under § 271.379  Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was lacking, 
and the trial court had properly dismissed the suit.380  
The Federal Circuit also found personal jurisdiction lacking in 
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., Ltd.381  In that case, 
Avocent, an Alabama developer of computer hardware devices, filed a 
declaratory judgment action against Aten International, a Taiwanese 
corporation with a California subsidiary.382  The parties did not 
dispute that Aten International’s products were available for sale in 
Alabama.383  Relying on that fact, Avocent contended that Aten 
International should be subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama.384  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, finding that Avocent’s reliance on the 
availability of Aten International products in Alabama failed to 
establish that Aten International either “‘purposefully directed its 
activities at residents of the forum’” or that Avocent’s suit “‘ar[ose] 
out of or relate[d] to those activities,’” as required to satisfy the 
specific personal jurisdiction standard.385
The Federal Circuit did find sufficient contacts to support the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendants in Campbell Pet Co. 
v. Miale.386  In Campbell, the California defendants attended a 
convention in Seattle, Washington, where they demonstrated their 
patented products, offered them for sale, and succeeded in taking 
two orders from out-of-state residents during the course of the 
convention.387  While at the convention, the defendants confronted 
several of the plaintiff’s employees at the plaintiff’s booth and 
accused them of infringing the defendants’ patents.388  Shortly 
thereafter, Campbell filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Washington seeking a declaratory judgment of 
 
 378. Id. at 1140, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting Fluid Mgmt. Ltd. v. 
H.E.R.O. Indus., Ltd., No. 95-5604, 1997 WL 112839, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 1997)). 
 379. Id. at 1141, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 380. Id. at 1142, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 381. 552 F.3d 1324, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 382. Id. at 1327, 89 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 1482. 
 383. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1482.  
 384. Id. at 133789 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1490. 
 385. Id. at 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1492 (quoting Breckenridge 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.3d. 1356, 1363, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1585 (Fed. 2006). 
 386. 542 F.3d 879, 881, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 387. Id. at 881–82, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 388. Id. at 882, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
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non-infringement.389  The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that 
neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction existed over the 
defendants.390
In order for an exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with 
the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution, three factors 
must be satisfied:  “(1) the non-resident defendant purposely do 
some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state, (2) the 
cause of action arise from or be connected with that transaction, and 
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”391  Applying 
this analysis, the district court determined that, although the 
defendants had transacted business in the state, in light of the 
defendants’ conduct at the trade show, the claim of non-
infringement was not sufficiently related to the transactions within 
the state.392  Because the defendants’ actions were “akin to submitting 
cease and desist letters,” an exercise of personal jurisdiction would 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.393
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.394  Although under 
Federal Circuit precedent, a “patentee’s act of sending letters to 
another state claiming infringement and threatening litigation is not 
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in that state,” the Federal 
Circuit held that the situation presented in Campbell involved 
sufficient additional conduct to support the exercise of jurisdiction.395  
Specifically, the court found that defendants had done more than 
serve a verbal notice akin to a cease and desist letter:  they attempted 
to have Campbell removed from the convention and had informed 
Campbell’s customers that Campbell’s products infringed the 
defendants’ patents.396
F. Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel 
A party may also be barred from litigating a controversy where 
either claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.397  “Under the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, ‘a judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on 
 
 389. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 390. Id. at 882–83, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254–55. 
 391. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 392. Id. at 883, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 393. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 394. Id. at 889, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 395. Id. at 885–86, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. 
 396. Id. at 886, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 397. See generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402, at 9 (2d ed. 2008). 
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the same cause of action.’”398  Issue preclusion, on the other hand, 
“bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to 
the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties.”399  Both 
of these terms fall within the ambit of the doctrine of res judicata.400
When a party raises claim preclusion as a bar to subsequent 
litigation, the Federal Circuit will review the district court’s 
determination under the law of the regional circuit in which the 
district court sits.401  In Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,402 the Federal 
Circuit applied the Ninth Circuit’s standard for claim preclusion in 
the context of a patent infringement suit.403  Under Ninth Circuit 
precedent, claim preclusion applies where:  “(1) the same parties, or 
their privies, were involved in the prior litigation, (2) the prior 
litigation involved the same claim or cause of action as the later suit, 
and (3) the prior litigation was terminated by a final judgment on the 
merits.”404  In Acumed, the parties contested only the second of these 
three prongs—whether the prior litigation involved “the same claim 
or cause of action.”405
In a previous lawsuit between the parties in which Stryker had been 
found to have infringed Acumed’s patent, Acumed learned during 
the discovery phase of the litigation that Stryker had another 
potentially infringing product currently in development.406  Stryker, 
however, had not yet begun to market or sell the product.407  After the 
close of fact discovery, Stryker began to market this second product.408  
The court offered to allow Acumed to add an additional 
infringement claim to cover this new product, but warned Acumed 
that doing so would necessitate postponing the entire trial for up to 
one year.409  Acumed chose not to incur this delay and declined the 
court’s invitation.410
 
 398. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1950, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
327 n.5 (1979)). 
 399. WRIGHT ET AL., supra, note 397 (citing Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g 
& Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535–536, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 400. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1323 n.2, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 n.2. 
 401. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 (citing Media Techs. Licensing, 
LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003)). 
 402. 525 F.3d 1319, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950. 
 403. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1952. 
 404. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1971)). 
 405. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 406. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 407. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 408. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 409. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 410. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
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Two weeks after the first trial ended with a final judgment of 
infringement, Acumed initiated a second suit alleging Stryker’s newly 
developed product also infringed the patent.411  The district court 
presiding over this second case dismissed the action on the ground 
that this new claim was precluded by the prior judgment.  According 
to the district court, the Federal Circuit’s patent-law-specific 
“essentially-the-same test” for claim preclusion only applies where a 
claim could not have been litigated in a prior action.412  The court 
therefore applied general principles of claim preclusion in reaching 
its decision.413
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected this reading of its claim 
preclusion test and proceeded to explain the proper manner by 
which the preclusive effect of a previous suit is to be analyzed.414  In a 
patent infringement suit, the answer to whether two claims for patent 
infringement are identical for purposes of claim preclusion is an 
issue particular to patent law and therefore properly analyzed under 
Federal Circuit law.415  “In applying the doctrine of claim preclusion, 
[the Federal Circuit] is guided by the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments,”416 which instructs a court to look to the transactional 
facts from which a claim arises.417  Interpreting Foster v. Hallco 
Manufacturing Co.418 and Hallco Manufacturing Co. v. Foster,419 the court 
explained that “claim preclusion does not apply unless the accused 
device in the action before the court is ‘essentially the same’ as the 
accused device in a prior action.”420  “Accused devices are ‘essentially 
the same’ where the differences between them are not ‘colorable’ or 
are ‘unrelated to the limitations in the claim of the patent.’”421  
Furthermore, the court rejected the limitation the district court 
attempted to impose on the scope of this test, stating that “we find 
nothing in Hallco or Foster that suggests that the essentially-the-same 
test does not apply where a claim could have been litigated in a prior 
 
 411. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 412. Id. at 1325, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954. 
 413. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 414. Id. at 1323–25, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–54. 
 415. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 416. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (defining a claim for 
purposes of claim preclusion by the transactional facts from which it arises). 
 418. 947 F.2d 469, 478, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 419. 256 F.3d 1290, 1294, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 420. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1324, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 421. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (citing Foster, 947 F.2d at 479–80, 20 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1249; KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 
1522, 1526, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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action.”422  Finding that the defendant had admitted that the two 
accused devices were not “essentially the same,” the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings.423
In Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc.,424 the Federal Circuit, relying 
on Acumed, found the two purportedly infringing devices at issue to 
be “essentially the same” for purposes of claim preclusion.425  The 
devices at issue in the different litigation stages in Roche were two 
generic drug applications targeted at two different variations of 
Roche’s brand name drug.426  During the first phase of the litigation, 
the court rejected Apotex’s invalidity and unenforceability 
contentions and found that Apotex’s first generic drug infringed 
Roche’s drug patent.427  When Roche later brought suit against 
Apotex for infringement based on the second generic drug, Apotex 
sought to litigate the validity of the patent a second time, arguing that 
the generic drug formulations were sufficiently distinct to prevent 
claim preclusion from applying.428  Both the district court and the 
Federal Circuit disagreed.429  Although the drug formulations had 
differences, the Federal Circuit explained that in order for claim 
preclusion not to apply, the differences must be related to the claims 
of the patent at issue.430  Because the drug formulations failed to meet 
this standard, the defendant’s claims that the patent was 
unenforceable and invalid were barred by the doctrine of claim 
preclusion.431
The Federal Circuit reiterated this rule in Nasalok Coating Corp. v. 
Nylok Corp.,432 a case involving a trademark dispute.433  In explaining 
the “essentially the same” requirement, the court described the policy 
considerations driving this rule as follows.434  First, “the plaintiff and 
defendant should be treated equally as to res judicata.  If the plaintiff 
would not be barred from bringing a second infringement suit, the 
 
 422. Id. at 1326, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954–55. 
 423. Id. at 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955. 
 424. 531 F.3d 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 425. Id. at 1379–80, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312–13. 
 426. Id. at 1375–76, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309–10. 
 427. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 428. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 429. Id. at 1380, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 430. Id. at 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 431. Id. at 1381, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313–14. 
 432. 522 F.3d 1320, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed Cir. 2008); see David M. Kelly 
& Stephanie H. Bald, 2008 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
947, 966 (2009). 
 433. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 434. Id. at 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
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defendant also should not be precluded from challenging patent 
validity in the second suit.”435  Second, “[a]t the time of an 
infringement suit, it will be difficult to anticipate the new products 
and future disputes that may later arise between the two parties.”436
Claim preclusion may also apply where parties to a controversy 
previously chose to settle a dispute by contract.437  When such a 
settlement agreement involves patent issues, the Federal Circuit will 
have appellate jurisdiction.438  When reviewing a settlement 
agreement, the Federal Circuit does not apply its own law but instead 
applies state contract law to interpret the settlement agreement.439
In Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc.,440 the 
parties previously entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a 
patent dispute.441  This settlement agreement contained a provision 
that, on its face, provided for release of liability and immunity from 
future suit to both parties.442  When Howmedica later brought suit 
against Wright for infringement of a patent not at issue in the prior 
suit, Wright raised the settlement agreement as a defense.443  
According to Wright, the language of the settlement agreement was 
sufficiently broad to collaterally estop Howmedica from bringing any 
patent infringement suit against Wright that was ripe at the time the 
settlement agreement was executed.444  The Federal Circuit, applying 
state contract law, determined that the parties only intended the 
release provision to apply to matters actually in dispute at the time of 
the contract.445  Although the present matter was “ripe” at the time of 
the agreement and clearly fell within the text of the agreement, New 
Jersey contract law permits a court to consider extrinsic evidence 
when interpreting a contract provision.446  Accordingly, both the 
district court and the Federal Circuit proceeded to examine the 
 
 435. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 436. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 437. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 287, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1891, 1896 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that where parties reach a settlement 
agreement and the court dismisses the dispute with prejudice, the judgment is final 
for purposes of res judicata). 
 438. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit where the trial court’s jurisdiction was based 
in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)). 
 439. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech. Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1347, 
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 440. Id. at 1337, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129. 
 441. Id. at 1341–42, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131–32. 
 442. Id. at 1347–48, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 443. Id. at 1347, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 444. Id. at 1342–43, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 445. Id. at 1350, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
 446. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
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intent of the parties, evidenced by their negotiations and a 
contemporaneous settlement agreement covering a patent dispute in 
Massachusetts, to conclude that the parties did not intend the 
agreement to bar the present suit.447  As such, Howmedica was not 
collaterally estopped from initiating the suit.448
G. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
A court may also decline to exercise jurisdiction where the parties 
have contracted to have any dispute resolved by alternative dispute 
resolution.449  Because whether parties to an agreement have 
contractually bound themselves to settle a dispute through 
arbitration is not an issue unique to patent law, the Federal Circuit 
will apply the law of the regional circuit to decide the question.450
In DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co.,451 the trial court refused 
to dismiss or stay litigation pending arbitration in a patent 
infringement action.452  In DataTreasury, one of Wells Fargo’s 
subsidiaries had previously entered into a patent license agreement 
with WMR e-Pin LLC (“WMR”).453  The license agreement compelled 
arbitration of any dispute or disagreement “between WMR and Wells 
Fargo” relating to the license.454  WMR subsequently assigned four 
patents to DataTreasury.455  When DataTreasury later brought suit 
against Wells Fargo for infringement of these patents, Wells Fargo 
moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that DataTreasury, as an assignee 
of WMR, was bound by the arbitration clause of the licensing 
agreement.456  The district court denied the motion, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.457  Reviewing the issue de novo, the Federal Circuit 
applied regional circuit law to determine the scope of the licensing 
agreement.458  Because the regional circuit itself would have analyzed 
the question of arbitrability under the state law governing the 
contract, the court looked to Minnesota law, which governed the 
 
 447. Id. at 1349–50, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137–38. 
 448. Id. at 1350, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
 449. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Polish S.S. Co., 346 F.3d 281, 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(compelling parties to a contract to arbitrate a dispute where the contract 
incorporated an arbitration clause). 
 450. DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1371–72, 86 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 451. Id. at 1368, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
 452. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 453. Id. at 1370, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 454. Id. at 1370–71, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–42. 
 455. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 456. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 457. Id. at 1373, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 458. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
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contract.459  Under Minnesota law, a non-signatory to an arbitration 
agreement can only enforce an arbitration clause in a limited 
number of circumstances.460  Because Wells Fargo’s subsidiary, rather 
than Wells Fargo, had signed the agreement, and none of the 
exceptions to third party enforcement applied, the court determined 
that neither party could be compelled to submit to arbitration.461  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay pending arbitration.462
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
In defining the scope of a patented invention, the claims of a 
patent are generally given the meaning that they would have to one 
of “ordinary skill in the art.”463  In construing claim terms, courts may 
consider the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution 
history, and extrinsic evidence.464
A. Claims 
1. Special claims 
Special rules of construction may apply depending on the type of 
claim or where in the claim a term appears.  For example, in TriMed, 
Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,465 the Federal Circuit considered whether claim 
language contained a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 para. 6.466  The claim term at issue read “said holes in said plate 
providing means for allowing the pin to slide axially therein but 
preventing compression across the fracture, and stabilizing said near 
end of the pin against displacement in the plane of the plate.”467  The 
Federal Circuit first noted that the “[u]se of the word ‘means’ creates 
a presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies.”468  The presumption is 
overcome if the claim, in addition to reciting functional language, 
also “recites sufficient structure for performing the described 
 
 459. Id. at 1372, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442–43. 
 460. See id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (explaining that a non-signatory may be 
compelled to arbitrate under the theory of (1) incorporation by reference;  
(2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel; or  
(6) third-party beneficiary). 
 461. Id. at 1372–73, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443–44. 
 462. Id. at 1373, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444. 
 463. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 464. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 465. 514 F.3d 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1787 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
 466. Id. at 1259–62, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789–91. 
 467. Id. at 1259, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788 (emphasis in original omitted). 
 468. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
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functions in their entirety.”469  Sufficient structure exists if the claim 
“specifies the exact structure that performs the functions in question 
without need to resort to other portions of the specification or 
extrinsic evidence for an adequate understanding of the structure.”470
The court identified the function specified in the claim to be 
“allowing a pin to slide axially through the pin plate while preventing 
compression across the bone fracture, and stabilizing the exposed 
end of the pin against displacement in the plane of the plate.”471  
However, because there was a sufficient structure articulated in the 
claim—namely, holes—that performed the function, the 
presumption was overcome, and it was improper to invoke § 112 
para. 6.472
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Symantec Corp. v. Computer 
Associates International, Inc.473 concerned construction of a term in the 
preamble of the claim.474  The patent at issue related to methods “of 
scanning for and detecting computer viruses.”475  The preamble of the 
claim read:  “In a system for transferring digital data for storage in a 
computer storage medium, a method of screening the data as it is 
being transferred . . . comprising the steps of: . . . .”476  The court relied 
on Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,477 for 
guideposts in determining whether to construe the preamble as a 
limitation rather than as merely providing context for the claim.478  In 
Catalina, the Federal Circuit had held that a preamble “generally is 
not limiting” “[a]bsent clear reliance on the preamble in the 
prosecution history” to distinguish the prior art, or unless “it is 
necessary to provide antecedent basis for the body of the claim.”479  In 
Symantec, the Federal Circuit recognized that the “as it is being 
transferred” language had been added to the preamble during 
prosecution to overcome the prior art, but the court noted that the 
applicant had also concurrently added another term to the body of 
the claim to overcome the same prior art.480  Thus, there was no clear 
 
 473. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 469. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
 470. Id. at 1260, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
 471. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
 472. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
 474. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 475. Id. at 1286, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451. 
 476. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 477. 289 F.3d 801, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 478. Symantec, 522 F.3d at 1288–89, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 479. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (citing Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809,  
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785). 
 480. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
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reliance “on the preamble” language to distinguish the prior art.481  
The Federal Circuit was likewise not persuaded that the difference in 
language between the added preamble language and the added claim 
term meant that the preamble language created a distinct 
limitation.482  The court concluded that, in the absence of anything in 
the specification or prosecution history to indicate a different 
meaning, it should be assumed that preamble language is duplicative 
of, or provides context for, the claim term.483
The Federal Circuit separately considered whether the term 
“computer system” should be limited to a single computer or should 
be read to include a network of multiple computers.484  Finding no 
support in the specification for a narrow construction of the term, 
the court construed the term according to its ordinary meaning to 
one of skill in the computer art, as demonstrated by a dictionary of 
computing terms.485  Notably, the Federal Circuit dismissed testimony 
by experts regarding how they would construe the term based on 
their reading of the specification.486  Such testimony was “unhelpful” 
because it gave only an expert’s understanding of the term and did 
not “identify the ‘accepted meaning in the field’ to one skilled in the 
art.”487
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc. 
presented a claim construction issue based on tension between a 
Jepson claim preamble and the body of the claim.488  A Jepson claim 
has a preamble (starting with the word “in”) and an improvement 
clause (starting with the phrase “an improvement comprising” or “the 
improvement comprising”).489  The preamble of a Jepson claim limits 
and defines the scope of the claim.490
 
 481. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808,  
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785). 
 482. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 483. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 484. Id. at 1290, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 485. Id. at 1290–91, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455–56. 
 486. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 487. Id. at 1291, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (quoting Sinorgchem Co., 
Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1137 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1415, 1420 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 488. 540 F.3d 1337, 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 489. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (2008); see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE  
§ 608.01(m) (2008) (“The preamble of this form of claim is considered to positively 
and clearly include all the elements or steps recited therein as a part of the claimed 
combination.”); Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315,  
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 766, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that when a Jepson claim is 
used the “claimed invention consists of the preamble in combination with the 
improvement”). 
 490. Epson Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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In construing a Jepson claim directed to an artificial knee 
prosthesis, the Federal Circuit considered tension between the 
preamble and the improvement clause.491  The preamble of the claim 
recited that there could be more than one “condylar element” 
meeting a certain “articulation requirement”: 
 In a knee prosthesis . . . having a femoral component and a tibial 
component, . . . the femoral component including at least one 
condylar element for confronting and engaging the bearing member 
to accomplish articulation of the knee prosthesis throughout a 
range of flexion . . . .492
The body of the claim (the improvement clause) referred to a 
singular condylar element that met a certain “geometric 
requirement”:  “the anterior-posterior surface profile contour along 
the condylar element [that has] an essentially constant anterior-posterior 
articular radius throughout the articular surface area of the condylar 
element which contacts the bearing member during articulation 
throughout the primary range of flexion . . . .”493
The district court construed the claim to require that, in a femoral 
component with two condylar elements, both elements needed to 
meet the geometric requirement.494  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
the district court that the claim term “at least one” should be 
construed to encompass one or more condylar elements; however, a 
panel majority disagreed that when there are two condylar elements, 
both must meet the geometric requirement.495  The majority reasoned 
that if that was the intent, the “more natural way of drafting the claim 
language . . . would be to require ‘each condylar element,’ rather 
than ‘the condylar element’” to meet the geometric requirement.496  
Because Wright offered no evidence that the claim should be 
interpreted by anything other than its plain language, the majority 
concluded that the claim required only that one condylar element 
meet the geometric requirement.497
Judge Prost dissented, arguing that “the terms ‘at least one 
condylar element’ and ‘the condylar element’ are coextensive in 
scope”, and thus, the two condylar elements must meet both the 
articulation and the geometric requirements.498
 
 491. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 540 F.3d at 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133. 
 492. Id. at 1340, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (emphasis altered). 
 493. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (emphasis altered). 
 494. Id. at 1343, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 495. Id. at 1344–45, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133–34. 
 496. Id. at 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133. 
 497. Id. at 1347, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 498. Id. at 1352, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
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2. A or an 
The indefinite article “a” or “an” is often construed to mean “one 
or more.”499  In Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,500 the 
Federal Circuit considered construction of the term “a.”501  The 
patents at issue were systems for cleaning a printing press cylinder 
using strips of cleaning fabric.502  Although the district court had 
construed “‘a pre-soaked fabric roll’ to mean ‘a single presoaked 
fabric roll,’” the Federal Circuit disagreed.503  It held that 
construction of “a” or “an” to mean “one or more” is the general rule 
and that “exceptions to this rule are extremely limited.”504  Such 
exceptions arise only “where the language of the claims themselves, 
the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate[s] a 
departure from the rule.”505  Further, the court held that use of the 
terms “the” or “said” in subsequent claims to refer back to a claim 
term containing “a” or “an” does not change application of the rule, 
but rather “reinvokes that non-singular meaning.”506  “Because the 
initial indefinite article (‘a’) carries either a singular or plural 
meaning, any later reference to that same claim element merely 
reflects the same potential plurality.”507
In contrast, in TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp.,508 the 
Federal Circuit construed the term “an” to mean only one.509  The 
dispute concerned patented digital video recorder (“DVR”) 
technology allowing television users to “time-shift” television signals 
by storing data relating to the transmissions on a hard disk in Motion 
Picture Expert Group (“MPEG”) format and subsequently 
transforming the data for replay.510  The claim at issue stated:  
“wherein said Output Section assembles said video and audio 
components into an MPEG stream.”511
Although the Federal Circuit recognized the general rule that “a” 
or “an” should be construed to mean “one or more,” it noted that 
 
 499. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356,  
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that use of the article “a” is 
interpreted to limit a specific element to one only where the patentee manifests a 
clear intent to do so). 
 500. 512 F.3d 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 501. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 502. Id. at 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504. 
 503. Id. at 1340, 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505, 1507. 
 504. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 505. Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 506. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 507. Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 508. 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 509. Id. at 1303–04, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 510. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803–04. 
 511. Id. at 1303, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
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proper construction “depend[ed] heavily on the context of its use.”512  
Relying on earlier and later limitations in the claim, the court 
concluded that, taken in context, the disputed claim term “clearly 
indicates that two separate components are assembled into a single 
stream, not that the video components are assembled into one stream 
and the audio components into a second stream.”513  Such a 
construction was further supported by the specification.514
Similarly, in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc.,515 the Federal Circuit 
held that the precedent construing the article “a” to mean “one or 
more” was inapplicable to construction of the term “a spacing.”516  
The term appeared in claims directed to a method for using loading 
devices to place catalyst particles into a multi-tube chemical reactor.517  
The method required “positioning a plurality of discrete plates” to 
provide “a spacing” between plates, with the spacing having “a width 
not greater than the smallest dimension of a single particle to be 
loaded into the multi-tube reactor.”518  Cat Tech argued that the claim 
required only one (not all) of the spaces between the plurality of 
plates to be so narrow.519
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “the indefinite article ‘a’ 
has been construed to mean ‘one or more,’”520 but the court held that 
Cat Tech’s proposed construction would render the “a spacing” 
limitation meaningless for all practical purposes.521  Having just one 
such “narrow gap between plates would be an exercise in futility 
because whole catalyst particles would simply fall into the other, 
wider gaps between the plates.”522
Such an interpretation could not be reconciled with certain 
dependent claims, which specified that the spaces were designed to 
block whole catalyst particles.523  Further, the court could find 
nothing in the specification to support such a construction and 
instead found that Cat Tech had disclaimed such a construction 
during prosecution of the parent application.524
 
 512. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 513. Id. at 1303, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 514. Id. at 1304, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 515. 528 F.3d 871, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 516. Id. at 886, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1976. 
 517. Id. at 874–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 518. Id. at 875, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 519. Id. at 884, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 520. Id. at 886, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 521. Id. at 885, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 522. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 523. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 524. Id. at 885–86, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075–76. 
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3. Plain and ordinary meaning 
The Federal Circuit has with some frequency given claims their 
ordinary and customary meaning.  For example, in Miken Composites, 
L.L.C. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,525 the Federal Circuit adopted the 
ordinary and customary meaning in construing the term “insert” to 
mean “something inserted or intended for insertion.”526  The 
patentee contended that the limitation was “purely structural” and 
did not require any specific action—i.e., it was irrelevant “whether an 
insert is placed into a pre-existing frame or whether a frame is built 
around it.”527  The patentee argued that by requiring insertion, the 
district court had erred by “importing a process limitation into claims 
directed to a product.”528  The Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s 
argument and affirmed the district court’s construction.529  The court 
noted that “nothing in the claims or specification indicates, explicitly 
or implicitly, that the inventor used the term in a novel way or 
intended to impart a novel meaning to it.”530  Although the Federal 
Circuit acknowledged that the ordinary meaning there had 
“functional attributes,” the court stated its construction did not read 
a process limitation into the claims but was simply a result of the fact 
that the claim “recites a structural component . . . with certain 
understood characteristics.”531
In Baldwin, by contrast, the Federal Circuit held that a district court 
had gone beyond the ordinary meaning of claim language and had 
read a process limitation into an apparatus claim.532  The district court 
was presented with a claim term—“reduced air content cleaning 
fabric”—that appeared in both method claims and apparatus 
claims.533  The district court construed the term only once to mean “a 
fabric whose air content has been reduced by some method prior to 
being wound on a roll.”534  The Federal Circuit held that the district 
court erred.535  The apparatus and method claims were “directed 
toward different classes of patentable subject matter,” and the district 
court’s construction had “blurred an important difference” between 
 
 525. 515 F.3d 1331, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 526. Id. at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005)). 
 527. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 528. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 529. Id. at 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 530. Id. at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 531. Id. at 1337–38, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 532. 512 F.3d 1338, 1346, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1509 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 533. Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
 534. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
 535. Id. at 1346, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509. 
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the two claims.536  The Federal Circuit held that the apparatus claims 
did not require any particular process or method and did not require 
the air content to be reduced prior to winding.537  The Federal Circuit 
also held that the district court erred by construing the method claim 
to require that air content be reduced prior to winding on the roll.538  
“[A]lthough a method claim necessarily recites the steps of the 
method in a particular order, as a general rule the claim is not 
limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the 
claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.”539  Finding no 
support in the claims or specification for requiring air content 
reduction prior to winding and no clear disavowal of claim scope in 
the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit rejected the district 
court’s construction and remanded the case to the district court.540
In DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc.,541 the Federal Circuit also applied 
the plain and ordinary meaning in interpreting claim language.542  
The patent at issue in DSW was directed to a method for storing and 
displaying footwear for customer self-selection.543  One step of the 
method consisted of “selectively positioning a generally vertically 
disposed, horizontally movably positionable stack divider” between two 
stacks containing two styles of footwear.544  The district court 
construed the term to encompass only methods that contain track 
and roller mechanisms connecting display modules to a support base, 
which other claims expressly described.545
The Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly 
imported the “track and roller” limitation from other claims.546  The 
Federal Circuit held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim 
term should control unless it was ambiguous or a special definition 
was apparent from the intrinsic record.547  The Federal Circuit could 
find no express disclaimer in the prosecution history of other 
methods of displaying footwear not involving the rolling track 
mechanism.548  Although the preferred embodiment disclosed in the 
specification included a rolling track mechanism, other embodiments 
 
 536. Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
 537. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
 538. Id. at 1345, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509. 
 539. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
 540. Id. at 1345–46, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508–10. 
 541. 537 F.3d 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 542. Id. at 1347, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 543. Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688–89. 
 544. Id. at 1345 n.1, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690 n.1. 
 545. Id. at 1345–46, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 546. Id. at 1347, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690–91. 
 547. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691. 
 548. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691. 
  
804 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
included other means to permit the stack dividers to have 
horizontally movable positions.549  Thus, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the district court had improperly imported into the 
claim term a limitation not required by the claims, specification, or 
prosecution history.550
Likewise, in 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd.,551 the Federal 
Circuit relied on the plain language of the claims.552  The patents at 
issue in 800 Adept related to a method for routing “1-800” telephone 
calls to a business’s location closest to the caller.553  In dispute was the 
meaning of the method step that required assigning, for each 
potential caller, a telephone number to which that caller’s calls would 
be routed—“assigning to the physical location of said potential first 
parties a telephone number of a service location of a second party 
that will receive calls.”554  The district court construed the “assigning” 
limitation to encompass calculations made during the telephone 
call.555  The Federal Circuit found such a construction to be flawed.556
First, the Federal Circuit found that the plain language of the 
claims made clear that the assigning step occurred prior to 
placement of the call and required that a telephone number of a 
service location be assigned to each potential caller.557  In addition, 
the court found nothing in the claims to suggest that assigning could 
encompass determining the telephone number of the service 
location during the telephone call based on a stored algorithm.558
The written description supported a construction based on the 
plain language of the claims.559  Furthermore, statements made 
during prosecution in distinguishing the invention from a prior art 
reference reinforced such a construction.560  In considering the 
prosecution history, the court noted that it did not rely on the 
doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, which courts use to limit the 
scope of a claim term “that would otherwise be read broadly.”561  
 
 549. Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691. 
 550. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691. 
 551. 539 F.3d 1354, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 552. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 553. Id. at 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 554. Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (emphasis omitted). 
 555. Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–71. 
 556. Id. at 1362, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 557. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 558. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 559. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 560. Id. at 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73. 
 561. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
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Rather, the court used the prosecution history simply to support its 
construction based on the claim language and written description.562
In contrast to the above cases, the Federal Circuit rejected reliance 
on the ordinary or customary meaning in construing the claim term 
“binary code” in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp.563  The patent at 
issue related to a remote-control garage door opening system 
comprising of a transmitter (generally integrated into the vehicle) 
and a receiver (usually attached to the device that operates the 
garage door).564  The claim was directed to a transmitter comprising, 
inter alia, a “binary code generator.”565  The district court had broadly 
construed “binary code,” based on its ordinary and customary 
meaning, to “not [be] limited to[] a representation of a base 2 
number.”566  The ordinary meaning of the binary code, according to 
the district court, could encompass binary numbers (base 2), trinary 
numbers (base 3), or even decimal numbers (base 10).567  Although 
the Federal Circuit recognized that it is unacceptable to import 
limitations from the written description into the claims, the appeals 
court held that the claims and specification required a more narrow 
interpretation of “binary code” limited to binary numbers.568  The 
court recognized that the written description is highly relevant to 
claim construction, and the court relied heavily on the specification’s 
use of the term “trinary code,” which indicated that “binary code” 
could not encompass base 3 numbers or any numbers other than 
base 2 numbers.569  
Likewise, in Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc.,570 the Federal Circuit 
limited the scope of the claim term “mechanism for moving said 
finger” to the structure disclosed in the patent for performing that 
function under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).  At issue in that case was the scope 
of claims in two patents directed to pin clamps that hold a workpiece 
securely in place during welding and other manufacturing 
processes.571  Patent owner Welker Bearing asserted that those patents 
were infringed by two PHD clamp devices, “Clamp I” and “Clamp 
II.”572   
                                                 
 562. Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 563. 516 F.3d 1331, 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 564. Id. at 1333, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 565. Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 566. Id. at 1336, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108. 
 567. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
 568. Id. at 1335–39, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107–09. 
 569. Id. at 1335, 1339, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107, 1109. 
 570. 550 F.3d 1090, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 571. Id. at 1092, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290-91. 
 572. Id. at 1094, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
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Ruling on PHD’s motion for summary judgment, the district court 
construed the claim term “mechanism for moving said finger” as a 
means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), and limited 
its scope to a “rotating central post.”573  Based on that ruling, the 
district court concluded that PHD’s Clamp II device did not infringe 
Welker Bearing’s patents.574
Reviewing the district court’s claim construction, the Federal 
Circuit reviewed prior decisions construing the word “mechanism” 
and indicated that whether “mechanism” should be construed under 
§ 112(6) is context specific.575  Agreeing with the district court that 
“mechanism for moving said finger” should be construed as a means-
plus-function limitation, the Federal Circuit found it significant that 
“[n]o adjective endows the claimed ‘mechanism’ with a physical or 
structural component.”576  The Court also found that the remainder 
of each claim at issue “provides no structural context for determining 
the characteristics of the ‘mechanism’ other than to describe its 
function.”577
Turning to whether the district court identified the correct 
structure disclosed in the specification as corresponding to the 
claimed function, the Federal Circuit agreed that the patents at issue 
only identified a single such structure:  a rotating central post.578  The 
Court found Welker Bearing’s argument that the doctrine of claim 
differentiation compelled a different conclusion unavailing. 
 With regard to claim differentiation, this court is aware that 
claim 1 of the ‘478 patent recites a rotating element, while claim 1 
of the ‘254 patent does not.  This difference between claims in 
different patents does not change the meaning of these means-
plus-function limitations.  By statute, this court must follow the 
directive to construe these limitations according to § 112 ¶ 6.  
Because both terms share the same specification with the same 
structure corresponding to the claimed function, this court cannot 
give these terms any different scope.579
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Welker Bearing’s argument 
that the Clamp II device could infringe under the doctrine of 
 
 573. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.   
 574. The district court also granted summary judgment of no infringement as to 
the Clamp I product on the basis that the record did not show that PHD made, used, 
sold, or offered for sale the Clamp I device at any time after the patents had issued.  
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.  The Federal Circuit affirmed that finding.  Id. 
at 1095, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 575. Id. at 1096, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 576. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 577. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.   
 578. Id. at 1097, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 579. Id. at 1098-99, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
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equivalents, and clarified that Welker Bearing’s argument was one of 
structural equivalents, rather than the doctrine of equivalents, 
because Clamp II’s structure was well known in the prior art and 
could not be classified as after-arising technology.580  The Court 
agreed with the district court that the evidence showed Clamp II’s 
structure was not insubstantially different from the claimed rotating 
central post.581
Notably, in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, 
Inc.,582 the Federal Circuit held that the district court had properly 
construed “and” to mean “or.”583  The lawsuit arose under the Hatch-
Waxman Act after Mylan filed an abbreviated new drug application 
certifying that Ortho-McNeil’s patent was invalid or not infringed.584  
The patent claim at issue contained a specified chemical formula 
containing several R groups (R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5), wherein “R2, 
R3, R4, and R5 are independently hydrogen or lower alkyl and R2 
and R3 and/or R4 and R5 together may be a group of formula 
(II).”585  The dispute hinged on construction of the term “and”:  
should it be construed to mean “and” (i.e., as conjunctive) so that 
both limitations must be met (thereby excluding the accused 
product, topiramate), or should it be construed to mean “or” (i.e., as 
disjunctive) so that either limitation is sufficient for infringement 
(thereby implicating topiramate)?586
The Federal Circuit determined that, based on the use of “and” in 
the claim, “and” meant “or” and joined “mutually exclusive 
possibilities.”587  The court looked at the claim term in the context of 
other claims and noted that to require a conjunctive meaning would 
render several dependent claims meaningless, contrary to a well-
established claim construction principle.588  Finally, the court 
examined the specification and concluded that it, too, supported a 
construction of “and” to mean “or.”589  The court concluded that it 
need not look at extrinsic evidence in construing the claim term 
because extrinsic evidence is less significant than intrinsic evidence.590  
While conceding that the primary dictionary definition for “and” is in 
 
 580. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.     
 581. Id. at 1100, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.  
 582. 520 F.3d 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 583. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198. 
 584. Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198. 
 585. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 586. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 587. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 588. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 
318 F.3d 1081, 1093, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 589. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199–200. 
 590. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
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the additive sense, the court noted that dictionaries also use “and” to 
connote alternatives.591
Finally, the Federal Circuit in O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond 
Innovation Technology Co.592 held that a court’s determination that a 
claim term has its plain and ordinary meaning “may be inadequate 
when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance 
on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ 
dispute.”593  The court held that when reliance on the ordinary 
meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute, it is the court’s duty to 
construe the term.594
The patents at issue in O2 Micro were directed to DC/AC converter 
circuits, and the claims contained the phrase “only if said feedback 
signal is above a predetermined threshold.”595  The parties disputed 
whether the “only if” limitation applied “at all times without 
exception” or whether it applied only during “steady state 
operation.”596  The district court declined to construe the phrase, 
concluding that it had a well-understood definition.597  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit held that turning to the ordinary meaning did not 
resolve the parties’ dispute because the parties disagreed not about 
what the words “only if” meant but about when those words 
applied.598  The district court therefore should have construed the 
term “to determine what claim scope is appropriate in the context of 
the patents-in-suit.”599  By failing to resolve the dispute, the district 
court improperly left the jury free to consider the parties’ claim 
construction arguments.600
B. Specification 
The specification is highly relevant to claim construction and is 
often the “single best guide” to determining the meaning of a claim 
term to one of ordinary skill in the art.601  The Federal Circuit 
frequently relies on the overall invention disclosed in the 
 
 591. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
 592. 521 F.3d 1351, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 593. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 594. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 595. Id. at 1354, 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305, 1307 (emphasis added).  
 596. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 597. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 598. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 599. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 600. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 601. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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specification (and not just specific embodiments) to define the scope 
of claim terms. 
In Netcraft Corp. v. eBay, Inc.,602 the Federal Circuit addressed 
Internet billing method patents that included the limitation 
“providing a communications link through equipment of the third 
party.”603  The district court construed the term to require that the 
third party provide customers with Internet access.604  Finding that the 
claims themselves did not expressly require the third party to provide 
Internet access, the Federal Circuit turned to the specification.605  
While it appreciated that the use of the phrase “the present 
invention” does not automatically limit the meaning of claim terms, 
the court held that, in this case, the specification’s repeated use of 
“the present invention” in the summary of the invention clearly 
referred to the invention as a whole and required the third party to 
provide Internet access.606  Furthermore, the abstract and disclosed 
embodiments supported that construction of the claim term.607  
Finding the prosecution history to lack clarity, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that it was less helpful than the specification in construing 
the claim term.608
In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc.,609 the Federal Circuit considered 
construction of two terms of a patent directed to an apparatus that 
limits potentially rapid accidental discharges of hazardous gasses 
from pressurized storage containers.610  Specifically, it construed the 
terms “flow restrictor” and “capillary.”611
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant ATMI’s argument that, 
based on the specification, the term “flow restrictor” required 
“severe” restriction of gas flow.612  The court found that any 
statements in the specification to that effect pertained only to specific 
embodiments and not to the full scope of the invention.613  
Nevertheless, appreciating that the overall objective of the invention 
was to prevent a hazardous release of gas, the court concluded that 
the term should be construed to require “a structure that serves to 
 
 602. 549 F.3d 1394, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 603. Id. at 1396, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,794,221 
(filed July 7, 1995)). 
 604. Id. at 1397, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. 
 605. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. 
 606. Id. at 1398, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
 607. Id. at 1398–99, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
 608. Id. at 1401–02, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41. 
 609. 543 F.3d 1306, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 610. Id. at 1310, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707–08. 
 611. Id. at 1322–28, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717–20. 
 612. Id. at 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
 613. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717. 
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restrict the rate of flow sufficiently to prevent a hazardous 
situation.”614
Similarly, in construing the term “capillary,” the Federal Circuit 
rejected ATMI’s argument that the term should be construed to 
require that the capillaries be uniform.615  Again looking to the 
specification, it noted that only specific embodiments discussed 
uniform capillaries and not the invention as a whole.616  Moreover, it 
pointed to the structure of the claims as additional evidence that the 
term “capillary” did not require uniformity.617
In Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.,618 the 
Federal Circuit relied on the specification to conclude that the term 
“remote interface,” read in light of the specification, should be 
construed to exclude consumer-owned personal computers.619  The 
claim at issue was directed to an automatic account processing system 
for establishing a financial account for applicants located at a 
“remote interface.”620
In construing the claim term, the majority first noted that the plain 
and ordinary meaning of “remote interface” is very broad and could, 
without reference to the specification, cover consumer-owned 
personal computers.621  The court, however, then turned to the 
specification, focusing on its use of the term “kiosk.”622  The preferred 
embodiment described a remote interface that was housed in a kiosk 
structure, but alternative embodiments were not so limited and the 
prosecution history made clear that a remote interface did not have 
to be housed in a kiosk.623  The majority, however, concluded that the 
specification used the term “kiosk” not only to refer to the housing for 
the computer equipment constituting the remote interface, but also, 
at times, to refer to the “entire ‘remote interface’ itself.”624  These 
latter uses of “kiosk,” combined with the common meaning of 
“kiosk,” suggest that the remote interface is installed in a publicly 
accessible location.625  Additionally, each example and feature of 
kiosks described in the specification indicating public accessibility led 
the majority to conclude that a skilled artisan would recognize that 
 
 614. Id. at 1324, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
 615. Id. at 1325–26, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719–20. 
 616. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719. 
 617. Id. at 1326–27, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 618. 527 F.3d 1300, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 619. Id. at 1311, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 620. Id. at 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 621. Id. at 1308, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 622. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 623. Id. at 1308–09, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–77. 
 624. Id. at 1308, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 625. Id. at 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
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“remote interface” required public accessibility and did not 
encompass a consumer-owned personal computer.626
In his dissent, Judge Linn did not agree with the majority’s reading 
of the specification as using “kiosk” in two different senses:  “I cannot 
subscribe to the majority’s seemingly contradictory analysis that the 
‘remote interface’ is not limited to a ‘kiosk’ except when it is.”627  He 
stated that the majority had “incongruously equate[d] ‘remote 
interface’ with ‘kiosk’ to justify engrafting the ‘publicly-accessible’ 
characteristic of kiosks onto the ‘remote interface’ term.”628  Such a 
construction, according to Judge Linn, “violates fundamental tenets 
of claim construction precedent.”629  He also discerned no disclaimer 
of consumer-owned personal computers in the specification, and he 
thus concluded that the term “remote interface” should be given its 
ordinary, broad meaning.630
In Oatey v. IPS Corp.,631 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle 
that claim terms should be construed so as not to exclude 
embodiments disclosed in the specification unless there is a clear 
disclaimer in the specification or prosecution history.632  The 
patented invention in Oatey was directed to a washing machine outlet 
box with two drain ports designed to satisfy new municipal plumbing 
codes prohibiting other appliances from sharing the drain port used 
by washing machines.633  The claim recited “[a] washing machine 
outlet box comprising a housing including a bottom wall, [and] first 
and second juxtaposed drain ports in said bottom wall.”634  The 
district court construed the phrase “first and second juxtaposed drain 
ports in said bottom wall” specifically to exclude an embodiment 
described in figure 3 of the patent.635  The district court construed the 
term to require “two separate physical openings in the bottom wall of 
the outlet box, as shown in Figure 2, and not a single opening divided by 
a wall in the attached tailpiece, as shown in Figure 3.”636  The Federal 
Circuit held that, because there was no disclaimer of the figure 3 
 
 626. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777–78. 
 627. Id. at 1317, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and 
dissenting-in-part). 
 628. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 629. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 630. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 631. 514 F.3d 1271, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 632. Id. at 1276–77, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794–95. 
 633. Id. at 1272, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 634. Id. at 1275, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,148,850 
(filed Apr. 21, 1999)) (emphasis omitted). 
 635. Id. at 1275–76, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794. 
 636. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794 (emphasis added). 
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structure in the specification or prosecution history, it was improper 
to exclude it from the scope of the claim.637
The Federal Circuit distinguished the Oatey case in its later decision 
in PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vividant, Inc.638  In PSN, the Federal 
Circuit considered a patent for a method of fabricating porcelain 
veneer restorations for teeth.639  The claim included an element that 
required a restoration to be “ready for mounting” on a tooth.640  The 
district court construed the term “ready for mounting” narrowly to 
mean that all finishing activities prior to mounting on the tooth had 
been performed (i.e., the element would not be met if any finishing 
step still needed to be performed).641  Finding no guidance in the 
claims themselves and no explicit definition in the specification, the 
court relied on implicit guidance in the specification to define the 
meaning of the term.642  The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
district court had erred by giving greater weight to the preferred 
embodiment (which did not describe finishing steps being 
performed after this point in the process) than to the summary of the 
invention (which did describe later finishing steps).643  The court 
found the decision in Oatey was inapplicable because the court’s 
construction of “ready for mounting” was broader than, and 
therefore did not exclude, the preferred embodiment.644  The court 
also noted that “Oatey is not a panacea, requiring all claims to cover 
all embodiments” and that “courts must recognize that disclosed 
embodiments may be within the scope of other allowed but 
unasserted claims.”645
Although the Federal Circuit has recognized that claims should 
generally not be construed so as to read in inoperable embodiments, 
it clarified that principle in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc.646  The 
case involved a disputed claim pertaining to coronary stents with a 
wall surface having “‘a plurality of slots formed therein, the slots 
being disposed substantially parallel to the longitudinal axis of the 
tubular member.’”647  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
construction of the term “slots” to refer to both “complete slots” and 
 
 637. Id. at 1277–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795. 
 638. 525 F.3d 1159, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 639. Id. at 1162, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893. 
 640. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894. 
 641. Id. at 1165, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896. 
 642. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896. 
 643. Id. at 1166, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. 
 644. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. 
 645. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. 
 646. 511 F.3d 1157, 1174, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 647. Id. at 1173, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,739,762 
col.11 l.67 to col. 12 l.2 (filed Nov. 3, 1986)). 
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“half slots.”648  According to the Federal Circuit, a construction of the 
term “slots” to include both “complete slots” and “half slots” was 
consistent with the written description, which used the term 
“complete slots” to distinguish from “half slots.”649
In so holding, the court rejected the argument that such a 
construction could not be correct since it covers inoperable 
embodiments.650  The court distinguished between a claim 
construction that makes all embodiments inoperable—which 
“‘should be viewed with extreme skepticism’”—from a construction 
that might simply cover some inoperable embodiments.651  The court 
further noted that construction of other claim terms prevented the 
claim from covering any inoperable stents.652
C. Prosecution History 
In addition to consulting the specification, courts may also rely on 
the prosecution history in construing claim terms.653  In Board of 
Regents of the University of Texas System v. BENQ America Corp.,654 the 
Federal Circuit construed the term “syllabic element”—which 
appeared in claims directed to a method of communicating by non-
verbal transmission using a touch-tone telephone.655  The Federal 
Circuit held that “syllabic element” should be construed narrowly to 
mean a one-syllable letter group,656 not, as the patentee contended, a 
word or part of a word.657
The Federal Circuit found little guidance in the claim language 
and instead relied on the specification and prosecution history to 
affirm the construction by the district court.658  The Federal Circuit 
noted that the specification repeatedly distinguished between a 
“word” and a “syllabic element,” demonstrating that the two terms are 
not coextensive in scope.659  The prosecution history likewise 
distinguished between “syllabic element” and “word.”660  Moreover, 
 
 648. Id. at 1173–75, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438–40. 
 649. Id. at 1174, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438–39. 
 650. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 651. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (quoting Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. 
Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d 1371, 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir.  
2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802 (2002)). 
 652. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 653. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 654. 533 F.3d 1362, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 655. Id. at 1364–65, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 656. Id. at 1367–68, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 657. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 658. Id. at 1368–70, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–43. 
 659. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 660. Id. at 1369–70, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
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the term “syllabic element” was added during prosecution to 
overcome an anticipation rejection after the examiner found prior 
art showing the use of a word—indicating that the claim was 
narrowed such that “syllabic element” did not include words.661
The scope of a claim term may be narrowed when the applicant 
makes a clear disclaimer during prosecution.662  In Computer Docking 
Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc.,663 the patents at issue related to a portable 
microprocessor.664  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
construction of the terms “portable computer” and “portable 
computer microprocessing system” to mean “‘a computer without a 
built-in display or keyboard that is capable of being moved or carried 
about’”—thus, excluding laptop computers.665
In so holding, the Federal Circuit relied on the doctrine of 
prosecution disclaimer.666  The court noted that the applicant had 
specifically distinguished its invention from a prior art reference 
disclosing a laptop computer with a built-in display and keyboard.667  
Although the applicant distinguished its invention in multiple ways, 
that did not preclude the court from finding a disavowal when it was 
clear and unambiguous:  “[A] disavowal, if clear and unambiguous, 
can lie in a single distinction among many.”668  In addition to the 
clear disavowal during prosecution, the court relied on the 
specification, which also supported such a construction.669
Likewise, in Solomon Technologies, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,670 the Federal Circuit found that the “prosecution history 
could not be clearer in showing a disclaimer” of subject matter.671  
Here, the court was reviewing the construction of the term “integral 
combination of a respective electric motor element and an element 
of said transmission unit” in a patent directed to a combination 
motor and transmission device.672  The court found that, in response 
to an anticipation rejection, the patent applicant had clearly 
 
 661. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 662. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 663. 519 F.3d 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 664. Id. at 1370, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130. 
 665. Id. at 1372–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132–36 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., No. 06-C-32-C, 2006 WL 5999613, at *4 
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2006)). 
 666. Id. at 1374–75, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
 667. Id. at 1375–77, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135–36. 
 668. Id. at 1377, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 669. Id. at 1378–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137. 
 670. 524 F.3d 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 671. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 672. Id. at 1312–13, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807–08. 
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disclaimed devices that use shafts to connect the motor and 
transmission elements.673
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found only a limited disavowal in 
Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.674  In Cohesive, the claims were 
directed to a high-performance liquid chromatography apparatus 
comprising a chromatographic body containing a “‘multiplicity of 
rigid, solid, porous particles.’”675  Based in part on the prosecution 
history, the Federal Circuit construed “rigid” to not exclude 
polymeric particles.676  The Federal Circuit first recognized that the 
ordinary meaning of “rigid” does not require that a particle be 
monomeric and not polymeric.677  The Federal Circuit was also 
unable to discern a clear and unmistakable disavowal of polymeric 
particles in the prosecution history.678  The court agreed that while an 
expert declaration submitted by the applicant in response to a prior 
art rejection distinguished the particular particles disclosed in the 
prior art, the declaration did not disavow all polymeric particles.679
Finally, in Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,680 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of the term “sealed 
sleeve” to be limited to “heat-sealed sleeve” based, in part, on the 
prosecution history.681  All references to a “sealed sleeve” in the 
specification were to a “heat-sealed sleeve,” and when the applicant 
had attempted during prosecution to remove the word “heat” from 
the specification and thereby broaden the invention’s scope, the PTO 
examiner rejected the changes as impermissibly adding new matter.682  
Relying on this history, the Federal Circuit held that the term “sealed 
sleeve” was properly construed as limited to a “heat-sealed sleeve.”683  
A broader construction would have caused the claim to have been 
invalid for lack of support in the initial disclosure.684
D. Extrinsic Evidence 
Although the Federal Circuit has “emphasized the importance of 
intrinsic evidence in claim construction,” extrinsic evidence may also 
 
 673. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 674. 543 F.3d 1351, 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903, 1908–09 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 675. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,772,874 
col.20 ll.20–34 (filed June 11, 1996)). 
 676. Id. at 1362, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 677. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 678. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09. 
 679. Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09. 
 680. 512 F.3d 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 681. Id. at 1340, 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505, 1507. 
 682. Id. at 1340–41, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 683. Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507–08. 
 684. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508. 
  
816 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
be considered.685  The Federal Circuit looked at both intrinsic and 
extrinsic evidence in construing the claim term “pipeline stage” in 
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc.686  The 
patented technology concerned methods for increasing 
microprocessor efficiency.687  The court first looked at the context in 
which the term was used in the claims and concluded that other 
terms in the claim indicated that “pipeline stage” was used in a 
temporal, rather than positional, sense.688  The court found the 
specification to be ambiguous as to the meaning of the term,689 but 
that the prosecution history supported the temporal construction of 
the claim term.690  Finally, the court examined extrinsic evidence—a 
computer textbook—which the court found “support[ed] the 
conclusion that the inventor used ‘the pipeline stage’ in its temporal 
sense, consistent with the term’s ordinary meaning in the computer 
arts.”691
Courts also may rely on dictionaries, provided they are not used to 
contradict the intrinsic evidence.692  In Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp.,693 
the district court had construed the term “local” as used to describe a 
computer device in computer networking systems to mean “a 
computer device (e.g., a hard drive) that is directly attached to a 
single computer’s processor by, for example, the computer’s bus.”694  
Patent owner Mangosoft argued on appeal that the district court’s 
claim construction opinion, which was issued before the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion in Phillips v. AWH Corp., had improperly relied on 
older case law that promoted the use of technical dictionaries.695  The 
Federal Circuit was unpersuaded.696  It noted that Phillips “recognized 
that reference to such sources is not prohibited so long as the 
ultimate construction given to the claims in question is grounded in 
the intrinsic evidence.”697  The court stated that even though the 
 
 685. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 686. 520 F.3d 1367, 1377–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232–35 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 687. Id. at 1369, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 688. Id. at 1378, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 689. Id. at 1378–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 690. Id. at 1378–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233–34. 
 691. Id. at 1380, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 692. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 693. 525 F.3d 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 694. Id. at 1329, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 695. Id. at 1329–30, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 696. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941–42. 
 697. Id. at 1330, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330). 
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district court had issued its decision before Phillips, its claim 
construction was “fully consistent with and supported by the intrinsic 
record—as well as the dictionary—and thus fully comports with our 
precedent.”698
Similarly, in Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc.,699 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of “partially 
hidden from view” to mean “hidden from view to some extent but not 
totally hidden from view” as the term was used to describe the top 
platform surface in a claim to a wall-mounted diaper changing 
station.700  The Federal Circuit first noted that the specification never 
used the term “partially hidden from view” to describe the platform 
top surface and that the term appeared only in the claims.701  Because 
there was nothing in the specification to assist in construing the term, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court was free to look 
to extrinsic evidence, provided it did not contradict the meaning 
discerned from the intrinsic record.702  According to the Federal 
Circuit, “[w]hen the intrinsic evidence is silent as to the plain 
meaning of a term, it is entirely appropriate for the district court to 
look to dictionaries or other extrinsic sources for context—to aid in 
arriving at the plain meaning of a claim term.”703
IV. INFRINGEMENT 
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides that “whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes 
the patent.”704  Determining patent infringement entails two steps:  
(1) the claims must be construed; and (2) the properly construed 
claims must be compared to the allegedly infringing device.705  This 
section addresses the Federal Circuit’s 2008 cases dealing with the 
second step. 
 
 698. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 699. 527 F.3d 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 700. Id. at 1380–81, 1384, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217, 1219. 
 701. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217. 
 702. Id. at 1382, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 703. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 704. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 705. E.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1573, 41 U.P.S.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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A. Literal Infringement 
“Generally, a claim is literally infringed if each properly construed 
claim element reads on the accused product or process.”706  In Johns 
Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp.,707 the Federal Circuit concluded 
that, despite a jury verdict of infringement and the district court’s 
denial of the accused infringer’s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law (“JMOL”), the accused product did not literally meet each of the 
claim elements.708
In Datascope, Johns Hopkins University and a licensee alleged that 
Datascope’s ProLumen device infringed patents relating to a catheter 
system.709  Each of the asserted independent claims required 
introducing, into a vascular conduit, “a fragmentation catheter 
comprised either of a fragmentation member or an expanding distal 
end that automatically ‘expands to conform to the shape and 
diameter of the inner lumen’ of the vascular conduit.”710  The term 
“expands to conform to the shape and diameter of the inner lumen” 
was construed to mean that the fragmentation member or distal end 
“expands and adjusts to remain in contact with the inner lumen in 
three dimensions along its length and width.”711  The only evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs to show that the ProLumen literally met 
the “expands to conform” claim limitation was the testimony of their 
expert.712  The expert concluded that “the S-wire in the ProLumen 
device expands and adjusts to remain in contact with the inner lumen 
in three dimensions along its length and width.”713
The Federal Circuit, in a decision written by District Judge Zobel 
(sitting by designation), concluded that the expert’s opinion was not 
supported by the facts.714  On cross-examination, the expert admitted 
that the ProLumen device contacted the inner lumen at only two 
points.715  A video animation relied upon by the expert also showed 
only two points of contact, and the Federal Circuit said this was 
unavoidable “[a]s a matter of geometry.”716  The Federal Circuit 
therefore concluded that “no reasonable jury could have found that 
 
 706. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 160 (4th ed. 2003). 
 707. 543 F.3d 1342, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 708. Id. at 1349, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370. 
 709. Id. at 1343–44, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
 710. Id. at 1345, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,766,191 
col.8 ll.34–42 (filed Feb. 29, 1996)). 
 711. Id. at 1346, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 712. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 713. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 714. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369–70. 
 715. Id. at 1347–48, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369. 
 716. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369–70. 
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the ProLumen device literally met th[e] limitation,” and reversed the 
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for JMOL.717
Judge Newman’s dissent criticized the majority’s willingness to 
rebalance the evidence.718  Without specifically addressing the claim 
construction requiring contact “in three dimensions,” Judge Newman 
said plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony was sufficient to support the jury 
verdict.719  “[I]t is not [the Federal Circuit’s] province to reweigh the 
evidence, when there was substantial evidence by which a reasonable 
jury could have reached its verdict.”720
In Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,721 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a judgment of no literal infringement reached by the district 
court after a bench trial.722  The patent related to the separation of 
synchronization signals from video signals.723  The patent was 
“directed to methods for sync separation . . . that minimize the effect 
of noise in the video signal.”724  The issue was whether the accused 
chips produced voltage peaks of synchronization signals that 
constituted a “clamped sync portion” as required by the claims.725  
The trial court found that “it simply cannot be said that the [accused] 
chips are designed to or do in practice produce a ‘clamped sync 
portion’ at the [patented level], even if a few pulses at that level 
sometimes occur in actual operation.”726
On appeal, the plaintiff made two arguments:  first, that the trial 
court had mistakenly excused the defendant’s infringement as de 
minimis (“even if a few pulses at that level sometimes occur in actual 
operation”); and second, that the trial court improperly required 
plaintiff to prove intent to infringe.727  The Federal Circuit, however, 
disagreed with both arguments.728  As to the first argument, the 
Federal Circuit understood the trial court to have found that “the few 
pulses that might occur at the [patented] level would not be a 
 
 717. Id. at 1349, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370. 
 718. See id. at 1349–51, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370–72 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that there was, in fact, substantial evidence in support of the jury’s 
verdict, and that it is not the job of the appellate court to replace the trial court’s 
verdict due to its own interpretation of the evidence). 
 719. Id. at 1350–51, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 720. Id. at 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 721. 545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 722. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 723. Id. at 1320, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 724. Id. at 1321, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 725. Id. at 1335–36, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 726. Id. at 1335–36, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. 
v. Gennum Corp., No. C 01-04204 RS, 2007 WL 1319528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 
2007)). 
 727. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 728. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
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clamped sync portion within the meaning of the claims because the 
hard clamp circuit does not perform the function of clamping or 
holding the sync tips to that voltage level.”729  The Federal Circuit said 
the district court did not find “that those few pulses actually would 
infringe very quickly or briefly.”730
The plaintiff’s second argument was based on the district court’s 
statement that if any pulses happened at the patented level, “it would 
be ‘a matter of happenstance rather than design.’”731  The plaintiff 
argued that the court required it to prove intent because of the use of 
the word “design.”732  The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that 
that statement did not mean that the trial court equated design with 
intent.733  Instead, it “was merely part of the evidence considered by 
the trial court in concluding that the hard clamp circuit does not 
provide a clamped sync portion.”734
In Broadcom Corp. v. International Trade Commission,735 the Federal 
Circuit addressed when a product’s compliance with industry 
standards could be used to prove infringement.736  Broadcom 
complained to the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) that 
Qualcomm had imported chipsets that infringed Broadcom’s 
patents.737  Broadcom accused Qualcomm’s chipsets in wireless 
handsets on third-generation wireless networks that use the EV-DO 
wireless communication standard developed and promoted by 
Qualcomm.738  Broadcom argued that “under the EV-DO standard, 
networks must implement the Idle State Protocol’s Sleep State and 
that the Sleep State involves powering down a handset’s wireless 
receiver”—which allegedly infringed the patent.739  The Federal 
Circuit, however, disagreed.  It concluded that the EV-DO standard 
did not require handsets to enter the Sleep State or power down 
when in the Sleep State:  “[t]he EV-DO standard provides that a 
terminal in the Sleep State ‘may shut down part of its subsystems to 
conserve power’ and the terminal ‘may shut down processing 
resources to reduce power consumption.’”740  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit continued, the EV-DO standard specified that “the use of the 
 
 729. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 730. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 731. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Videotek, 2007 WL 1319528, at *6). 
 732. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 733. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 734. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 735. 542 F.3d 894, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 736. Id. at 899, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 737. Id. at 896, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290. 
 738. Id. at 898, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
 739. Id. at 899, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (emphasis added). 
 740. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (emphasis added). 
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word ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ indicates that a certain feature is not 
required by the standard.”741  The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed 
the Commission’s finding of non-infringement.742  The Federal 
Circuit did not consider Broadcom’s argument that Qualcomm’s 
promotion of the optional features was sufficient to show inducement 
because the Federal Circuit found that Broadcom had not presented 
that argument to the administrative law judge at the ITC.743
In Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,744 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of joint infringement, following up on the court’s 
previous decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,745 which 
“clarified the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly 
infringed by the combined actions of multiple parties.”746 Under BMC 
Resources, “where the actions of multiple parties combine to perform 
every step of a claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if 
one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such 
that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the 
‘mastermind.’”747  In Muniauction, the issue was whether the actions of 
a bidder and auctioneer in an electronic system for auctioning 
financial instruments “may be combined under the law so as to give 
rise to a finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer.”748  The 
Federal Circuit found that it was insufficient that the auctioneer 
controlled access to its system and instructed bidders on the system’s 
use.749  The court held that the auctioneer “neither performed every 
step of the claimed methods nor had another party perform steps on 
its behalf, and Muniauction [had] identified no legal theory under 
which Thomson might be vicariously liable for the actions of the 
bidders.”750
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Communications Systems, Inc.,751 the 
district court addressed a defense to infringement:  implied license.752  
Plaintiff Zenith owned a patent on wired remote control devices, 
called “pillow speakers,” used to control a television and receive 
 
 741. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 742. Id. at 908, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 743. Id. at 900, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–94. 
 744. 532 F.3d 1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 745. 498 F.3d 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 746. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357 (citing BMC Res., 
498 F.3d at 1380, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549). 
 747. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380–81,  
84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550). 
 748. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357. 
 749. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358. 
 750. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358. 
 751. 522 F.3d 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 752. Id. at 1354, 1360–67, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517, 1521–26. 
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television audio in hospital rooms.753  Zenith then licensed the patent 
to three companies that manufactured and distributed the pillow 
speakers.754  Defendant PDI marketed a television that was compatible 
with Zenith’s pillow speakers,755 and Zenith sued claiming that PDI 
directly infringed its patent by testing its televisions with pillow 
speakers, and indirectly infringed by supplying televisions and 
encouraging customers to operate them with pillow speakers.756  The 
district court granted PDI’s motion for summary judgment based on 
the licenses between Zenith and the three pillow speaker 
manufacturers.757  The Federal Circuit affirmed.758  In an opinion by 
Judge Schall, the appeals court noted that this case was different than 
a typical implied-license case.759  In an ordinary case, the issue is 
whether a license is implied by the mere “sale of nonpatented 
equipment used to practice a patented invention.”760  A court 
therefore will, in the typical case, examine whether the unpatented 
equipment has noninfringing uses and infer an implied license only 
if the unpatented equipment has no noninfringing uses.761  In this 
case, however, the Federal Circuit stated that “the license is not 
merely implied by virtue of the sale of pillow speakers by [the three 
manufacturers].”762  Instead, customers purchasing pillow speakers 
obtained an implied license to use the pillow speakers “derived from 
the express licenses between Zenith and those manufacturers.”763  In this 
situation, where the patent owner had expressly authorized the sale 
of a device for infringing uses, the traditional inquiry—whether the 
equipment involved has no noninfringing uses—was irrelevant.764
The court next addressed the scope of the implied licenses 
obtained by the purchasers of pillow speakers—i.e., whether they 
allowed the customers to use the pillow speakers with non-Zenith 
 
 753. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. 
 754. Id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 755. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 756. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 757. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 758. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 759. See id. at 1360–61, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521–22 (analogizing this case to 
Jacobs v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1097, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), which was not a typical implied-license case). 
 760. Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (quoting Met-Coil Sys., Corp. v. 
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) 
(emphasis added). 
 761. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521–22. 
 762. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 763. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 764. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
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televisions such as PDI’s televisions.765  The Federal Circuit noted that 
the express license agreements gave the three manufacturers broad 
“authorization to ‘make, have made, use, sell or otherwise dispose 
of . . . any pillow speaker unit’” and that “[n]o restrictions are placed 
on the grants.”766  The court therefore held that “purchasers of pillow 
speakers manufactured by [the three companies] obtain[ed] an 
implied license under [the patent] to use the pillow speakers in 
combination with any compatible television—not just Zenith 
televisions,”767 and the appeals court affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment that the patent was not infringed upon 
because of the implied license defense.768
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents 
Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does 
not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the 
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements 
of the patented invention.”769  Infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents may be limited by a number of related doctrines, such as 
prosecution history estoppel.770
1. Amendment-based prosecution history estoppel 
“The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent 
owner from recapturing with the doctrine of equivalents subject 
matter surrendered to acquire the patent.”771  Under amendment-
based prosecution estoppel history, “[a] patentee’s decision to 
narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a 
general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the 
amended claim.”772  This presumption of surrender, however, 
 
 765. See id. at 1361–62, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (discussing whether the 
implied licenses allowed the customers to use the pillow speakers with non-Zenith 
televisions such as PDI’s televisions). 
 766. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 767. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 (emphasis omitted). 
 768. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 769. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21,  
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1866 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950)). 
 770. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 (2002) (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33,  
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873)). 
 771. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1312,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718, 1724 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 772. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Exhibit Supply Co. 
v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136–37, 52 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 275, 277 (1942)). 
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according to Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,773 can 
be rebutted if the patentee shows any of the following: 
 [T]hat the alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable at 
the time of the narrowing amendment, that the rationale 
underlying the narrowing amendment bore no more than a 
tangential relation to the equivalent in question, or that there was 
“some other reason” suggesting that the patentee could not 
reasonably have been expected to have described the alleged 
equivalent.774
a. The tangentiality exception 
The Federal Circuit addressed the second of these, the 
tangentiality exception, in at least three cases during 2008.  In Regents 
of the University of California v. Dakocytomation California, Inc.,775 the 
Federal Circuit rejected the trial court’s ruling that prosecution 
history estoppel barred the plaintiffs’ allegations of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents.776  The patent at issue was 
“directed to improved ‘methods for identifying and classifying 
chromosomes’ in order to detect chromosomal abnormalities.”777  
The district court held that the patentees had narrowed the scope of 
the “blocking nucleic acid” limitation during prosecution.778  The 
district court therefore barred the plaintiffs from asserting that the 
defendants’ peptide nucleic acids (“PNAs”) were an equivalent of a 
“blocking nucleic acid” and granted summary judgment of non-
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.779
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that prosecution history estoppel 
did not apply because the “nucleic acid” limitation was not narrowed 
during prosecution for a substantial purpose related to 
patentability.780  Alternatively, they argued that the presumption of 
surrender was overcome because the rationale for the amendment 
was only tangentially related to the accused equivalent product.781
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentees presumptively 
surrendered all equivalents of the “blocking nucleic acid” limitation 
 
 773. Festo, 535 U.S. 722. 
 774. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714). 
 775. 517 F.3d 1364, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 776. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 777. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,447,841 
col.1 ll.21–22 (filed Dec. 14, 1990)). 
 778. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 779. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 780. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 781. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
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because they had amended the claim to overcome, at least in part, 
the examiner’s rejections.782  The Federal Circuit held that the 
presumption of surrender was overcome here “because the 
narrowing amendment was only tangential to the accused PNA 
equivalent.”783  The court found that the prosecution history showed 
that the patentees’ arguments in narrowing the claim focused on the 
method of blocking, not the type of nucleic acid.784  Indeed, the court 
found that the “nucleic acid” aspect of the claim was “not at issue in 
the office action rejecting the claims, the Examiner Interview 
Summary Record, or the patentees’ remarks accompanying the 
amendment.”785
The dissenting opinion of Judge Prost disagreed with the majority’s 
application of the presumption of prosecution history estoppel.786  
The amendment, Judge Prost stated, had more than a simple 
tangential relationship to the equivalent because it “limits the claims 
to a method of disabling repetitive sequences by blocking with 
‘blocking nucleic acids’ (i.e., DNA or RNA).”787  Judge Prost stated 
that the patentees therefore “surrendered any other means of 
disabling repetitive sequences,” but the accused equivalent (PNA) 
“functions to do exactly that, i.e., to disable repetitive sequences.”788
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,789 however, Judge Prost 
wrote the opinion for the court rejecting the application of the 
tangentiality exception and holding that prosecution history estoppel 
barred infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.790  The patent 
at issue related to methods of compressing speech.791  Plaintiff Lucent 
argued on appeal that the district court erred in finding that it had 
not rebutted the presumption of surrender through the tangentiality 
exception.792  More specifically, Lucent argued that the accused 
equivalent diverged from the claimed invention in that: 
 [S]teps 1–4 (determining redundancies) are performed once 
per frame as opposed to once per pulse.  This difference . . . is 
unrelated to the rationale for the amendment, which was to 
distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art based only on 
 
 782. Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937–38. 
 783. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 784. Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 785. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 786. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 787. Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 788. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 789. 525 F.3d 1200, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 790. Id. at 1217, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014–15. 
 791. Id. at 1204, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 792. Id. at 1217, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
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the performance of step 5 (removing redundancies) during each 
pulse-forming iteration as opposed to during each frame-based 
iteration.793
The Federal Circuit again applied Festo’s test for the tangential 
exception—“‘whether the reason for the narrowing amendment is 
peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent’”794—but 
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not overcome the 
presumption of surrender.795  The court concluded that the patentee 
had amended the claims to add “a five-step iterative process for 
determining and removing redundancies during the pulse-forming 
loop.”796  The claimed invention differed from the prior art because 
the invention determined pitch removal during each pulse-forming 
iteration.797  The alleged equivalent, however, “determine[d] pitch 
redundancy outside the iterative process for forming each loop,” and 
the court therefore concluded that “the purpose for the amendment 
is not unrelated [i.e., not tangential] to the alleged equivalent.”798
Similarly, in International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,799 the Federal 
Court held that the tangentiality exception did not apply.800  During 
the prosecution of its patent related to metal-oxide-semiconductor 
field effect transistors (“MOSFETs”), the patentee added an 
“adjoining” limitation to overcome the examiner’s rejections.801  The 
defendant argued that this amendment limited the claim only to 
MOSFETs devices and therefore precluded it from reaching IXYS’s 
insulated gate bipolar transistors (“IGBTs”).802
In response, the patentee argued that prosecution history estoppel 
did not apply to the “adjoining” limitation because it broadened the 
claim instead of narrowing it, and alternatively, that the tangential 
exception applied.803  The Federal Circuit held that the patentee was 
partially correct that the “adjoining” amendment was broadening in 
some respects.804  In other respects, however, “[t]his term excludes 
structures that might have been covered by the original claim 
 
 793. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
 794. Id. at 1218, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
 795. Id. at 1218, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 796. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 797. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 798. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 799. 515 F.3d 1353, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 800. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 801. Id. at 1358, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 802. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 803. Id. at 1358–59, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 804. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
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language,” and “[t]he amendment therefore narrowed the scope of 
the claim.”805
As to the tangentiality argument, the Federal Circuit acknowledged 
that the examiner rejected the original claim because the 
specification did not support all of its limitations and that the 
patentee overcame this rejection “by amending the claim to contain 
only the structural limitations disclosed in the text of the 
specification,” a modification that might not have been required.806  
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the patentee’s decision to 
narrow the claim “using the limiting term ‘adjoining,’ whether or not 
required to overcome the rejection, cannot be described as only 
tangentially related to the equivalency of a structure with a non-
adjoining regions.”807
b. The foreseeability exception 
Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.808 involved 
both the tangentiality and foreseeability exceptions from Festo.  The 
patent at issue involved “technology to control airflow surge in 
auxiliary power units or ‘APUs.’”809  Honeywell alleged that 
Sundstrand’s APS 3200 infringed claims of three of its patents under 
the doctrine of equivalents.810  The district court held that Honeywell 
had not overcome the presumption of surrender under either the 
tangentiality or foreseeability exceptions and that prosecution history 
estoppel therefore precluded application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.811
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court.  In its 
tangentiality analysis, the Federal Circuit focused on the patentee’s 
rewriting of dependent claims into independent ones.812  According 
to the court, by rewriting the dependent claims (which contained an 
“IGV limitation”) as independent claims, the patentee “‘effectively 
add[ed] the [IGV] limitation to the claimed invention.’”813  The court 
 
 805. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 806. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911–12. 
 807. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 808. 523 F.3d 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 809. Id. at 1307, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 810. Id. at 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722. 
 811. Id. at 1311, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723. 
 812. See id. at 1316, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727 (emphasizing the need to assess 
“‘the patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment’” 
(quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
 813. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727 (quoting Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton 
Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1144, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)) (alteration in original). 
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said that Honeywell had, in essence, amended the claims to add the 
IGV limitation and that “[b]ecause the alleged equivalent focuses on 
the IGV limitation, the amendment bore a direct, not merely 
tangential, relation to the equivalent.”814
With respect to foreseeability, the essential inquiry is “whether the 
alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time of the amendment.”815  By limiting the 
application of prosecution history estoppel only to unforeseeable 
equivalents, the exception “ensures that the doctrine [of equivalents] 
does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter could have 
foreseen during prosecution and included in the claims.”816  In 
Honeywell, the Federal Circuit had to decide whether the alleged 
equivalent—“the use of IGV position to detect high flow and low 
flow”—was later-developed technology and unforeseeable at the time 
of the amendments during prosecution.817  The defendant had not 
developed the alleged equivalent until eight years after the patent 
amendments, but the Federal Circuit held that this timing was 
“ambiguous with respect to the foreseeability criterion” because, for 
example, the defendant had developed the equivalent quickly after 
noticing the problem.818  The court ultimately found that “much of 
the extrinsic evidence—most notably several prior art references in 
the record—support[ed] the district court’s decision” that the 
alleged equivalent was foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill at the 
time of the amendment.819
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman argued that prosecution 
history estoppel did not apply because the claims were never 
substantively amended, only changed in form from dependent to 
independent claims.820  Judge Newman disagreed with the majority’s 
“presumption of surrender to all equivalents of the claim elements 
and limitations that originated in dependent claims that were never 
amended and that were not the subject of prosecution history 
estoppel.”821  According to Judge Newman, the majority’s holding that 
“surrender of the entire universe of potential equivalents is presumed 
 
 814. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727. 
 815. Id. at 1312, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724 (quoting Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369,  
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327). 
 816. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725. 
 817. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725. 
 818. Id. at 1314, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726. 
 819. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726. 
 820. See id. at 1321, 86. U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“Simply presenting claims of varying scope, whether in independent or dependent 
form, is not a narrowing amendment or argument.”). 
 821. Id. at 1317, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
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when the original independent claim is cancelled,”822 even though 
there was no narrowing amendment or limiting argument during 
prosecution with respect to the dependent claims, “place[d] new 
constraints on the patentee’s access to the doctrine of equivalents.”823
With respect to the tangentiality exception, Judge Newman argued 
that the majority did not review the reason for the narrowing 
amendment and its relation to the accused equivalent as required by 
Festo.824  According to Judge Newman, “[t]his criterion relates to why 
an amendment was made; it does not become irrebuttable simply 
when the accused equivalent concerns the same element that was 
added by amendment.”825
Furthermore, Judge Newman suggested that the majority applied 
significantly more restrictive criteria for the foreseeability exception 
than that established by the Supreme Court in Festo.826  According to 
Judge Newman, under Festo, “foreseeability means ‘readily known 
equivalents,’ not unknown equivalents developed a decade later.”827  
The alleged equivalent was not foreseeable because “[i]t was 
uncontradicted that the [alleged] equivalent was developed years 
after the [patentee’s] application was filed and prosecuted, and only 
after considerable effort.”828
2. Argument-based prosecution history estoppel 
“In addition to amendment-based prosecution history estoppel, 
there can also be argument-based prosecution history estoppel.”829  
Argument-based prosecution history estoppel can arise when the 
patentee makes unmistakable statements surrendering claim scope 
during patent prosecution.830
In Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,831 the Federal Circuit engaged 
in an extensive analysis of argument-based prosecution history 
estoppel.  One of the defendants argued that the district court should 
have instructed the jury that prosecution history estoppel limited the 
range of “equivalents of the ‘wall surface’ limitation.”832
 
 822. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 823. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729. 
 824. Id. at 1321–22, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731–32. 
 825. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732. 
 826. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729. 
 827. Id. at 1319, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 
(2002)). 
 828. Id. at 1321, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731. 
 829. SCHWARTZ, supra note 706, at 168. 
 830. Id. at 168 n.81. 
 831. 511 F.3d 1157, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 832. Id. at 1176, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
  
830 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
The appellant relied on Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,833 in 
which the Federal Circuit discussed “the relationship between 
prosecution disclaimer (limiting claim scope because of statements 
made by the patentee in prosecution) and argument-based 
prosecution history estoppel (limiting the scope of the doctrine of 
equivalents because of statements made by the patentee in 
prosecution).”834  In Omega, the Federal Circuit stated that both 
prosecution disclaimer and argument-based estoppel required “clear 
and unmistakable” disavowing actions or statements during 
prosecution.835
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the patentee 
had not made any broad disclaimer regarding the “wall surface” 
limitation during the prosecution history.836  Instead, the patentee 
had “simply made explicit the meaning of the term ‘wall surface’ that 
was already implicit in the patent.”837  A “reference to the ‘common 
cylindrical plane’ in the prosecution history therefore did not 
disclaim any subject matter that was otherwise within the scope of the 
claim language, but merely explained, in more explicit terms, what 
the claims already covered.”838  Thus, the Federal Circuit held, there 
was no “clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope that would 
eliminate any equivalents of the ‘wall surface’ limitation.”839
3. Other limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents is subject to additional limitations 
besides prosecution history estoppel.  For example, “the ‘all 
limitations rule’ restricts the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents if doing so would vitiate a claim limitation.”840  When 
considering whether the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate a claim 
limitation, a court must consider “whether the alleged equivalent can 
be fairly characterized as an insubstantial change from the claimed 
subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation 
meaningless.”841
 
 833. 334 F.3d 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 834. Cordis, 511 F.3d at 1177, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 835. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1325–26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 836. Cordis, 511 F.3d at 1177, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 837. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 838. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 839. Id. at 1178, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 840. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1129, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1871 (1997)). 
 841. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (citing Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. 
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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In Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., the Federal 
Court held that the “all limitations rule” prevented the patentee’s use 
of the doctrine of equivalents.842  The patents related to “novel 
recombinant plasmids for the enhanced expression of an enzyme” 
and to “methods for the conditional control of the expression of said 
enzyme.”843  During prosecution, the patentee “specifically chose to 
limit claim 4 to a recombinant plasmid where the bacterial source 
[was] E. coli.”844  In litigation, the patentee argued that the 
defendant’s product, which replaced E. coli with an enzyme known as 
Thermus aquaticus (“Taq”) was insubstantial and equivalent to the 
plaintiff’s product.845  The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that “a 
finding that Taq is an equivalent of E. coli would essentially render the 
‘bacterial source [is] E. coli’ claim limitation meaningless, and would 
thus vitiate that limitation of the claims.”846  After they “specifically 
chose” E. coli to be the bacterial source, the plaintiffs “cannot now 
argue that any bacterial source . . . would infringe that claim.”847
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.,848 the Federal Circuit 
held that “[w]here . . . a patentee has brought what would otherwise 
be equivalents of a limitation into the literal scope of the claim, the 
doctrine of equivalents is unavailable to further broaden the scope of 
the claim.”849  The patents at issue related to High Performance 
Liquid Chromatography (“HPLC”), which is a “process for 
separating, identifying, and measuring compounds contained in a 
liquid.”850  The key claim limitation at issue referred to particles 
“having average diameters of greater than about 30 µm.”851  The 
Federal Court’s decision focused on the meaning of the word “about” 
in the phrase “about 30 µm.”852
The patent owner accused the defendant’s “30 µm” HPLC columns 
of being within the scope of equivalents of the “about 30 µm” 
limitation.853  The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that “the word 
‘about’ in the context of the written description and the claims . . . 
makes clear [that] ‘about 30 µm’ encompasses particle diameters that 
 
 842. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 843. Id. at 1118, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 844. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 845. Id. at 1128, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242. 
 846. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (alteration in original). 
 847. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 848. 543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 849. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. 
 850. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 851. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (emphasis added). 
 852. See id. at 1371–72, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916–17 (analyzing the purpose of 
the numeric range in the limitation). 
 853. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
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perform the same function, in the same way, with the same result as 
the 30 µm particles.”854  Thus, such equivalents are already within the 
literal scope of the claim and the “patentee cannot rely on the 
doctrine of equivalents to encompass equivalents of equivalents.”855
C. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
The mirror image of the doctrine of equivalents is the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents.  The reverse doctrine of equivalents “allows a 
court to find no infringement even though each element of the 
patent’s claim literally reads on the product or process of the alleged 
infringer.”856  It is a factual determination and the test is “whether the 
apparently literally infringing product or process is so far changed in 
principle that it performs the same or similar function in a 
substantially different way.”857  The Federal Circuit “has never 
affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents,”858 and 2008 was no exception. 
In Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the defendant Apotex 
attempted unsuccessfully to invoke the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents as a defense against infringement.859  Plaintiff Roche 
asserted infringement by Apotex based on a drug formulation 
covered by an Apotex abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) 
that was directed to a generic version of Roche’s ACULAR LS drug.860  
The defendant did not argue that its formulation fell outside of the 
literal scope of the patent; instead it argued that its formulation did 
not infringe under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.861
The defendant argued that: 
 [A] person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the 
‘principle’ of [the asserted patent] is the use of [Octoxynol 40] in 
an amount sufficient to cause the formation of micelles and 
thereby provide robust stability to the formulation by preventing 
interactions between [ketorolac tromethamine] and 
[benzalkonium chloride].862
According to the defendant, the concentration of Octoxynol 40 in 
its drug formulation “is far below the concentration required to form 
 
 854. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. 
 855. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. 
 856. SCHWARTZ, supra note 706, at 169. 
 857. Id. 
 858. Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 859. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 860. Id. at 1374–76, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309–11. 
 861. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 862. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
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micelles.”863  According to the defendant, its formulation was 
“stabilized by a completely different ingredient and mechanism, and 
functions in a ‘substantially different way’ from” Roche’s 
formulation.864
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents defense.865  The Federal Circuit held that the defendant 
had failed to properly establish the “principle” or “equitable scope of 
the claims” in the patented invention.866  The Federal Circuit noted 
that “[t]he ‘principle’ . . . of the patented invention is determined in 
light of the specification, prosecution history, and the prior art,” but 
stated that there was “no mention of ‘micelle’”—the core of the 
alleged “principle” of the patent—“in the claims, specification, or 
prosecution history.”867  Furthermore, the specification disclosed a 
formulation containing the same concentration of Octoxynol 40 as in 
the alleged infringing formulation.868  The Federal Circuit therefore 
held that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, and that 
the district court had properly granted summary judgment of literal 
infringement.869
D. Indirect Infringement 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit also resolved a few cases dealing with 
induced infringement.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), “‘[w]hoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.’”870  To prevail on a claim of inducement, “the patentee 
must show, first that there has been direct infringement, and second 
that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement.”871  Two 
years ago, in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.,872 the Federal Circuit 
clarified the meaning of the intent required for induced 
infringement.873  It “requires more than just intent to cause the acts 
that produce direct infringement.  Beyond that threshold knowledge, 
 
 863. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 864. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 865. Id. at 1378–79, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 866. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 867. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 868. Id. at 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 869. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 870. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304–05,  
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) 
(2006)). 
 871. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276–77 (internal citations omitted). 
 872. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 873. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
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the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct 
infringement.”874
In Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission,875 the 
Federal Circuit reiterated the level of intent required for induced 
infringement.876  The ITC’s administrative law judge decided the case 
before the DSU decision, and therefore only required a showing of 
“the intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement.”877  The 
Federal Circuit explained that although proper at the time, this 
approach was improper after DSU.878  The court therefore vacated and 
remanded the ITC’s determination of induced infringement.879  The 
Federal Circuit also reiterated that induced infringement requires 
not only intent to cause the infringing acts, but also “‘evidence of 
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement,’ 
i.e., specific intent to encourage infringement.”880  The court did, 
however, note that this specific intent may be shown by circumstantial 
evidence.881
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,882 the Federal Circuit reiterated 
that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to show intent for 
induced infringement.883  The district court had found that 
Qualcomm directly infringed and induced infringement of certain 
claims, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.884  The 
Federal Circuit agreed with the plaintiff Broadcom that substantial 
evidence supported the jury’s induced-infringement verdict.885  The 
law, the court concluded, did not require direct evidence as 
defendant Qualcomm argued.886  The circumstantial evidence here 
was enough to establish intent, which under DSU required a showing 
that the alleged infringer “knew or should have known his actions would 
induce actual infringements.”887  The court noted that Qualcomm did 
 
 874. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (internal citations omitted). 
 875. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 876. Id. at 1354, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 877. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 878. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 879. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 880. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 
F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 881. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 882. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For discussion of 
this case’s implications upon permanent injunctions, see infra notes 1663–1676 and 
accompanying text. 
 883. Id. at 699–700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55. 
 884. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55. 
 885. Id. at 700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 886. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 887. Id. at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS 
Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis added)). 
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“not dispute that it was on notice of Broadcom’s patents and 
infringement contentions,” conceded it “worked closely with its 
customers to develop and support the accused products,” and did not 
“make changes to those products or give its customers” warnings even 
after suit was filed.888
Qualcomm had also argued that the district court erred by 
instructing the jury to consider a failure to obtain an opinion of 
counsel as a factor in determining intent to induce infringement.889  
Qualcomm argued that the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Seagate890 
made such an instruction erroneous.  According to Qualcomm, 
because the Federal Circuit held in Seagate that willful infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 284 would be determined based on an “objective 
recklessness” standard and that a defendant had no obligation to 
obtain opinion of counsel to defeat allegations of willful 
infringement, there also could be no such obligation for a defendant 
accused of induced infringement as the Federal Circuit had 
established in DSU that induced infringement put an even higher 
burden on the plaintiff—i.e., showing specific intent.891
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected Qualcomm’s assertion that 
opinion-of-counsel evidence is no longer relevant in determining 
intent to induce infringement.892  According to the court, Qualcomm 
was correct that a defendant has no affirmative duty to seek an 
opinion of counsel and that, as the Federal Circuit held in Knorr-
Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge, GmbH v. Dana Corp.,893 a court may 
not impose, when a defendant fails to obtain an opinion of counsel, 
an “adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an 
opinion would have been unfavorable.”894  The Federal Circuit, 
however, held that even if an adverse inference or evidentiary 
presumption was inappropriate, a failure to obtain counsel’s opinion 
could be a factor that a jury could consider in evaluating an alleged 
infringer’s intent.895  “Because opinion-of-counsel evidence, along 
with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer ‘knew or 
should have known’ that its actions would cause another to directly 
infringe . . . such evidence remains relevant.”896  The court stated that 
 
 888. Id. at 700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (internal quotations omitted). 
 889. Id. at 698–99, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 890. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 891. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 892. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 893. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 894. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting Knorr-
Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1346, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566). 
 895. Id. at 699–700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55. 
 896. Id. at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
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just as an opinion of counsel can be used by a defendant as 
exculpatory evidence with respect to intent under DSU, “failures to 
procure such advice” can be circumstantial evidence used by a 
plaintiff to show intent to infringe.897
The Federal Circuit also was not swayed by Qualcomm’s argument 
based on Seagate.  The Federal Circuit held that, whatever effect 
Seagate’s objective recklessness standard may have had to limit the 
relevance of opinion of counsel with respect to willful infringement, 
the standard for induced infringement continued to be the “specific 
intent” standard established in DSU, and on that question, opinion-of-
counsel evidence remained relevant.898
Finally, in another induced-infringement case, Symantec Corp. v. 
Computer Associates International, Inc.,899 the Federal Circuit reversed a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.  
The district court held that the patentee had not established induced 
infringement because it had not shown direct infringement by third 
parties.900  On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the 
district court’s summary judgment.901  The court held that even 
though the plaintiff had not produced evidence that “any particular 
customer” had directly infringed, the plaintiff had shown that the 
defendant encouraged customers to use the accused products and 
that customers could use those products only in an infringing way.902  
The plaintiff therefore had “produced sufficient circumstantial evidence 
of direct infringement to create a genuine issue of material fact.”903  
The Federal Circuit also addressed in 2008 “an important, and 
previously unresolved, question concerning the scope of liability” 
under the second form of indirect infringement—contributory 
infringement under § 271(c).904  In Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer 
Inc., 550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the accused infringer 
manufactured an optical disk drive that, for purposes of the appeal, 
was assumed to contain both (a) components that had no substantial 
noninfringing use (i.e., separate hardware and embedded software 
modules that necessarily performed the patented process) and  
(b) components that did have substantial noninfringing uses.905  The 
 
 897. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 898. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 899. 522 F.3d. 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 900. Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 901. Id. at 1299, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 902. Id. at 1293, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. 
 903. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457 (emphasis added). 
 904. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1336, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1577, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 905. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585. 
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accused manufacturer could not be held directly liable because only 
its customers practiced the patented method, but the patent owner 
sought to hold the manufacturer liable for indirect contributory 
infringement under § 271(c).  Section 271(c) imposes liability on 
anyone who sells “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process,” if, among other things, the 
component, material, or apparatus is not “suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use.”906   
In a per curiam decision, the Federal Circuit held that the accused 
manufacturer could be held liable for contributory infringement 
under § 271(c).  Even though the ultimate device that the accused 
manufacturer sold—i.e., the optical disk drive—had substantial 
noninfringing uses, the Federal Circuit held that the sale of the disk 
drive could constitute contributory infringement based on the 
included component that did not have substantial noninfringing 
uses.907  The court stated that under any other rule, evasion of 
§ 271(c) “would become rather easy”:  a manufacturer that wanted to 
sell hardware that would be used to infringe a patented process could 
avoid contributory liability simply by adding additional hardware that 
also performs another (noninfringing) process.908   
Judge Gajarsa dissented.  He argued that, under the Federal 
Circuit’s prior decision in Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575 
(Fed. Cir. 1987), the accused manufacturer could be considered, for 
purposes of § 271(c), to have “sold” only the optical disk drive (which 
had substantial noninfringing uses) and not the component.909  Judge 
Gajarsa also argued that the facts in Ricoh did not rise to the standard 
for contributory infringement established by the Supreme Court in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltc., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), 
which Judge Gajarsa said allowed such liability only where one could 
“presume an intent that a product [would] be used to infringe 
another’s patent”910 and where there was “more acute fault than the 
mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.”911
 
 906. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 907. 550 F.3d at 1337-38, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586-87. 
 908. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
 909. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592. 
 910. Id. at 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592. 
 911. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932-33, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010 (2005)). 
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E. Section 271(e)(1):  Research Exemption to Infringement 
The Federal Circuit resolved two cases dealing with 35 U.S.C.  
§ 271(e)(1), the “safe harbor” statute that protects from infringement 
liability the making, sale, use, or importation of a patented invention 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.”912  In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,913 Amgen 
complained to the ITC that Roche’s importation of human 
erythropoietin and derivatives (collectively “EPO”) was in violation of 
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.914  Amgen argued 
that the EPO and the process by which it was made in Europe 
infringed Amgen’s patents.915  Roche moved for summary judgment, 
and the Commission granted it, holding that the importation of EPO 
was protected by the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor.916  Amgen appealed the 
Commission’s ruling, arguing that the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor statute 
did “not apply to Tariff Act violations based on foreign practice of 
patented processes,” and, moreover, that “not all of the imported 
EPO was used for the statute’s exempt purposes.”917  Amgen argued 
that the safe-harbor statute did not protect the importation at issue 
because liability was based, in part, on the infringement of process 
patents.918  The safe-harbor statute protects the importation of only 
“patented invention[s]”; Amgen argued that “a process cannot be 
imported” and that importation of products produced offshore by an 
infringing process therefore would not fall within the safe harbor.919  
Amgen also indicated that the Commission had “a long-standing . . . 
right” to block importation based on offshore practice of U.S. 
patented process920 and argued that Congress preserved this authority 
when it enacted § 271(g) in 1988.921  Amgen cited Congress’s 
statement that the addition of § 271(g) “shall not deprive the patent 
owner of any remedies available under subsections (a) through (f) of 
 
 912. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
 913. 519 F.3d 1343, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 914. Id. at 1344–45, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189; see also Tariff Act of 1930,  
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
 915. Id. at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.  A foreign process can be the basis 
for U.S. infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which provides that 
importing a product “made by a process patented in the United States” constitutes 
infringement.  35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006). 
 916. Amgen, 519 F.3d at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 917. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 918. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 919. Id. at 1346, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190. 
 920. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190. 
 921. Id. at 1347, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190. 
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section 271 . . . [and] under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”922  
According to Amgen, this showed that although the safe harbor 
might block process patent infringement when enforced in the 
district courts under § 271(g), a remedy was retained for process-
patent infringement enforced under section 337.923
Judge Newman’s majority opinion agreed with the Commission 
that the safe-harbor statute protected Roche’s EPO from section 337 
exclusion “not only as to infringement of Amgen’s product patents 
but also as to Amgen’s process patents.”924  According to the majority, 
§ 271(g)’s legislative history as well as Supreme Court guidance 
supported the Commission’s ruling.925  The majority cited a 
congressional report directly on this issue, stating that Congress did 
not intend that it shall be an act of infringement to import a 
product which is made by a process patented in the United States 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”926
The Federal Circuit also cited Supreme Court statements 
emphasizing Congress’s broad purpose “of removing patent-based 
barriers to proceeding with federal regulatory approval of medically 
products.”927  The court said that this “weigh[ed] heavily against 
selectively withholding the § 271(e)(1) exemption depending on 
whether the infringement action is in the district court or the 
International Trade Commission.”928  That interpretation of this 
broad policy has extended § 271(e)(1) to “all uses of patented 
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and 
submission of any information under the FDCA.”929  The Federal 
Circuit therefore “affirm[ed] the Commission’s ruling that the safe 
harbor statute applies to process patents in actions under Section 
337, when the imported product is used for the exempt purposes of 
§ 271(e)(1).”930
With respect to Amgen’s second argument—that at least some of 
the imported EPO was “not exempt because its actual use was not 
 
 922. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (quoting Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9006(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1567 
(1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)). 
 923. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. 
 924. Id. at 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. 
 925. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191–92. 
 926. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191–92 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 48 (1987)). 
 927. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
 928. Id. at 1348–49, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
 929. Id. at 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005)). 
 930. Id. at 1349, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
  
840 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information”931—the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the 
Commission to determine the exempt status of each study in which 
the EPO was to be used.932
In his dissent, Judge Linn agreed with the majority that § 271(e)(1) 
was intended to protect process patents, but he argued that the 
statute’s protection did not extend to block the Commission’s authority 
to exclude imports.  Judge Linn noted that “§ 271(e)(1) declares that 
certain activities ‘shall not be an act of infringement,’” whereas the 
plain language of section 337 of the Tariff Act allows the Commission 
to exclude products even without an act of infringement.933  Although 
a separate section, section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), makes it unlawful to 
import articles that “infringe a valid and enforceable United States 
patent,”934 section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) prohibits importation of articles 
that “are made, produced, processed . . . [by] a process covered by 
the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.”935  
According to Judge Linn, “this difference in language [was] not 
accidental,” and the legislative history showed that process claims are 
not within the safe-harbor statute.936
In Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,937 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor applied to the 
importation of products that were not themselves regulated but that 
were used with regulated devices.938  Plaintiff Proveris sued 
Innovasystems (“Innova”) for infringing its patent related to nasal 
spray pumps and inhalers.939  Innova’s accused device—an Optical 
Spray Analyzer (“OSA”)—is not FDA-regulated, but it is used with a 
regulated device.940  Innova argued that the safe-harbor statute 
protected the OSA devices because they were “used by third parties 
solely for the development and submission of information to the 
 
 931. Id. at 1349, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
 932. Id. at 1350, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 933. See id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not require an act of infringement for the Commission to 
issue an exclusion order.”). 
 934. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) 
(2006)) (emphasis added). 
 935. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (quoting § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)). 
 936. Id. at 1353–54, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195–96. 
 937. 536 F.3d 1256, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 938. Id. at 1258, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 939. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 940. Id. at 1259, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
  
2009] 2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS  841 
                                                
FDA.”941  The district court, however, ruled as a matter of law that the 
safe-harbor statute did not include the OSA devices.942
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that one of the purposes of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act was to eliminate the de facto extension in 
patent life caused by the fact that other parties could not produce 
competitive products upon expiration of a patent because such 
products required FDA pre-market approval, and a competitor 
ordinarily could not begin that process until after the patent 
expired.943  Section 271(e)(1) sought to eliminate that distortion “by 
providing a safe harbor that immunized competitors from 
infringement on account of making, using, offering to sell, or selling 
. . . a ‘patented invention solely for use reasonably related’” to an 
FDA submission.944  “The basic idea behind this provision was to allow 
competitors to begin the regulatory approval process while the patent 
was still in force, followed by the market entry immediately upon 
patent expiration.”945
The Federal Circuit concluded that the OSA devices are protected 
by the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor because they are not subject to the 
FDA pre-market approval,946 and they thus “face[] no regulatory 
barriers to market entry upon patent expiration.”947  The defendant 
Innova was therefore “not a party who, prior to [§ 271(e)(1)], could 
be said to have been adversely affected by the [above-mentioned] 
distortion.”948  In short, because Proveris’s patented product “is not 
subject to a required [Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act] approval 
process, it does not need the safe harbor protection afforded by  
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”949
F. Design Patent Infringement 
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,950 the Federal Circuit 
reconsidered (in an en banc proceeding) the appropriateness of its 
point-of-novelty test in design patent cases.951  The main issue before 
 
 941. Id. at 1260, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 942. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 943. Id. at 1260–61, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 944. Id. at 1261, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
(2006)). 
 945. Id. at 1261, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 946. Id. at 1265, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 947. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 948. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 949. Id. at 1266, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 950. 543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 951. Id. at 671, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63. 
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the Court was “whether the ‘point of novelty’ test should continue to 
be used as a test for infringement of a design patent.”952
The Federal Circuit began by discussing the rule of law for design 
patent infringement established by the Supreme Court in Gorham Co. 
v. White.953  In that case, the Supreme Court established the “ordinary 
observer test” as the proper standard to determine infringement of a 
design patent.954  Accordingly, 
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if 
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing 
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one 
patented is infringed by the other.955
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, since its 1984 case, Litton 
Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,956 it has held that satisfying the ordinary-
observer test is not sufficient to prove similarity.957  Rather, the court 
has also required patentees to satisfy a “point of novelty test,” which 
requires that the accused design “also appropriate the novelty of the 
claimed design in order to be deemed infringing.”958  Thus, in 
essence, “[f]or a design patent to be infringed . . . no matter how 
similar two items look, ‘the accused device must appropriate the 
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior 
art.’”959  Since its inception, the point-of-novelty test has been used 
both as “conjunctive” with, and “distinct” from, the ordinary-observer 
test.960
On appeal, the plaintiff urged the Federal Circuit to abandon the 
point-of-novelty test961 and replace it with an ordinary-observer test 
focusing on the “appearance that distinguishes the patented design 
from the prior art.”962  The defendant attempted to defend the point-
of-novelty test,963 arguing that the Supreme Court had adopted the 
test in an 1893 decision, Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.964
 
 952. Id. at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 953. 81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
 954. Egyptian Goddess, 542 F.3d at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 955. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528). 
 956. 728 F.2d 1423, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 957. Egyptian Goddess, 542 F.3d at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 958. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 959. Id. at 670–71, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444, 
221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 109). 
 960. Id. at 671, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 961. Id. at 672, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 962. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 963. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 964. 148 U.S. 674 (1893). 
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After a lengthy discussion of Whitman Saddle, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion suggested that it 
was fashioning a separate point of novelty test for infringement.”965  
The court therefore held that the point-of-novelty test “should no 
longer be used in the analysis of a claim of design patent 
infringement [case] . . . . [T]he ‘ordinary observer’ test should be the 
sole test . . . .”966  Finally, the Federal Court applied the ordinary-
observer test and affirmed the summary judgment of non-
infringement.967
V. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Every issued patent is presumed to be valid, and each claim of a 
patent is “presumed valid independently of the validity of other 
claims.”968  This statutory presumption of validity arises because it is 
assumed that the patent examiner conducted a diligent review of the 
prior art and verified that all requirements of patentability were met 
before allowing the claims.969  An alleged infringer may overcome the 
statutory presumption of validity only upon a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence of invalidity.970
A. Patentable Subject Matter 
It is a well-known threshold requirement that, in order to qualify 
for patent protection, an invention must encompass patentable 
subject matter.  The Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.”971  Therefore, a patent’s validity may be challenged if the 
claimed subject matter does not fall within one of the four statutory 
classes listed above. 
 
 965. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 673, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664–65. 
 966. Id. at 678, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 967. Id. at 680–83, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670–72. 
 968. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 969. See Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054,  
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The presumption of validity . . . 
carries with it a presumption the examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was 
allowing.”). 
 970. See, e.g., Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367, 
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View 
Eng’g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1377, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948, 1953 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 741, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 645 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 971. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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As the Supreme Court has noted, the broad language of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 reflects Congress’s intention that patentable subject matter 
“‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”972
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s § 101 decisions have imposed 
some limits.  In particular, one may not obtain a patent on laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, abstract intellectual concepts, or 
mathematical formulas.973  In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued a key 
decision that addressed the line between such patent-ineligible 
principles and patent-eligible subject matter. 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Bilski974 clarified the 
test for determining what constitutes a patentable “process” under  
§ 101, addressing patentability in the context of a prospective 
business method patent.975  Bilski and his co-applicant sought a patent 
directed to “[i]n essence, . . . a method of hedging risk in the field of 
commodities trading.”976  On review, the examiner noted that the 
applicants had not limited their claims to implementation on a 
computer and concluded that the claims were not limited by any 
particular apparatus.977  The examiner ultimately rejected all eleven 
claims as unpatentable under § 101, and the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences sustained the rejection.978
The Federal Circuit, in a 9-3 decision, affirmed the PTO’s rejection 
of Bilski’s claims, holding that the claims were not directed to a 
patent-eligible “process” under § 101.979  Writing for the majority, 
Chief Judge Michel explained that, while the Supreme Court has 
held that a claim is not a patentable “process” if it is drawn to 
“fundamental principles” (such as “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas”), a process may be patentable if it is 
drawn to a particular “application” of a fundamental principle.980  
This distinction is designed to prevent the issuance of claims that 
seek to pre-empt entirely others’ use of a law of nature or abstract 
idea.981  According to the majority, the Supreme Court, particularly 
through its decisions in Diamond v. Diehr982 and Gottschalk v. Benson,983 
 
 974. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 972. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 
(1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)).  
 973. Id.; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 201 (1978). 
 975. Id. at 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 976. Id. at 949, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 977. Id. at 950, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 978. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 979. Id. at 949, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 980. Id. at 952–53, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389–90 (emphasis omitted) (citing 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 187, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 7, 8 (1981)). 
 981. Id. at 953, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 982. 450 U.S. 185, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). 
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“enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is 
tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application 
of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle 
itself.”984  That test is the “machine-or-transformation” test, under 
which a process is “surely patent-eligible under § 101 if:  (1) it is tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”985
Adopting this test, the court rejected as “inadequate” “several other 
purported articulations of § 101 tests,”986 including the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test,987 the “technological arts test,”988 and the “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result” test989 set forth in State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.990 and In re Alappat.991  With 
respect to the last test, the Federal Circuit noted, without explicitly 
overruling its decision in State Street,992 that “those portions of our 
opinions in State Street and AT&T [Corp. v. Excel Communications, 
Inc.]993 relying solely on a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ 
analysis should no longer be relied on.”994  The Federal Circuit 
further rejected any “categorical exclusions”—such as for all business 
 
 983. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972). 
 984. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 985. Id. at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (referencing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6; Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 n.9 (1978); Cocrane v. 
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)). 
 986. Id. at 958, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 987. Id. at 959, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.  Described and refined in In re 
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978), In re Walter, 618 
F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,  
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A 1982), this test required two separate steps:   
“(1) determining whether the claim recites an ‘algorithm’ within the meaning of 
Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is ‘applied in any manner to 
physical elements or process steps.’”  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 959 (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 686). 
 988. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. Urged by some 
amici, the technological arts test would, in the Federal Circuit’s view, “be unclear 
because the meanings of the terms ‘technological arts’ and ‘technology’ are both 
ambiguous and ever-changing.  And no such test has ever been explicitly adopted by 
the Supreme Court, this court, or our predecessor court.”  Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
at 1395. 
 989. Id. at 959–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 990. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 991. 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 992. The State Street decision, which involved a claim directed to a data processing 
system for managing a portfolio of mutual funds, held that claims drawn toward 
methods of conducting business should be “treated like any other process claims” 
under § 101.  149 F.3d at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 993. 172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 994. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 n.19, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395 n.19. 
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method patents—“beyond those for fundamental principles already 
identified by the Supreme Court.”995
Having concluded that the machine-or-transformation test was the 
proper test to apply, the Federal Circuit then elaborated upon the 
“transformation” prong that was at issue in the case.996  To qualify as a 
patent-eligible process under the “transformation” prong, the 
“transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed 
process”997 and may not constitute merely “‘insignificant postsolution 
[or extra-solution] activity.’”998  In addition, the “article” transformed 
should be drawn from one of two categories of items:  The first (and 
most “self-evident”) category consists of “physical objects or 
substances” that undergo chemical or physical transformations.999  
The second category consists of “electronic signals and electronically-
manipulated data” that represent physical objects or substances.1000  As 
an example of the latter category, the court cited its mixed decision 
in In re Abele, in which it deemed unpatentable a claim directed to a 
process of graphically displaying variances in data, but deemed 
patentable a separate claim specifying that such data constituted “X-
ray attenuation data produced in a two dimensional field by a 
computed tomography scanner.”1001  Thus, because the latter claim 
encompassed a transformation of raw data into “a particular visual 
depiction of a physical object” (e.g., a bone or internal organ),1002 it 
constituted patentable subject matter. 
The Federal Circuit held that Bilski’s claims did not satisfy the 
machine-or-transformation test because they did not transform any 
article to a different state or thing.1003  The applicants’ process, as 
claimed, involved simply an exchange of legal rights to purchase a 
 
 995. Id. at 960, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 996. The court declined to elaborate upon the “machine” component of the test.  
Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (“As to machine implementation, Applicants 
themselves admit that the language of claim 1 does not limit any process step to any 
specific machine or apparatus. . . . We leave to future cases the elaboration of the 
precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular 
questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process 
claim to a particular machine.”). 
 997. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 998. Id. at 957 & n.14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393 & n.14 (citing Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 185, 191–92, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 10 (1981)).  In addition, the 
Federal Circuit specified that Diehr further held that “mere field-of-use limitations are 
generally insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent-eligible.”  
Id. at 957, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 999. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1000. Id. at 962–63, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 1001. Id. at 962–63, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 
908–09, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 1002. Id. at 963, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 1003. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
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particular commodity at a particular time and price.1004  As such, it did 
not involve a patent-eligible transformation under § 101.1005  
“Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or 
private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such 
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical 
objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical 
objects or substances.”1006  This, coupled with the applicants’ 
admission that their claims failed to meet the “machine” prong of the 
test, rendered Bilski’s claims unpatentable under § 101.1007
Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Linn, wrote a separate concurrence, 
which reviewed the legislative history of the patent statute1008 and 
concluded that, under the statute, the only patent-eligible processes 
are those concerning other types of patentable subject matter, i.e., 
manufactures, machines, or compositions of matter.1009  Judge 
Newman’s dissent disagreed with the concurrence’s reading of the 
legislative history to preclude entirely patents on “business 
method[s]” or “human activity.”1010  In addition, Judge Newman 
criticized the majority for “usurp[ing] the legislative role”1011 and 
“redefining the word ‘process’ in the patent statute” in a way that 
contradicted Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent,1012 
thereby creating uncertainty in the law1013 and threatening to impede 
technological progress by diminishing inventors’ incentives.1014
The final two dissents expressed disagreement with the majority’s 
enunciation of the machine-or-transformation test, while nevertheless 
 
 1004. Id. at 964, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 1005. Id. at 963–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 1006. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 1007. Id. at 964, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 1008. Id. at 966–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400–07 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 1009. Id. at 966, 974, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400, 1407. 
 1010. Id. at 989, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. 
at 985–89, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414–17 (describing the English Statute of 
Monopolies and the English common law, and contrasting them with U.S. patent law 
in order to argue that the English laws do not inform the interpretation of § 101). 
 1011. Id. at 997, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 1012. Id. at 977, 981, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407, 1411.  In particular, according 
to Judge Newman, the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr “did not propose the 
‘machine-or-transformation’ test” to limit patentable processes under § 101.  Id. at 
981, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. 
 1013. See id. at 994–95, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421–22 (arguing that the 
majority’s opinion upset settled expectations and failed to answer numerous 
questions arising from the machine-or-transformation test, such as what types of 
transformations may qualify as being “central to the purpose of the claimed process,” 
whether “software instructions implemented on a general purpose computer are 
deemed ‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine,’” and whether the inventions of State St. and 
AT&T v. Excel would pass the new test). 
 1014. See id. at 997, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (“The court’s decision affects 
present and future rights and incentives . . . .”). 
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agreeing (implicitly or explicitly) that Bilski’s claims constituted 
unpatentable subject matter.1015  Judge Mayer dissented on the 
grounds that the majority opinion did not go far enough to limit 
patentability under § 101, and he criticized the majority for adopting 
a test that is “too easily circumvented.”1016  According to Judge Mayer, 
“State Street and AT&T should be overruled” because “[a]ffording 
patent protection to business methods lacks constitutional and 
statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation 
and usurps that which rightfully belongs in the public domain.”1017  
Finally, Judge Rader’s dissent argued that the majority should have 
affirmed the Board’s rejection simply “[b]ecause Bilski claims merely 
an abstract idea.”1018  This conclusion is supported by a direct reading 
of Supreme Court precedent, which holds that “the only limits on 
[patent] eligibility are inventions that embrace natural laws, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”1019  However, wrote Judge Rader, the 
majority “expands (transforms?) some Supreme Court language into 
rules that defy the Supreme Court’s own rule,”1020 unduly limit the 
scope of patentable subject matter, and “link[] patent eligibility to 
the age of iron and steel at a time of subatomic particles and 
terabytes.”1021
The Federal Circuit’s order in In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten1022 denied 
a request to rehear the dispute underlying its 2007 decision in In re 
Nuijten,1023 in which the court affirmed the PTO’s determination that 
claims directed to an electromagnetic “signal” were unpatentable 
under § 101.1024  Judge Linn, joined by Judges Newman and Rader, 
dissented from the court’s order.  Judge Linn would have reheard the 
case, as it “raise[d] important questions about the relationship 
between § 101 and § 103.”1025  He also argued that the panel majority 
 
 1015. Id. at 998–1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424–34 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. 
at 1011-15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434–37 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 1016. Id. at 1008, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 1017. Id. at 998, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.  In particular, Judge Mayer wrote, it 
was “highly unlikely that the framers . . . intended to grant patent protection to 
methods of conducting business,” in light of their keen awareness of the “odious” 
monopolies on trade that led to the seventeenth-century English Statute of 
Monopolies.  Id. at 998–99, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424–25. 
 1018. Id. at 1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 1019. Id. at 1012–13, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 1020. Id. at 1013, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 1021. Id. at 1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 1022. 515 F.3d 1361, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1023. 500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1024. See id. at 1357, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (explaining that electromagnetic 
signals are devoid of matter and they are not “manufacture[s]” under § 101) 
(alteration in original). 
 1025. In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten, 515 F.3d at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928. 
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had too narrowly construed the scope of a § 101 “manufacture” to 
exclude “‘transient or ‘fleeting’” things like signals, in conflict with 
applicable precedent.1026  Following the Federal Circuit’s denial of the 
petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court denied the appellant’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.1027
B. Anticipation 
To be patentable, an invention must be “new.”1028  If the claimed 
subject matter of a patent is not “new,” it is said to be “anticipate[d]” 
by the prior art.1029  In order to invalidate a claim on the grounds of 
anticipation, a challenger must establish that every element of the 
claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either 
expressly or inherently.1030  In contrast with the standard for 
obviousness, discussed below in Section C, the standard for 
anticipation is one of strict identity, requiring that the prior 
reference set forth all claimed elements “arranged as in the claim.”1031  
Section 102 of the patent statute establishes various ways in which a 
patent may be invalidated due to anticipation, among which are  
(1) disclosure in a prior patent or printed publication1032 and  
(2) disclosure by public use or sale.1033
1. Patents and printed publications 
Under § 102 of the patent statute, 
[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
(a) the invention was . . . patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention 
thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
 
 1026. See id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928 (discussing prior decisions’ 
broader “framework” for delineating patentable “manufactures,” such as those in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980), 
and In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 221 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 1027. Nuijten v. Dudas, 129 S. Ct. 70 (2008). 
 1028. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2008) (specifying in § 101 that only a “new and 
useful” invention—or a “new and useful” improvement upon an invention—is 
entitled to patent protection (emphasis added)).  Section 102 defines various sources 
of prior art that may negate novelty, as discussed in further detail below.  Id. § 102. 
 1029. EMI Group N. Am. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350,  
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1030. See id. at 1350, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429 (“A prior art reference 
anticipates a patent claim if the reference discloses, either expressly or inherently, all 
of the limitations of the claim.”) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 
760, 771, 218 U.S.P.Q. 781, 789 (Fed Cir. 1983)). 
 1031. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 954, 
960, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1966)). 
 1032. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2008). 
 1033. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year 
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.1034
These requirements are “grounded on the principle that once an 
invention is in the public domain, it is no longer patentable by 
anyone.”1035  In the case of printed publications, which are not 
necessarily “published” to the same degree as issued patents, 
anticipation depends upon whether the particular reference was 
“publicly available” or “publicly accessible” to interested skilled 
artisans prior to the “critical date” (i.e., more than one year prior to 
the date the application was filed).1036  The determination of whether 
a document constitutes a printed publication under § 102 is a 
question of law based upon the underlying facts of each particular 
case.1037
In Leggett & Platt Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc.,1038 the Federal Circuit applied 
the doctrine of inherent anticipation to affirm summary judgment of 
invalidity over a previously filed patent.  Plaintiff Leggett & Platt 
(“L&P”) instituted an infringement action against defendant VUTEk, 
a manufacturer of large-scale commercial printers, for alleged 
infringement of L&P’s ‘518 patent entitled “Method and Apparatus 
for Ink Jet Printing on Rigid Panels.”1039  VUTEk argued that the 
asserted ‘518 claims were anticipated by VUTEk’s ‘823 patent, which 
described a printer carriage that used UV radiation to set ink after it 
is deposited on a surface.1040  Although the parties agreed that the 
‘823 reference anticipated numerous limitations of the ‘518 patent, 
they disputed whether it disclosed an assembly that is “effective to 
impinge sufficient UV light on the ink to substantially cure the ink,” 
as required by the ‘518 patent.1041
 
 1034. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 1035. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1896) 
(citing In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361, 196 U.S.P.Q. 670, 675 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 1036. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1377–78, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 898–99, 228 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) at 455. 
 1037. See, e.g., Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 
1317, 1321, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Whether an asserted 
anticipatory document qualifies as a ‘printed publication’ under § 102 is a legal 
conclusion based on underlying factual determinations.”); see also In re Hall, 781 F.2d 
at 899, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 455 (“The § 102 publication bar is a legal 
determination based on underlying fact issues, and therefore must be approached 
on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 1038. 537 F.3d 1349, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1039. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 1040. Id. at 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949. 
 1041. Id. at 1353–54, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
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In affirming the district court’s judgment of invalidity, the Federal 
Circuit relied on evidence showing that the ‘823 reference disclosed 
light emitting diodes (“LEDs”) that used UV energy to cure the ink 
about 75–80% when used as indicated.1042  Under the strict summary 
judgment standard, the court was unable to hold, as a matter of law, 
that seventy-five to eighty percent cured constituted “substantially 
cure[d]” as that term was construed by the district court.1043  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that, while the ‘823 reference 
may not have expressly disclosed LEDs that “substantially cure[d]” 
ink, “it inherently disclose[d] LEDs that [were] ‘effective to’ do 
so.”1044  Therefore, the prior art reference anticipated the asserted 
claims, rendering them invalid.1045
In Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc.,1046 the Federal Circuit reversed 
a summary judgment of anticipation on the grounds that the district 
court had improperly combined elements from two separate 
examples disclosed within a single prior art reference.  The claim at 
issue recited a payment system for processing credit card transactions 
over the Internet and comprised five “links” between various 
participating entities (e.g., between a customer computer and a 
vending computer, between a customer computer and a payment 
processing computer).1047  On defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, the district court concluded that the claim was invalidated 
by a single prior art reference, the iKP reference, which included all 
five of the claimed links, albeit in two separately disclosed 
examples.1048
On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had 
incorrectly applied the law of anticipation, under which a prior art 
reference does not anticipate unless it “not only disclose[s] all 
elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, 
but . . . also disclose[s] those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’”1049  
This means, the court held, 
that unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the 
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the 
limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the 
 
 1042. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 1043. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 1044. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 1045. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 1046. 545 F.3d 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1047. Id. at 1362, 1368–69, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757–58. 
 1048. Id. at 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758. 
 1049. Id. at 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758 (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
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claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing 
claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.1050
In the present case, the iKP reference disclosed two separate 
systems for online credit card payment, neither of which contained 
all five links combined or arranged in the same way as in the asserted 
claim.1051  Because it was erroneous to combine different elements of 
the separate systems merely because they all appeared within the 
same prior art reference, the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity was reversed.1052
In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,1053 the court affirmed the validity 
of a patent on a dextrorotatory isomer, where prior patents 
describing its chemical racemate did not sufficiently disclose or 
enable the separation of the particular isomer claimed.1054  The patent 
at issue covered a chemical compound commonly known as 
clopidogrel bisulfate, which is sold under the brand name Plavix to 
treat and prevent blood clots.1055  In particular, the asserted claim 
recited the “dextrorotatory isomer”—one of a pair of stereoisomers 
of a compound, which is identical to its counterpart (the levo-rotatory 
isomer) in all aspects except its orientation in three-dimensional 
space.1056  The racemate—a combination of both stereoisomers—was 
disclosed in two prior patents as part of a general class of 
compounds.1057  In response to allegations of infringement, the 
alleged infringer argued that the prior disclosure of the racemate 
anticipated the asserted claims, rendering them invalid.1058  The 
district court held that the prior art’s disclosure of a particular genus 
of compounds did not anticipate the specific isolated stereoisomer 
claimed, and that the earlier patent did not sufficiently enable one of 
ordinary skill to make the invention without undue 
experimentation.1059
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's 
determination that the references did not constitute anticipating 
disclosures of the detrorotatory isomer, where they contained only 
general statements that the compounds (including the racemate) 
 
 1050. Id. at 1371, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759. 
 1051. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759. 
 1052. Id. at 1371, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760. 
 1053. 550 F.3d 1075, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1054. Id. at 1084, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375–76. 
 1055. Id. at 1077, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 1056. Id. at 1077, 1080, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371, 1373. 
 1057. Id. at 1078, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 1058. Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1059. Id. at 1084–85, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77. 
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consisted of stereoisomers.1060  As noted in Net MoneyIN, an 
anticipating reference must disclose all elements of a claim “arranged 
as in the claim”1061 without requiring one of ordinary skill to pick, 
choose, and combine various elements not directly related to each 
other in the cited reference.1062  In addition, the Federal Circuit held 
that the district court did not err when it concluded that the prior art 
references were not adequately enabling.1063  Anticipation “requires 
the specific description as well as enablement of the subject matter at 
issue.”1064  As the court noted, “[a]ny presumption of enablement of 
prior art does not exclude consideration of whether undue 
experimentation would be required to achieve enablement.”1065  In 
this case, the evidence established that the process of separating 
stereoisomers (into their dextrorotatory and levo-rotatory forms) was 
known to be both difficult and unpredictable, thus requiring 
substantial experimentation even by those skilled in the art.1066  
Therefore, there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that 
the prior art reference would not have enabled a skilled artisan to 
isolate the dextrorotatory isomer of clopidogrel.1067
Similarly, the court in Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1068 affirmed the district court’s determination that 
a prior art reference did not anticipate claims directed to a drug 
treatment, where the reference was not enabling.1069  According to the 
Federal Circuit, “the trial court’s findings properly support[ed] its 
conclusion that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have needed to 
experiment unduly to gain possession of the invention.”1070  The 
asserted claims were directed to the use of riluzole to treat 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”) or Lou Gehrig’s disease.1071  The 
record established that the alleged prior art patent, which disclosed 
several diseases and many thousands of compounds, only made 
passing reference to riluzole, without discussing its use as a treatment 
 
 1060. Id. at 1084, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1061. Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. 
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751, 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 1062. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (referencing In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587, 
172 U.S.P.Q. 524, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1972)). 
 1063. Id. at 1085, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77. 
 1064. Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1065. Id. at 1085, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 1066. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 1067. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77. 
 1068. 545 F.3d 1312, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1069. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1070. Id. at 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1071. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
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for ALS.1072  Moreover, the dosage guidelines in the alleged prior art 
reference were general and provided insufficient guidance regarding 
a treatment regimen for ALS.1073  The reference also failed to provide 
working examples.1074  Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded, the 
reference did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to use 
riluzole as a treatment for ALS, and the patent was not invalid.1075
In PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,1076 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the presumption of patent validity extends to the 
question of priority date.1077  PowerOasis asserted two patents that 
derived from a June 2000 continuation-in-part (“CIP”) application, 
which itself derived from an original application filed in February 
1997.1078  The alleged infringer, T-Mobile, argued that the asserted 
claims were anticipated by the MobileStar Network, which was in 
public use more than one year prior to the filing of the CIP 
application.  Because PowerOasis conceded that the MobileStar 
Network included all the limitations of the asserted claims, 
PowerOasis argued that the claims were entitled to the priority date 
of the original 1997 application, which predated the MobileStar 
Network.1079  The district court placed the burden of proof on 
PowerOasis to establish entitlement to the earlier priority date.1080  
After determining that the original patent’s written description did 
not adequately disclose the later-issued CIP claims, the district court 
granted T-Mobile’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity due to 
anticipation.1081
Affirming the decision on appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected 
PowerOasis’s assertion that the presumption of validity should also 
include a presumption that CIP claims must be accorded the earliest 
effective filing date.1082  In the present case, the PTO had made no 
determination regarding the priority date of the claims, either in the 
context of a rejection or in the context of an interference.1083  The 
court explained:  “When neither the PTO nor the Board has 
previously considered priority, there is simply no reason to presume 
 
 1072. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1073. Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1074. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1075. Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1076. 522 F.3d 1299, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1077. Id. at 1301, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1078. Id. at 1301–02, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1079. Id. at 1302–03, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1080. Id. at 1303, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1081. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1082. Id. at 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1083. Id. at 1304–05, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388–89. 
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that claims in a CIP application are entitled to the effective filing date 
of an earlier filed application.”1084
That conclusion, the court explained, did not alter T-Mobile’s 
burden, as the moving party, to prove invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.1085  Because PowerOasis did not dispute that the 
MobileStar Network was in public use more than one year prior to 
the filing of the CIP application, and it conceded that the MobileStar 
Network would constitute § 102(b) prior art if not afforded the 
earlier filing date, T-Mobile had met its burden.1086  Therefore, “the 
burden was on PowerOasis to come forward with evidence to the 
contrary,”1087 i.e., establishing entitlement to an earlier priority 
date.1088  Upon review of the record, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were not 
entitled to the earlier filing date because the original written 
description did not support the later-issued asserted claims.1089
The Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Technology 
Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,1090 when it affirmed the district court’s 
judgment that certain asserted claims were not entitled to an earlier 
filing date and were therefore invalid over the prior art.1091  The court 
also clarified the burdens of proof raised in PowerOasis, distinguishing 
between the burden of persuasion (“the ultimate burden assigned to 
a party who must prove something to a specified degree”), and the 
burden of production, also known as the burden of “going forward 
with evidence.”1092  Because the patent statute imposes a presumption 
of validity, 
a challenger has the burden of persuasion to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the contrary is true.  That ultimate 
burden never shifts, however much the burden of going forward 
may jump from one party to another as the issues in the case are 
raised and developed.1093
Therefore, the court explained, 
 PowerOasis says nothing more than, and should be understood to 
say, that once a challenger (the alleged infringer) has introduced 
sufficient evidence to put at issue whether there is prior art alleged 
 
 1084. Id. at 1305, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1085. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1086. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1087. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1088. Id. at 1305–06, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1089. Id. at 1306–10, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389–94. 
 1090. 545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1091. Id. at 1320, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867–68. 
 1092. Id. at 1326–27, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1093. Id. at 1329, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
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to anticipate the claims being asserted, prior art that is dated 
earlier than the apparent effective date of the asserted patent 
claim, the patentee has the burden of going forward with evidence 
and argument to the contrary.1094
In SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc.,1095 the 
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s summary 
judgment of invalidity on four SRI patents, because there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that an SRI prior art paper was 
publicly accessible—and thus a “printed publication”—under  
§ 102(b).1096  The patents at issue pertained to methods for securing 
computer systems and detecting suspicious network activity.1097  SRI 
had described its invention in a paper analyzing the live traffic of 
TCP/IP gateways—the “Live Traffic” paper.1098  Approximately one 
year and three months before SRI filed the priority patent 
application, one of the inventors emailed the Live Traffic paper to a 
program chair at the Internet Society, which was soliciting papers for 
an upcoming symposium.1099  The email noted that the Live Traffic 
paper would also be available on SRI’s file transfer protocol (“FTP”) 
server, at a particular FTP address.1100  In SRI’s later patent 
infringement action, the defendants moved for summary judgment 
that all of the patents were invalidated by the prior art Live Traffic 
paper.1101  The district court granted the motion, holding that the 
Live Traffic paper constituted a “printed publication” under § 102(b) 
and thus anticipated the claims of the patents-in-suit.1102
Vacating and remanding the district court’s decision as to the Live 
Traffic paper,1103 the Federal Circuit held that the record contained 
insufficient factual support for defendants’ assertion that the paper 
was publicly accessible by virtue of its location on the FTP server.1104  
Like an uncatalogued graduate thesis stored in a remote library 
 
 1094. Id. at 1328–29, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 1095. 511 F.3d 1186, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1096. Id. at 1195, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 1097. Id. at 1188, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 1098. Id. at 1188, 1190, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490, 1492. 
 1099. Id. at 1190, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 1100. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 1101. Id. at 1192, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1102. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493. 
 1103. Id. at 1198, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498.  The court also affirmed a portion 
of the district court’s decision, in which it granted summary judgment of invalidity as 
to one of the patents on the grounds that a separate publication—the EMERALD 
1997 paper—anticipated the claims.  Id. at 1192–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493–
95. 
 1104. Id. at 1195, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
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location,1105 the Live Traffic paper was placed on SRI’s own FTP server 
without an index, catalogue, or any other research tools.1106  Unlike 
posters displayed at a publicized professional conference,1107 the Live 
Traffic paper was posted to a proprietary FTP server and known only 
to a handful of non-SRI individuals charged with peer-reviewing the 
unfinished paper for future publication.1108  It was thus more akin to 
“posters at a vacant and unpublicized conference.”1109  Although the 
record showed seven prior instances in which SRI directed a person 
to other documents within the same subdirectory, there was “no 
suggestion” that such individuals could freely navigate through the 
directory structure1110 or that they “would—unprompted—look there 
for an [entirely separate] unpublicized paper with a relatively obscure 
filename.”1111
Judge Moore dissented, arguing that the court should have 
affirmed the district court’s ruling of invalidity based on the Live 
Traffic paper.1112  In particular, she argued that the defendants’ 
unrefuted evidence indicated that SRI’s FTP server was navigable and 
used by the cyber security community at the relevant time period.1113  
She maintained that “[t]his case is quite unlike the uncatalogued, 
unshelved thesis in a general university library”1114 because SRI placed 
the paper on an FTP server used for cyber security, in a subdirectory 
named for a well-known cyber security project, with a file name that 
abbreviated an annual cyber security symposium.1115  Moreover, the 
factors governing public dissemination—length of time available 
(seven days), the expertise of the target audience (sophisticated 
computer scientists who knew how to use the FTP server), reasonable 
expectation of copying (no confidentiality labels or protective 
measures to dissuade copying), and ease of copying (simple in FTP 
tool)—supported the conclusion that the Live Traffic paper was 
publicly available prior to the critical date.1116
 
 1105. See In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1358–59, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 673 
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (applicant’s uncataloged, unshelved thesis was not a “publication”). 
 1106. Id. at 1196, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 1107. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347–50, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 
1117–20 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing the slide presentation given by applicants at a 
meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists, which was printed and 
pasted on poster boards to be displayed for the next two-and-a-half days). 
 1108. Id. at 1196–97, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 1109. Id. at 1197, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 1110. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 1111. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 1112. Id. at 1198, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (Moore, J., dissenting in part). 
 1113. Id. at 1200, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1114. Id. at 1202, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 1115. Id. at 1201–02, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500–01. 
 1116. Id. at 1202–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501–03. 
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Another decision discussing the “public accessibility” of a printed 
publication under § 102 was Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade 
Commission,1117 in which the Federal Circuit disagreed with the 
International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) determination that an 
alleged prior art reference was not publicly available prior to the 
critical date.1118  The prior art at issue was the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (“GSM”) standard, a comprehensive set of 
technical specifications for a mobile network.1119  The ITC had 
concluded that the GSM standard was analogous to the publication in 
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.,1120 which comprised sensitive 
documents about a complex military system and was maintained in a 
restricted-access proprietary library.1121  On appeal, however, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the record showed wide circulation of 
the GSM documents prior to the critical date:  “publicly available” 
versions distributed as “consistent sets”; exchange of GSM 
specifications between U.S. companies and their European 
subsidiaries; and even the sale of over 25,000 copies of a “GSM 
bible.”1122  Therefore, the GSM standard was “sufficiently accessible, at 
least to the public interested in the art.”1123
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the validity of the patent-
in-suit under § 102, on the grounds that the GSM standard did not 
constitute a single anticipating reference.1124  Indeed, the record 
indicated that the hundreds of specifications making up the GSM 
standard were authored by various sets of authors at different times 
and consisted of hundreds of individual specifications, each 
“stand[ing] as a separate document in its own right.”1125  Moreover, 
the internal cross-references to other parts of the GSM standard did 
not constitute incorporation by reference so as to warrant 
consolidation.1126  For those reasons, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
ITC’s determination that the GSM standard did not anticipate the 
patent claims under § 102.  The court further foreclosed the 
availability of an obviousness argument, holding that “[t]his court 
 
 1117. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1118. Id. at 1345, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 1119. Id. at 1350, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063–64. 
 1120. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 1121. Kyocera Wireless, 545 F.3d at 1350, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064. 
 1122. Id. at 1350–51, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064. 
 1123. Id. at 1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065 (citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899, 
228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation omitted). 
 1124. Id. at 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
 1125. Id. at 1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
 1126. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
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need not engage in an obviousness inquiry when [respondent] did 
not assert relevant obviousness arguments at the proper time.”1127
Similarly, where a patent holder raised a new issue of fact on 
appeal, in Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Nokia, Inc.,1128 the Federal 
Circuit refused to disturb the district court’s initial judgment.  The 
asserted claims, which described a mobile communication system 
using a code division multiple access (“CDMA”) scheme, were held 
invalid by the district court, primarily on the basis of defendant’s 
expert testimony showing the presence of each limitation in a prior 
art reference.1129  On appeal, the patent holder asserted, for the first 
time, that the prior art reference failed to disclose a particular 
“synchronization” limitation.1130  Noting that that patent holder had 
ample opportunities to present its arguments to the trial court, the 
Federal Circuit “decline[d] to remand this case to the district court to 
decide an argument as to what a prior art reference discloses [a fact 
finding] when that argument, without any justification, is raised for 
the first time on appeal.”1131  The court chastised the patent holder:  
“Appellate courts review district court judgments; we do not find 
facts.”1132
2. Public use and on-sale bar 
Section 102(b) of 35 U.S.C. bars the ability to patent an invention 
that was “in public use or on sale in this country[] more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States.”1133  Therefore, once an inventor publicly uses or sells an 
invention, she has one year in which to file a patent application.  As 
the Supreme Court has noted, underlying both the public use bar 
and the on-sale bar is a “reluctance to allow an inventor to remove 
existing knowledge from public use.”1134  The determination of patent 
validity under § 102(b)’s public use or on-sale bar is a question of law 
based on underlying facts.1135
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,1136 the Supreme Court set forth a 
two-pronged test that has been applied to both the public use and on-
 
 1127. Id. at 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1128. 527 F.3d 1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1129. Id. at 1320–22, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050. 
 1130. Id. at 1322, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051. 
 1131. Id. at 1324, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1132. Id. at 1323, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1133. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008). 
 1134. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 
(1998). 
 1135. Netscape Communs. Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1136. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
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sale bars under § 102(b).1137  Under this test, the on-sale bar 
invalidates a patent if, prior to the critical date (1) the invention was 
the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale; and (2) the 
invention was ready for patenting.1138  Similarly, the public use bar 
mandates invalidation if, prior to the critical date, (1) the invention 
was in public use; and (2) the invention was ready for patenting.1139  A 
party may show that an invention was “ready for patenting” in at least 
two ways:  (1) by demonstrating that the invention was reduced to 
practice; or (2) by demonstrating that the inventor had prepared 
drawings or other written descriptions of the invention that were 
sufficiently specific to enable one skilled in the art to practice the 
invention.1140
Even in the case of a pre-critical-date public use or sale, however, a 
patentee may nevertheless avoid invalidation of the patent by 
establishing that the prior public use or sale was undertaken for the 
purpose of experimentation, in an effort to “perfect” the invention.1141  
Under this “experimental use” exception, an inventor’s limited 
testing in public does not constitute “public use” for the purpose of  
§ 102(b), so long as the inventor maintains control over the use of 
the invention1142 and does not attempt to profit by it.1143
In E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid Printing Solutions, 
LLC,1144 the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its 
 
 1137. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1741, 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [Pfaff] Court’s analysis of the statutory 
term ‘invention,’ or the ready for patenting prong, applies to both . . . parts of 
section 102(b), ‘on sale’ and ‘public use.’  Thus, the Supreme Court’s ‘ready for 
patenting test’ applies to the public use bar under § 102(b).”). 
 1138. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646–47. 
 1139. See Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (“A bar under  
§ 102(b) arises where, before the critical date, the invention is in public use and 
ready for patenting.”). 
 1140. Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705, 1712 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1141. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64–65, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645; see also Elizabeth v. 
Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) (holding that an inventor’s 
public use “by way of experiment” does not bar patentability). 
 1142. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. 
Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“[C]ontrol and customer awareness ordinarily must be proven if experimentation is 
to be found.”); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1100, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f the inventor has no control over the alleged 
experiments, he is not experimenting.  If he does not inquire about the testing or 
receive reports concerning the results, similarly, he is not experimenting.”); In re 
Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1581, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1890, 1894 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he inventor must keep the invention under his own control.”). 
 1143. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645–46 (describing the on-
sale bar, which prevents an invention from being patented if it has been on sale any 
time before the patent application is filed) (quoting Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 137). 
 1144. 525 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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discretion in failing to accord a patent the priority date of the 
original provisional application, as required by the patent statute.1145  
In that case, the patentee changed its position over the course of the 
district court proceedings by asserting an earlier priority date in light 
of the accused infringer’s assertions of invalidity under § 102.1146  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the undisputed facts 
contained in the prosecution history established that the patent, 
which derived from a non-provisional application, was entitled to the 
filing date of the earlier provisional application as a matter of law.1147  
Because the provisional and non-provisional applications were 
identical and shared a common inventor, because the non-
provisional was filed within twelve months of the provisional, and 
finally because the non-provisional explicitly referenced the 
provisional in the application, 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) of the patent 
statute mandated that the non-provisional filing be given “the same 
effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the 
provisional application.”1148
In American Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc.,1149 the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment of 
invalidity, over a jury verdict to the contrary, where the prior public 
use of the invention was experimental.1150  The asserted patent was 
directed to a wheelchair restraint system for use in mass transit 
vehicles.1151  The accused infringer, USSC Group, argued that the 
claims were invalid for being in public use more than one year prior 
to the December 1996 filing date.1152  In particular, USSC pointed to 
the inventors’ failure to obtain formal confidentiality agreements 
when disclosing the device to others before December 1995.1153
In upholding the district court’s denial of USSC’s motion for 
summary judgment, the Federal Circuit held that 
the fact that the inventors revealed the prototype to a select group 
of individuals without a written confidentiality agreement is not 
dispositive.  When access to an invention is clearly limited and 
controlled by the inventor, depending upon the relationships of 
 
 1145. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 1146. Id. at 1355–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736. 
 1147. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741. 
 1148. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) 
(2008)); see also id. at 1359–63, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737–39 (discussing the 
requirements for a non-provisional application to claim priority over a provisional 
application). 
 1149. 514 F.3d 1262, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1150. Id. at 1265, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1151. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1152. Id. at 1267, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 1153. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
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the observers and the inventor, an understanding of confidentiality 
can be implied.1154
Here, the record established that the inventors had maintained 
control of the invention throughout the pre-critical-date period.1155  
The periodic demonstrations to a limited number of friends and 
colleagues were used to solicit feedback regarding “evolving 
prototypes” as the invention was being developed.1156  All disclosures 
occurred in an out-of-service bus—indeed, there was no evidence that 
a prototype was placed in service before December 1995—and the 
inventors consistently removed the invention from the bus for storage 
under their control.1157  Therefore, these early disclosures fell within 
the experimental use exception, and the district court appropriately 
confirmed the jury’s verdict that the patent was valid.1158
In contrast, the court in Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, 
Inc.1159 reversed the district court’s judgment applying the 
experimental use exception and concluded that the claimed 
invention was invalid for being on sale prior to the critical date.1160  
Sewing machine manufacturer Atlanta Attachment had developed, in 
response to a request from potential customer Sealy, Inc., the 
invention that became the subject of the ‘603 patent.1161  The asserted 
claim of the ‘603 patent was directed to an automatic gusset ruffler 
machine for use in producing pillowtop mattresses.1162  More than a 
year prior to the critical date, Atlanta Attachment sent several 
prototypes to Sealy for testing and approval, along with offers to sell 
production models to Sealy.1163  Atlanta Attachment also sent an 
invoice, which Sealy paid, for one prototype that embodied all 
elements of the asserted claim.1164  Although Sealy ultimately decided 
not to buy the machines, Atlanta Attachment applied for a patent on 
its invention and later sued Leggett & Platt for patent 
infringement.1165
Applying the two-pronged test described by the Supreme Court in 
Pfaff, the Federal Circuit held that claimed invention was both (1) the 
subject of a pre-critical-date commercial offer for sale and (2) ready 
 
 1154. Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86. 
 1155. Id. at 1267–68, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86. 
 1156. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86. 
 1157. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86. 
 1158. Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
 1159. 516 F.3d 1361, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1160. Id. at 1363, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996. 
 1161. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996–97. 
 1162. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996. 
 1163. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997. 
 1164. Id. at 1363, 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997–98. 
 1165. Id. at 1364, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997. 
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for patenting at the time of the offer, thus rendering the asserted 
claim invalid under the on-sale bar provision of § 102(b).1166  In the 
case of the prototype embodying all elements of the claim, Atlanta 
Attachment had offered the machine for sale (by sending an invoice) 
and Sealy had accepted (by paying the invoice).  Thus, the invention 
was the subject of an actual commercial sale, not merely an offer for 
sale.1167  The court also rejected Atlanta Attachment’s argument that 
its sales to Sealy qualified as “experimental use.”1168  In giving the 
prototypes to Sealy to conduct its own testing, Atlanta Attachment 
relinquished control over the prototypes and the alleged 
experimentation.1169  Moreover, “once there has been a commercial 
offer, there can be no experimental use exception.”1170  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the invention was “ready for 
patenting” under Pfaff because it had been reduced to practice at the 
time of the sale of the prototype, even though other improvements 
were later made.1171
In a separate concurrence, Judge Prost called attention to “the 
confusion in our caselaw” regarding the application of the 
experimental use doctrine to the two-prong test set forth in Pfaff.1172  
In particular, wrote Judge Prost, the Pfaff decision distinguished 
between “ready for patenting” (the second prong of the inquiry) and 
“reduction to practice.”1173  Nevertheless, numerous post-Pfaff 
decisions have held that the experimental use exception is 
categorically unavailable once the invention is reduced to practice.1174  
Judge Prost disagreed with this position, noting that “[i]f we were to 
accept that reduction to practice eliminates availability of the 
experimental use doctrine as a whole, the continuing viability of that 
doctrine would exist only between the time an invention is ready for 
patenting and the time it is reduced to practice.”1175  This would 
 
 1166. Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 1167. Id. at 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998. 
 1168. Id. at 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 1169. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998. 
 1170. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 1171. Id. at 1367–68, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 1172. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000 (Prost, J., concurring). 
 1173. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 1174. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000–01 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, 
Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1371 n.10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1769, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 2002); New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. 
Comp. 298 F.3d 1290, 1297, 1299, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843, 1850, 1851 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., concurring); Zacharin v. United States, 213 
F.3d 1366, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 1175. Id. at 1368–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001. 
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dramatically restrict inventors’ abilities to continue developing an 
invention.1176  Therefore, in her view, even after creating a complete 
invention that is ready for patenting, inventors “should be able to 
continue to privately develop any claimed aspect of that invention 
without risking invalidation, if they conduct development activities in 
a way that is neither public nor simply commercial, even if there is 
some commercial benefit to the inventor[s] in connection with the 
experimental use.”1177
Notwithstanding Judge Prost’s concurrence in Atlanta Attachment, 
the Federal Circuit issued two additional opinions in 2008 affirming 
the rule that reduction to practice eliminates the availability of the 
experimental use exception to the on-sale bar.  In re Cygnus 
Telecommunications Technology, LLC Patent Litigation1178 affirmed the 
district court’s ruling of invalidity explicitly “based on this court’s law 
that ‘experimental use cannot occur after a reduction to practice.’”1179  
There, the inventor’s own declaration stated that the invention—a 
computerized call-back system for placing telephone calls from 
abroad—had been reduced to practice by the time the inventor 
began charging two “beta testers” a per-minute rate to use the 
system.1180  Other information provided by the inventor further 
established that the system was functional and embodied all 
limitations of the claim prior to the sales to the beta testers.1181  Thus, 
the district court had correctly declined to apply the experimental 
use exception, and the patent was invalid under § 102(b).1182
Similarly, in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation,1183 the Federal Circuit 
reiterated that “experimental use cannot negate a public use when it 
is shown that the invention was reduced to practice before the 
experimental use.”1184  In this matter, which involved patents on the 
drug omeprazole (the active ingredient in Prilosec), the court 
concluded that the district court had misapplied the law when it 
found that the experimental use exception would prevent 
 
 1176. Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001. 
 1177. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001 (emphasis added). 
 1178. 536 F.3d 1343, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1179. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (citing Cont’l Plastic Containers v. 
Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1180. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1181. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1182. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808–09. 
 1183. 536 F.3d 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1184. Id. at 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (acknowledging, as a “But see,” 
Judge Prost’s concurrence in Atlanta Attachment). 
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invalidation even if the invention had been reduced to practice before 
or during the experimentation period.1185
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
determination that clinical studies investigating the claimed drug 
formulation did not qualify as invalidating public uses under § 
102(b), on the grounds that the drug was not yet ready for patenting 
at the time of the clinical trials.1186  The alleged infringers argued that 
the claimed drug formulation had been successfully reduced to 
practice and was therefore “ready for patenting” under Pfaff.1187  The 
district court found otherwise, and the Federal Circuit agreed.1188
Although it was undisputed that the formulation had been 
produced prior to the trials, this “[did] not establish that the 
[patentees] had determined that the invention would work for its 
intended purpose” of increasing in vivo drug stability without 
significantly compromising long-term storage stability.1189  Moreover, 
the fact that the formulation was “more stable” than prior 
formulations was insufficient to prove that the drug was stable enough 
to be used in treatment.1190  Finally, even if it was well-known before 
the critical date that omeprazole was a safe and effective treatment, 
the challenge faced by the inventors was not providing safe and 
effective treatment, but developing a formulation that could be 
delivered to the small intestine and overcome the drug’s sensitivity to 
the acidic environment—a goal that had not been achieved before 
the critical date.1191  Thus, there was no clear error in the district 
court’s finding that the claims were not ready for patenting—and 
thus not invalidating—under § 102(b).1192
C. Obviousness 
In keeping with the goal of limiting patent monopolies to cases of 
true innovation, the patent statute also bars the patentability of 
inventions that are obvious.  In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
provides that a claimed invention is unpatentable “if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
 
 1185. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1186. Id. at 1373–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873–74. 
 1187. Id. at 1373, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1188. Id. at 1373–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873–75. 
 1189. Id. at 1373–74, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75. 
 1190. Id. at 1374–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75. 
 1191. Id. at 1375, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1192. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
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at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art.”1193
Obviousness is a legal question, based upon underlying factual 
determinations.1194  The relevant factual inquiries are (1) the scope 
and content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art, 
(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, 
and (4) evidence of secondary factors (also called objective indicia of 
non-obviousness), such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
needs, and the failure of others.1195
In contrast with anticipation, obviousness may be proven by 
combining elements disclosed in various separate prior art 
references.  In evaluating obviousness based on a combination of 
references, the Supreme Court has noted that “it can be important to 
identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill 
in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed 
new invention does.”1196  As explained in the Supreme Court’s 2007 
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,1197 obviousness must 
be assessed in a flexible manner, as the motivation to combine 
references can be triggered by “any need or problem known in the 
field of endeavor at the time of invention.”1198  Nevertheless, a 
“combination of familiar elements according to known methods is 
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable 
results.”1199
In deciding KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
strict use of the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test, 
under which a patent claim is only found obvious if the prior art, the 
nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill 
in the art evidences some motivation or suggestion to combine the 
prior art teachings.1200
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.,1201 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the relationship between the patent-law doctrines of 
anticipation and obviousness.  The underlying dispute involved 
 
 1193. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2008). 
 1194. Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1181, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 
148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)). 
 1195. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467. 
 1196. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 
1396 (2007).  
 1197. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).  
 1198. See id. at 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (reasserting the applicability of 
the Graham analytical framework).   
 1199. Id. at 416, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.   
 1200. Id. at 418–19, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.  
 1201. 543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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patents relating to high-performance liquid chromatography, a 
process of identifying and separating various chemical compounds in 
a liquid.1202  At the jury trial, the alleged infringer, Waters Corp., 
argued that the asserted claims were anticipated by seven different 
prior art references.1203  Waters also argued that the seven references, 
either separately or in various combinations, rendered the claims 
obvious.1204  Over Waters’s objection, the district court submitted 
obviousness, but not anticipation, to the jury, reasoning that 
anticipation is “a subset of obviousness.”1205  The jury found, inter alia, 
that the claims were not obvious over the prior art references.1206  On 
appeal, Waters asserted that the district court had erred by granting 
judgment as a matter of law on the anticipation issue, and the Federal 
Circuit agreed.1207
The two-judge majority of the panel held that the district court had 
erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider anticipation without 
making the requisite finding that no reasonable jury could have 
concluded that the references anticipated the claims.1208  Instead, the 
district court had characterized Waters’s anticipation position as 
“iffy,” which did not foreclose the possibility of a favorable jury 
verdict.1209  The majority went on to assert that, “[w]hile it is 
commonly understood that prior art references that anticipate a 
claim will usually render that claim obvious, it is not necessarily true 
that a verdict of nonobviousness forecloses anticipation.”1210  
Anticipation and obviousness are separate statutory conditions of 
patentability and involve distinct tests.1211  Therefore, the majority 
refused to accept the dissent’s assertion that every anticipated claim is 
also obvious.1212  The court stated: 
 
 1202. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 1203. Id. at 1358–59, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1204. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1205. Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1206. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1207. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1208. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1209. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1210. Id. at 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 1211. Id. at 1363–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11. 
 1212. Id. at 1364 n.2, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 n.2.  As an example, the 
majority posed the following hypothetical: 
Consider . . . a claim directed toward a particular alloy of metal.  The 
claimed metal alloy may have all the hallmarks of a nonobvious invention—
there was a long felt but unresolved need for an alloy with the properties of 
the claimed alloy, others may have tried and failed to produce such an alloy, 
and, once disclosed, the claimed alloy may have received high praise and 
seen commercial success.  Nevertheless, there may be a centuries-old 
alchemy textbook that, while not describing any metal alloys, describes a 
method that, if practiced precisely, actually produces the claimed alloy.  
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 A court cannot refuse to submit the issue of anticipation to the 
jury simply because the accused infringer has also asserted an 
obviousness defense.  It is for the litigants—not the court—to make 
the strategic decision as to whether to assert one, both, or neither 
of these defenses in a jury trial.1213
The majority therefore reversed the district court’s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law on anticipation and remanded for 
further proceedings.1214
Judge Mayer dissented from the majority’s decision to remand the 
issue of anticipation to the trial court.  He agreed that the tests for 
establishing obviousness and anticipation are separate and that a 
district court cannot refuse to submit an anticipation defense to a 
jury simply because the accused infringer had also presented an 
obviousness defense.1215  Nevertheless, Judge Mayer maintained that 
once the jury had already determined that the claims were not 
obvious, there was no logical reason to remand the case to consider 
anticipation.1216
 The jury here considered all of the allegedly anticipating prior 
art references, but nonetheless returned a verdict that the asserted 
claims are non-obvious.  If a series of prior art references did not 
render the claimed invention obvious, how could one of those 
references contain each and every element of the claimed 
invention so as to render it anticipated?1217
Therefore, Judge Mayer would have affirmed the district court’s 
directed verdict on anticipation.1218
A series of Federal Circuit decisions in 2008, addressing the 
Supreme Court’s April 2007 decision in KSR,1219 clarified the test for 
determining obviousness based on a combination of prior art 
references.  The dispute in Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp.1220 
represented a “textbook case of [obviousness] when the asserted 
claims involve a combination of familiar elements according to 
known methods that does no more than yield predictable results.”1221  
The patent at issue was directed to a method and device for 
 
While the prior art alchemy textbook inherently anticipates the claim under 
§ 102, the claim may not be said to be obvious under § 103. 
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 n.2. 
 1213. Id. at 1364–65, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 1214. Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 1215. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 1216. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919. 
 1217. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919. 
 1218. Id. at 1377, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 1219. Supra discussion Part I.A.1.  
 1220. 520 F.3d 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1221. Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
  
2009] 2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS  869 
                                                
electrocuting small rodents, using an electrical resistive switch.1222  
The undisputed facts showed that a prior art device, the Gopher 
Zapper, disclosed all elements of the asserted claims, with the 
exception of the type of switch used:  the Gopher Zapper used a 
mechanical pressure switch, rather than an electrical resistive 
switch.1223  The use of resistive switches, however, was taught in two 
prior patents, the Dye and Madsen references, which both described 
devices for applying electrical current to an external body and were 
directed toward solving the same problem as the patent-in-suit—the 
tendency for mechanical switches to malfunction in damp and dirty 
environments.1224  In light of this evidence, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the patentee’s device was invalid as embodying merely 
an obvious combination of prior art teachings to yield predictable 
results.1225  Because the objective indicia of non-obviousness were 
insufficient to overcome such a clear case of obviousness, the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the accused infringer’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law as to obviousness.1226
In Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. 
Buffalo Technology, Inc.,1227 the Federal Circuit concluded that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the motivation to combine 
prior art references to render the patent obvious, and thus, the 
district court had erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
patentee.1228  The patents-in-suit were aimed at addressing a problem 
affecting indoor wireless local area networks—called the “multipath 
problem”—in which multiple, echoed signals (caused by radio waves 
“bouncing” off objects in a room) interfere with the main signal.1229  
Before the district court, the alleged infringer argued that the claims 
were obvious in light of several combinations of prior art 
references.1230  Applying the pre-KSR teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation (“TSM”) test, the district court granted summary 
judgment of non-obviousness, distinguishing between the general 
motivation to address a problem (which it deemed insignificant to 
prove obviousness) and a specific motivation to pursue a particular 
solution to the problem.1231  The Federal Circuit vacated the district 
 
 1222. Id. at 1339–40, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111. 
 1223. Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1224. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1225. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1226. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1227. 542 F.3d 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1228. Id. at 1378, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1229. Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 1230. Id. at 1372–73, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570–71. 
 1231. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
  
870 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
court’s determination in light of the new analytical framework 
discussed in KSR.1232
The court explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR had 
criticized the Federal Circuit’s TSM test for focusing solely on the 
precise problem that an inventor sought to solve.1233  Rather, the 
Court ruled in KSR that “any need or problem known in the field of 
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can 
provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner 
claimed.”1234  Therefore, the alleged infringer had raised a valid 
argument that all of the relied-upon references addressed a common 
problem, the “multipath” problem for wireless radio frequency 
communication systems.1235  This, coupled with the patentee’s 
counterargument that the prior art presented a different problem, 
created a factual issue regarding the motivation to combine 
references.1236  The Federal Circuit accordingly remanded the matter 
to the district court for further proceedings on the obviousness 
issue.1237
The court in Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc.1238 affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to set aside a jury verdict of non-obviousness 
where the jury improperly failed to consider a piece of relevant prior 
art.  The infringement suit involved a patented system for tracking 
items, such as silicone semiconductor wafers, in a manufacturing 
facility.1239  The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that one 
prior art patent, the “Hesser” reference, disclosed “essentially the 
same structure” as the patent-in-suit.1240  The sole material difference 
was that the Hesser reference disclosed that tracking information was 
communicated over a bus, while the claims of the asserted patent 
recited communication by way of a multiplexer.1241  The alleged 
infringers had argued that the Hesser reference, in combination with 
the well-known interchangeability between a bus and a multiplexer in 
the relevant prior art, rendered the claims invalid for obviousness.1242  
Following a trial, the jury concluded that the Hesser reference did 
not constitute relevant prior art and therefore deemed the asserted 
 
 1232. Id. at 1374, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1233. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1234. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 
1389–90 (2007).  
 1235. Commonwealth Scientific, 542 F.3d at 1375, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1236. Id. at 1375–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1237. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1238. 544 F.3d 1310, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1239. Id. at 1312, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 1240. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 1241. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626–27. 
 1242. Id. at 1314–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
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claims non-obvious.1243  Following post-trial briefing, the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in KSR, and the district court, after 
hearing additional arguments in light of KSR, set aside the jury 
verdict and entered judgment of obviousness as a matter of law.1244
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the jury had erred in 
finding that the Hesser reference was not prior art.1245  Hesser was 
directly pertinent to the art of tracking articles in a factory.1246  In fact, 
the patent holder’s own technical expert had acknowledged that the 
relevant prior art would include the Hesser reference.1247  Moreover, 
one of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with both 
buses and multiplexers, each of which had well-known advantages 
and disadvantages at the time the patent-in-suit was filed.1248  The 
court noted KSR’s point that “‘if a technique has been used to 
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using 
the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or 
her skill.’”1249  Therefore, because the patent holder had presented no 
evidence to indicate that the multiplexer in its invention operated in 
an unconventional or unfamiliar way, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
the district court that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan 
to replace Hesser’s bus with a multiplexer to arrive at the claimed 
invention.1250
As a procedural matter, the court in Asyst Technologies also ruled 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
accused infringer to introduce a new theory of invalidity (based on 
the Hesser reference).1251  “[T]he change in claim construction 
resulting from this court’s decision on appeal ‘changed the rules of 
the game.’”1252  It was therefore appropriate for the district court to 
allow the accused infringer to amend its defenses in light of the new 
claim construction.1253  
 
 1243. Id. at 1313, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 1244. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 1245. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 1246. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 1247. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 1248. Id. at 1314–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. 
 1249. Id. at 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (2007)).  
 1250. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.  In addition, the secondary considerations 
asserted by the patent holder were either inapplicable or not attributable to the 
particular bus/multiplexer substitution that distinguished the patent from Hesser.  
Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 1251. Id. at 1317, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
 1252. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 1253. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
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In Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp.,1254 however, the Federal Circuit held 
that a defendant had waived its argument under KSR by not raising 
the argument in the district court, even though KSR had been 
decided after the jury verdict and post-trial briefing.  The court held 
that the defendant could have raised KSR after the post-trial briefing 
was completed because the district court judge did not decide the post-
trial motions for almost four months after the KSR decision.1255  As the 
court summarized, “when there is a relevant change in the law before 
entry of final judgment,” a party that fails to notify the district court 
“waives arguments on appeal that are based on that change of law.”1256
In Erico International Corp. v. Vutec Corp.,1257 the Federal Circuit 
addressed obviousness in the context of a grant of a preliminary 
injunction.  The dispute arose out of Erico’s ‘994 patent, which 
disclosed a method of using Erico’s popular J-Hook fasteners to 
support low voltage communication cables.1258  The asserted claim 
included a limitation that required “spacing the [J-Hooks] . . . so that 
the run sags between [the J-Hooks] no more than about 30 cm.”1259  
Erico sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from 
selling its own version of the J-Hook.1260  While admitting that it had 
copied Erico’s J-Hook design,1261 the defendant argued that the 
asserted claim was invalid as obvious over a similar hook device 
disclosed in “the OBO Betterman” reference, in combination with a 
1990 publication by the Electronics Industries 
Alliance/Telecommunications Industry Association (“EIA/TIA”) 
setting forth proper standards for hanging open-top cable 
supports.1262  Nevertheless, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction, which the Federal Circuit vacated by a 2-1 panel 
majority.1263
The majority decision determined that the defendant raised a 
substantial question of invalidity, thus negating the patent holder’s 
“likelihood of success” on the merits.1264  As the Federal Circuit 
explained, “[v]alidity challenges during preliminary injunction 
proceedings can be successful, that is, they may raise substantial 
 
 1254. 550 F.3d 1112, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1255. Id. at 1117, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 1256. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 1257. 516 F.3d 1350, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1258. Id. at 1351, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031–32. 
 1259. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1260. Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 1261. Id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1262. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 1263. Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 1264. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
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questions of invalidity, on evidence that would not suffice to support 
a judgment of invalidity at trial.”1265  Raising a substantial question of 
invalidity “requires less proof than the clear and convincing standard 
to show actual invalidity.”1266  Under this lowered standard, the court 
concluded that the alleged combination of references, supported by 
the inventor’s own testimony, posed a “serious challenge” to the 
validity of the asserted claim.1267  The OBO Betterman reference 
disclosed a hook with downward flaring flanges that were nearly 
identical to those of Erico’s J-Hook.1268  The EIA/TIA standards set 
out appropriate circumstances for using an open-top cable support 
system for communication cables.1269  Moreover, the inventor had 
testified that it was common practice for installers of communication 
cables to pull cable taut in order to reduce sagging to less than  
30 cm.1270  This combination, explained the majority, suggests an 
“implicit motivation to combine the prior art” to use J-Hooks to meet 
the claim limitation of 30-cm-or-less cable sag.1271  Thus, a preliminary 
injunction was not warranted. 
Dissenting, Judge Newman argued that the majority applied an 
incorrect standard to the factor of “likelihood of success on the 
merits.”1272  The proper inquiry is “not whether there is a ‘substantial 
question’; it is whether the defendants have shown that they are likely 
to succeed on the merits, on the standards and burdens of proof as 
would prevail at trial.”1273  Moreover, Judge Newman criticized the 
majority for not explaining how the district court abused its 
discretion1274 and for failing to consider the other equitable factors 
(irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest) 
that are relevant to a preliminary injunction.1275
The court in Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.1276 clarified the 
post-KSR standard for determining obviousness in the context of 
patents on chemical compounds.  The patent at issue, owned by Eisai, 
claimed the compound rabeprazole and its salts.1277  Rabeprazole is 
part of a class of drugs called proton pump inhibitors, which suppress 
 
 1265. Id. at 1355–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1266. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1267. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1268. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1269. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 1270. Id. at 1356–57, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034–35. 
 1271. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1272. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1273. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036. 
 1274. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1275. Id. at 1358–59, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036. 
 1276. 533 F.3d 1353, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1277. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
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the secretion of gastric acid.1278  When Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. filed abbreviated new drug 
applications (“ANDAs”) seeking to produce a generic version of the 
drug, Eisai initiated a patent infringement lawsuit.1279  Teva countered 
by asserting that Eisai’s claimed drug compound was obvious in view 
of EP ‘726 (claiming lansoprazole, a known anti-ulcer drug), the  
‘431 patent (claiming omeprazole), and an article by Brandstrom, et 
al.1280  In particular, Teva focused on the EP ‘726 patent disclosing 
lansoprazole, which is structurally identical to rabeprazole, except 
that lansoprazole has a fluorinated substituent, whereas rabeprazole 
has a methoxypropoxy substituent.1281  The district court granted Eisai 
summary judgment of non-obviousness, and Teva appealed.1282
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that 
the claims were non-obvious.1283  Where the patent claims a chemical 
compound, an obviousness analysis typically turns on “structural 
similarities and differences” between the claimed compound and 
other compounds disclosed in the prior art.1284  Thus, one may prove 
obviousness by establishing some motivation for why a skilled artisan 
would select and then alter a known compound (i.e., lead 
compound) to arrive at the claimed invention.1285  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in KSR supports this reasoning, as it noted that “an 
invention may have been obvious ‘[w]hen there [was] . . . a design 
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there [were] . . . a 
finite number of identified, predictable solutions.”1286  “In other 
words,” wrote the Federal Circuit, “post-KSR, a prima facie case of 
obviousness for a chemical compound still, in general, begins with 
the reasoned identification of a lead compound.”1287
Here, Teva chose to identify lansoprazole as the lead compound in 
its obviousness theory.1288  However, one of the most desirable traits of 
lansoprazole is its ability to cross lipid membranes—a property that is 
 
 1278. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1279. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1280. Id. at 1357, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 1281. Id. at 1357–58, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 1282. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1283. Id. at 1362, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1284. Id. at 1356–57, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith 
Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)). 
 1285. Id. at 1357, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455. 
 1286. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1390 (2007)) (alteration in 
original). 
 1287. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. 
 1288. Id. at 1358–59, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
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attributable to its fluorinated substituent.1289  Because the record 
provided “no discernable reason”1290 for why a skilled artisan would be 
motivated to select lansoprazole, only to remove its key feature, Teva 
failed to establish that the patented claims were obvious.1291
The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re DBC1292 affirmed the PTO’s 
rejection of claims directed to a “nutraceutical composition” from the 
fruit of the manogsteen tree as obvious over the prior art.1293  DBC 
had obtained a patent on its composition, claiming a mixture of the 
juice and rind of the mangosteen fruit, combined with at least one 
other type of fruit or vegetable juice.1294  On re-examination, the 
examiner rejected all claims as obvious over a combination of seven 
references, of which only one (the JP ‘442 patent) was not before the 
original examiner who found the claims patentable.1295  In response, 
DBC submitted three declarations to show objective indicia of non-
obviousness, including the success of XanGo, the commercial 
embodiment of DBC’s invention.1296  The examiner, however, 
finalized the rejection, and the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences affirmed.1297  On appeal, DBC argued (1) that the Board 
failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based upon a 
substantial new question of patentability because the JP ‘442 patent 
was cumulative prior art and (2) that the Board erred in not giving 
adequate weight to its evidence of commercial success.1298
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision.1299  Regarding 
DBC’s first argument, the JP ‘442 reference was not cumulative 
because it was the only reference that taught the production of a 
compound with dietary or health benefits (i.e., a “neutraceutical 
composition” under the patent’s definition of the term) by 
combining the bitter mangosteen rind with fruits and fruit juices.1300  
Although one prior art patent disclosed the use of mangosteen rind 
as a drug, it only disclosed administration via “a syrup, solution, or 
suspension with a carrier”; it did not disclose a combination of the 
rind with fruits or fruit juices.1301  Therefore, the PTO correctly 
 
 1289. Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 1290. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 1291. Id. at 1358–59, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456–57. 
 1292. 545 F.3d 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1293. Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1294. Id. at 1375–76, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1295. Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1296. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1297. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125–26. 
 1298. Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 1299. Id. at 1375, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1300. Id. at 1376, 1382, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125, 1130. 
 1301. Id. at 1382, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130. 
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concluded that the JP ‘442 reference presented a substantial new 
question of patentability and appropriately rejected the claims.1302  
Regarding DBC’s second argument, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
the PTO that DBC’s evidence of commercial success was insufficient 
to rebut the strong prima facie case of obviousness.1303  DBC had 
merely presented its sales figures without establishing “that the sales 
were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed 
invention.”1304
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112 
1. Enablement 
Under the enablement requirement, every patent must describe 
“the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the 
same.”1305  This statutory mandate is “part of the quid pro quo of the 
patent bargain”1306 and is designed to ensure that the public is 
enriched (by an adequate disclosure of the invention) just as the 
inventor is enriched (by a limited monopoly to commercialize the 
invention).  It therefore follows that a patent specification must 
enable the full scope of each and every claim.1307
Enablement is a question of law, based upon underlying questions 
of fact.1308  Moreover, because a patent is presumed valid, a party 
challenging enablement must prove non-enablement by clear and 
convincing evidence.1309
In Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC,1310 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment of invalidity due to a lack of enablement, where 
the scope of the claims was broader than the disclosures in the 
specifications.  The two patents at issue concerned a process for 
integrating a user’s own audio signal or visual image into a pre-
 
 1302. Id. at 1382–83, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130. 
 1303. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 1304. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 
140, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 1305. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1306. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1307. Id. at 1241, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284, 1287. 
 1308. Id. at 1238, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 
735, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 1309. Id. at 1238–39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
 1310. 516 F.3d 993, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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existing audiovisual presentation.1311  Defendants’ allegedly infringing 
product, “ReVoice Studio,” allowed a user to combine her voice with 
pre-existing movie images on a DVD.1312  The asserted claims applied 
to both video games and movies.1313  Nevertheless, the district court 
found that the patent specifications did not adequately explain how 
the invention would function in the context of movies, which, unlike 
video games, did not use discrete signals for identifying and 
retrieving particular character images.1314  Thus, the district court 
adjudged the claims invalid for lack of enablement as to movies.1315
The Federal Circuit affirmed, maintaining that “‘[t]he scope of the 
claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement’ to 
‘ensure[] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent 
specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the 
claims.’”1316 Defendants showed, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the patents-in-suit did not teach how the patented system would 
perform certain necessary steps in the context of movies, which did 
not have easily separable character functions as video games did.1317  
In addition, expert testimony clearly established that, as a result of 
such technical differences, one skilled in the art would not be able to 
apply the patents’ teachings to movies.1318  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court correctly granted summary 
judgment of invalidity for lack of enablement.1319
2. Written description 
Paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 also requires “a written 
description of the invention.”1320  The Federal Circuit has explained 
that the written description requirement is separate and distinct from 
the enablement requirement.1321  No particular form of disclosure is 
 
 1311. Id. at 995, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 1312. Id. at 995, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 1313. Id. at 996, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 1314. Id. at 998, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 1315. Id. at 996–97, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 1316. Id. at 999, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830 (quoting Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. 
v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1317. Id. at 1000, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 1318. Id. at 1000–01, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 1319. Id. at 1000, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 1320. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1321. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 
1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 
U.S. 722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707 (2002) (listing, as statutory 
requirements, that the patent application “describe, enable, and set forth the best 
mode of carrying out the invention”); see also In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1357, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 to 
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required, but the written description must be sufficient to convey to 
one of ordinary skill in the art that the patentee was “in possession” of 
the invention, i.e., that the patentee invented what is claimed.1322  
Satisfaction of the written description requirement is an issue of 
fact.1323  The sufficiency of a patent’s written description is evaluated 
as of the filing date of the patent; therefore, the inquiry centers on 
the original disclosure and the originally filed claims.1324
In Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,1325 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity of patents 
concerning recombinant plasmids, where the patent specifications 
failed to provide adequate written description support for the full 
genus of plasmids claimed.1326  Discussing its precedent in Regents of 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,1327 the court explained that “to 
satisfy the written description requirement for a claimed genus, a 
specification must describe the claimed invention in such a way that a 
person of skill in the art would understand that the genus that is 
being claimed has been invented, not just a species of the genus.”1328
Contrary to this rule, the facts showed that the asserted claims 
encompassed an entire genus of recombinant plasmids containing 
coding sequences of DNA polymerase from any bacterial source, 
while the more narrow specifications of the patents disclosed solely 
the polA gene coding sequence from a single bacterial source.1329  
Particularly in light of record evidence showing that the polA gene 
varied among different bacterial sources, the court agreed with the 
district court that this narrow disclosure was insufficient, under Eli 
Lilly, to support the much broader scope of the claims.1330  Thus, the 
patent holders did not satisfy the written description requirement, 
and the patents were invalid.1331
 
require a written description requirement separate and apart from the enablement 
requirement.”). 
 1322. In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111, 1117; see O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853) (holding that a patentee “can lawfully claim only 
what he has invented and described, and if he claims more his patent is void”). 
 1323. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116. 
 1324. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 1325. 541 F.3d 1115, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For discussion of 
this case’s implications on the doctrine of equivalents, see supra notes 840–847 and 
accompanying text. 
 1326. Id. at 1126, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 1327. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1328. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1124, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 1329. Id. at 1125, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 1330. Id. at 1126, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 1331. Id. at 1127, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241. 
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The court reached a similar result in In re Alonso,1332 when it 
affirmed the PTO’s rejection of claims directed to the use of human 
antibodies to treat a rare form of cancer, where the sole antibody 
described in the specification was not representative of the “densely 
populated genus” encompassed by the claims.1333  The court held that 
the PTO’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.1334  
Several articles had shown that the type of antibody required for 
Alonso’s claimed method “var[ied] substantially in their 
composition.”1335  Nevertheless, Alonso only disclosed a single 
antibody.  Moreover, the specification failed to teach anything “about 
the structure, epitope characterization, binding affinity, specificity, or 
pharmacological properties common to the large family of antibodies 
implicated by the method.”1336  It also did not describe the antigens to 
which the antibodies of the claimed method must bind.1337  
Therefore, the PTO correctly rejected the claims for lack of adequate 
written description of the full claimed genus. 
The court’s opinion in Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research 
Organisation v. Buffalo Technology (USA), Inc.1338 addressed the issue of 
whether an amendment to a patent application impermissibly added 
“new matter” to the specification so as to broaden the disclosure 
beyond what was supported in the written description.1339  As 
originally filed, the application had described the use of “radio 
transmissions” to communicate between devices in a wireless local 
area network.1340  However, the claims were limited to radio 
transmissions “in excess of 10 GHz.”1341  A later amendment 
substituted the phrase “radio frequencies” for several references to 
“in excess of 10 GHz.”1342  This had the effect of “increas[ing] the 
range of frequencies specifically referenced by [these] passages” to 
include frequencies between 3 KHz and 300 GHz (the range 
attributable to “radio frequencies”).1343
The alleged infringer argued that these amendments improperly 
broadened the disclosure by adding “new matter” in violation of  
 
 1332. 545 F.3d 1015, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1333. Id. at 1021, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1334. Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
 1335. Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
 1336. Id. at 1022, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1337. Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1338. 542 F.3d 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1339. Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1340. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1341. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1342. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1343. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
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35 U.S.C. § 132,1344 and that the disclosure was no longer supported 
by the original written description, thus rendering the claims invalid 
under § 112.1345  The district court disagreed, finding that the 
invention was described broadly enough in the original written 
description to encompass systems operating at the larger range of 
frequencies.1346
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district 
court’s determination, holding that “there [was] enough material in 
the original disclosure” to support the broader reading of the 
invention.1347  A close reading of the original application established 
that the references to a 10 GHz minimum represented “useful 
embodiments” of the invention, rather than limitations on the 
claimed subject matter.1348  Moreover, the original specification 
indicated that the frequency range was not limited to greater than  
10 GHz; in fact, there were explicit and implicit references to 
frequencies as low as 1–3 GHz.1349  This was further supported by 
expert testimony, which indicated that a person of ordinary skill 
would understand that the system permitted continuous transmission 
at 2–3 GHz.1350  Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s refusal to invalidate the claims based upon the alleged 
addition of new matter.1351
Judge Lourie concurred, solely for the purpose of pointing out “a 
reasonable alternative view” regarding the introduction of new 
matter.1352  In light of the full record in the case, Judge Lourie 
asserted, it would also be reasonable to conclude that the applicants 
had altered the nature of the specification by their 1995 amendment, 
thus invalidating the claims.1353
3. Definiteness 
As a further condition of patentability, 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a 
patent to include claims that “particularly point[] out and distinctly 
claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
 
 1344. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (providing, inter alia, that “[n]o amendment shall 
introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention”). 
 1345. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 542 F.3d at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1575. 
 1346. Id. at 1380, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. 
 1347. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. 
 1348. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576. 
 1349. Id. at 1381, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576–77. 
 1350. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577. 
 1351. Id. at 1382, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1352. Id. at 1386, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 1353. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
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invention.”1354  This is referred to as the definiteness requirement, and 
claims that lack particularity and distinctness are deemed 
indefinite.1355  The purpose behind this provision is two-fold:  (1) to 
provide clear warning to others regarding the scope of activities that 
may constitute infringement and (2) to assist examiners and courts in 
determining patentability.1356  Thus, the only patentable claims are 
those that “clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before 
in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future 
enterprise.”1357
Because every claim is presumed to be valid, a claim is indefinite 
only if it is “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly 
ambiguous.”1358  A claim is not indefinite simply because “it poses a 
difficult issue of claim construction.”1359  In the case of means-plus-
function elements, which are limited by statute to “the corresponding 
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and 
equivalents thereof,”1360 the specification must provide a person of 
ordinary skill in the art with enough information to “know and 
understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation.”1361
In Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I, LLC,1362 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness, where 
the claim term could not be construed from the disclosures in the 
patent or distinguished from the disclosed prior art.1363  The term at 
issue was “fragile gel,” as used in a claim for a method of drilling in 
oil fields.1364  Halliburton asserted that the term “fragile gel” referred 
to a gel that, inter alia:  (1) “easily transitions to a liquid state upon 
the introduction of force (e.g., when drilling starts) and returns to a 
 
 1354. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1355. See United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236, 55 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 381, 385 (1942) (“The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness 
in claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went 
before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future 
enterprise.”).
 1356. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385. 
 1357. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385. 
 1358. Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1358, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1128, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United 
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338–39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (concluding that Honeywell’s patent claims were 
invalid as indefinite). 
 1359. Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 1360. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006). 
 1361. Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1118, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, 
Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1382, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1362. 514 F.3d 1244, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1363. Id. at 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1364. Id. at 1246, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
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gel when the force is removed (e.g., when drilling stops)” and (2) “is 
capable of suspending drill cuttings and weighting materials.”1365  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that neither this proposed definition nor 
any other construction of the term “fragile gel” could resolve the 
ambiguity as to its scope in the asserted claims.1366  Therefore, the 
court affirmed the district court’s judgment of invalidity.1367
It was not sufficient that the patent specification included a 
definition of fragile gel that closely tracked the first part of 
Halliburton’s description set forth above.1368  “Even if a claim term’s 
definition can be reduced to words, the claim is still indefinite if a 
person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into 
meaningfully precise claim scope.”1369  Here, nothing in the patent 
sufficiently defined the requisite degree of fragileness as compared to 
the prior art; that is, “how much more quickly the gels broke when 
stress was imposed or how much more quickly the gels reformed when 
stress was removed.”1370  Likewise, the patent failed to delineate what 
degree of suspending capability (i.e., gel strength) was required.1371  
Because a variety of factors could affect the liquid-gel transitioning or 
gel strength in a particular oil well (e.g., geology of the terrain, 
wellbore size, depth, and angle), an ordinary skilled artisan would be 
unable to determine, from one oil well to the next, whether a 
particular drilling fluid would fall within the scope of the claimed 
invention.1372  “When a proposed construction requires that an artisan 
make a separate infringement determination for every set of 
circumstances in which the composition may be used, and when such 
determinations are likely to result in differing outcomes (sometimes 
infringing and sometimes not), that construction is likely to be 
indefinite.”1373
The Federal Circuit also noted that Halliburton’s proposed 
definition was “functional, i.e., the fluid is defined ‘by what it does 
rather than what it is.’”1374  As the court explained, the Supreme Court 
has warned against the “dangers of using only functional claim 
 
 1365. Id. at 1250, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 1366. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 1367. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1368. Id. at 1251, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 1369. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659–60. 
 1370. Id. at 1253, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (emphasis added). 
 1371. Id. at 1254, 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 1372. Id. at 1254–55, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 1373. Id. at 1255, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 1374. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212, 
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 228 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
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limitations to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.”1375  
Although claims are not necessarily indefinite for using functional 
language, the use of such functional language may fail to clearly 
delineate the scope of the subject matter claimed, thus rendering the 
claims indefinite.1376
Unlike in Halliburton, the Federal Circuit in Microprocessor 
Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc.1377 reversed the district 
court’s summary judgment of invalidity and held that the claims were 
not indefinite.1378  The asserted patent claimed a computer processor 
architecture and methods for increasing the efficiency of 
microprocessors.1379  At the district court, asserted claims one and 
seven—claiming a “method of executing instructions in a pipelined 
processor” and a “pipelined processor,” respectively—were deemed 
invalid as indefinite on two grounds:  (1) that the claims were 
insolubly ambiguous for requiring that the same word be construed 
differently in different portions of one claim; and (2) that the claims 
impermissibly mixed classes of subject matter (i.e., both method and 
apparatus) within a single claim.1380  The Federal Circuit, however, 
disagreed on both counts, holding that the claims were definite and 
thus valid.1381
Regarding the use of differing interpretations for the same word 
within a claim, the court held that the claim was “amenable to 
construction” and therefore definite.1382  Although the term could 
have had one of two meanings, the appropriate meaning was “readily 
apparent from each occurrence in context,” and, as used, the term 
“was not surrounded by uniform language that require[d] a single 
interpretation.”1383  Indeed, although it is generally assumed that a 
single claim term should be defined consistently throughout all 
claims of a patent, “the patentee’s mere use of a term with an 
antecedent [such as ‘said’ or ‘the’] does not require that both terms 
 
 1375. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney & 
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381, 381 (1942); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466, 469 (1938)). 
 1376. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63 (citing Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 212–13, 
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 228). 
 1377. 520 F.3d 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1378. Id. at 1369, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63. 
 1379. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 1380. Id. at 1374, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1381. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1382. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32. 
 1383. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
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have the same meaning.”1384  In light of the evidence, the court 
concluded that the asserted claims were not insolubly ambiguous.1385
Regarding the mixing of classes of subject matter, although claim 
one appeared to recite both a method and an apparatus for 
executing the method, the court determined that the apparatus 
description actually served as a component of the preamble, rather 
than a separate claimed component.1386  Thus, there was no ambiguity 
as to the scope of the claim, which was “clearly limited to practicing 
the claimed method in a pipelined processor possessing the requisite 
structure.”1387  Conversely, claim seven was not indefinite simply for 
using functional language in an apparatus claim.1388  In fact, 
functional language is explicitly permitted by statute in the context of 
means-plus-function limitations, as were employed here.1389  
Moreover, the court found, claim seven was limited to an apparatus 
possessing a certain structure and merely capable of performing 
certain functions.1390  Therefore, the claim was not indefinite.1391
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game 
Technology,1392 the court addressed the definiteness requirement in the 
context of means-plus-function claims directed to a computer-
implemented invention.1393  The patent-in-suit, the ‘102 patent, 
disclosed an electronic slot machine that allowed a user to select her 
own combinations of winning symbol positions.1394  Appearing in 
several places in the asserted claims were the terms “control means” 
and “game control means,” which the parties agreed were means-
plus-function terms invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6.1395  The patent 
owner, Aristocrat, conceded that the only part of the specification 
describing the structure that performed the functions of the “control 
means” was a statement that one of ordinary skill in the art could 
“introduce the methodology on any standard microprocessor base 
 
 1384. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Process 
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1356–57, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added). 
 1385. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1386. Id. at 1374–75, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1387. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1388. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1389. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Halliburton 
Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I, LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1654, 1658 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 1390. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1391. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1392. 521 F.3d 1328, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1393. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 1394. Id. at 1330, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. 
 1395. Id. at 1331, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
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[sic] gaming machine by means of appropriate programming.”1396  
The district court held that this constituted an insufficient disclosure 
of the requisite structure under § 112 and concluded that the claims 
were invalid for indefiniteness.1397
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, explaining that 
[i]n cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which 
the inventor has invoked means-plus-function claiming, this court 
has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the 
specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or 
microprocessor . . . . For a patentee to claim a means for 
performing a particular function and then to disclose only a 
general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform 
that function amounts to pure functional claiming.1398
Thus, the corresponding structure for a computer-implemented 
function is “not [a] general purpose computer, or microprocessor, 
but rather [a] special purpose computer programmed to perform [a] 
disclosed algorithm.”1399
Here, the ‘102 patent’s references to a “standard microprocessor” 
and “appropriate programming” were insufficient to describe a 
structure capable of performing the required functions.1400  The 
specification disclosed no more than a general purpose computer.1401  
Although Aristocrat “was not required to produce a listing of source 
code or a highly detailed description of the algorithm to be used,” it 
was required, at the very least, to provide some algorithm that 
“transform[ed] the general purpose microprocessor [in]to a ‘special 
purpose computer’” to satisfy the corresponding structure 
requirement for means-plus-function claims.1402  Because it had not, 
the district court properly adjudged the claims invalid as indefinite.1403
Two subsequent 2008 decisions reached a similar conclusion.  In 
Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc.,1404 the Federal Circuit upheld 
the district court’s determination that a means-plus-function claim 
directed to scheduling satellite or cable broadcasts was indefinite, 
where the patent simply recited that “software” performed the 
disclosed function.1405  The district court correctly noted that this 
 
 1396. Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (citation omitted). 
 1397. Id. at 1333, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 1398. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 1399. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (quoting WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game 
Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1400. Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 1401. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 1402. Id. at 1338, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1403. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1404. 523 F.3d 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1405. Id. at 1364, 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611, 1623. 
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constituted an insufficient disclosure of the purported structure, as it 
provided no detail about the means to accomplish the function.1406  
Because the patent disclosed no algorithm or description of the 
requisite structure, the claims were invalid for indefiniteness.1407  
Likewise, the court in Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc.1408 affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness where the 
specification failed to disclose an algorithm by which the general 
“bank computer” performed the function of “generating an 
authorization indicia” for online credit card transactions.1409
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1410 the Federal 
Circuit reversed a judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness, where 
the district court’s determination was based upon an incorrect 
understanding of the law regarding claim definiteness.1411  In the 
claims at issue, which were directed to a method of curing tobacco, 
one limitation required “an airflow sufficient to substantially prevent 
an anaerobic condition around the vicinity of [the tobacco 
plants.]”1412  The district court determined that the term “anaerobic 
condition” was indefinite and granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.1413
Reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that “[w]hen a word of degree 
is used . . . the patent’s specification [must] provide[] some standard 
for measuring that degree” in order to be deemed definite.1414  
Because an “anaerobic condition” implies some degree of oxygen 
deficiency, it was necessary to show, within the patent specification, a 
standard for measuring that condition.1415  The standard, held the 
court, was clearly established within the patent.1416  The claims 
explicitly referred to curing in an anaerobic environment in order to 
“substantially prevent the formation of at least one nitrosamine.”1417  
Moreover, the district court had construed the “substantially prevent” 
term, based upon the intrinsic record, to mean a series of defined 
 
 1406. Id. at 1340–41, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1407. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1408. 545 F.3d 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1409. Id. at 1362, 1365–67, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753, 1755, 1757. 
 1410. 537 F.3d 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1411. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 1412. Id. at 1360, 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1413. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 1414. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 (citing Datamize LLC v. Plumtree 
Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)) (alterations in original). 
 1415. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011. 
 1416. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 1417. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citation omitted). 
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numerical ranges for levels of particular nitrosamine compounds.1418  
Thus, because one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain the 
existence of an “anaerobic condition” by measuring the levels of the 
various nitrosamines, the term was not insolubly ambiguous.1419
“The district court’s contrary conclusion,” noted the Federal 
Circuit, “was based on its misunderstanding that claim definiteness 
requires that a potential infringer be able to determine if a process 
infringes before practicing the claimed process.”1420  However, this is 
incorrect under the court’s precedent.1421  “The test for indefiniteness 
does not depend on a potential infringer’s ability to ascertain the 
nature of its own accused product to determine infringement, but 
instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled artisan the 
bounds of the invention.”1422  Because the term “anaerobic 
condition,” as construed by the district court, sufficiently delineated 
the bounds of the claim, it was not indefinite.1423
E. Double Patenting 
The judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double 
patenting prevents one inventor from obtaining more than one valid 
patent on essentially the same invention, by precluding attempts to 
“claim inventions so alike that granting both exclusive rights would 
effectively extend the life of patent protection.”1424  An analysis of 
double patenting consists of two steps:  (1) construing the claims of 
the two patents to determine the differences; and (2) determining 
whether the differences render the claims patentably distinct.1425  “A 
later patent claim is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent 
claim if the later claim is obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier 
claim.”1426
In the examination context, the courts typically use a one-way test, 
in which “the examiner asks whether the application claims are 
 
 1418. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1419. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1420. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1421. Id. at 1372–73, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1422. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. 
v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384,  
76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing same standard). 
 1423. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 1424. In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494 F.3d 1011, 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 1425. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1869, 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1426. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
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obvious over the patent claims.”1427  In rare circumstances, however, 
where an applicant has been unable to issue its first-filed application, 
a two-way test may apply, in which “the examiner also asks whether 
the patent claims are obvious over the application claims.”1428  The 
two-way test is “a narrow exception”1429 that may apply only where “the 
PTO is solely responsible for . . . delay” that causes a second-filed 
improvement application to issue prior to a first-filed basic 
application.1430  Double patenting is a question of law that is reviewed 
de novo.1431
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.,1432 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the district court had erred when it did not hold a 
patent invalid on the grounds of double patenting.1433  The patents-in-
suit, owned by Pfizer, covered a genus of non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory compounds that included the compound celocoxib—
the active ingredient in Pfizer’s arthritis drug Celebrex.1434  During 
prosecution, Pfizer had responded to the examiner’s restriction 
requirement by electing to pursue only some of its composition 
claims in the original application (which ultimately issued as the  
‘823 patent), while pursuing the restricted-out composition claims in 
a divisional application (which became the ‘165 patent) and the 
restricted-out method claims in a continuation-in-part application 
(which became the ‘068 patent).1435  In the resulting Hatch-Waxman 
Act infringement suit, Teva Pharmaceuticals argued that the  
‘068 patent was invalid due to obviousness-type double patenting, 
because the ‘165 patent constituted prior art to the ‘068 patent.1436  
Although the district court determined that the relevant claims of the 
‘068 patent and ‘165 patent were not patentably distinct, it 
nonetheless determined that the ‘068 patent was valid under the 
“safe-harbor” provision of 35 U.S.C. § 121.1437
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court that the 
relevant claims of the two patents were not patentably distinct, 
because the ‘068 claims simply recited methods of administering a 
 
 1427. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 1428. Id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1429. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1430. Id. at 1437, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1431. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1590, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 1432. 518 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1433. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 1434. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 1435. Id. at 1357–58, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1436. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1437. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
  
2009] 2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS  889 
                                                
“therapeutically-effective amount” of the compounds claimed in the 
‘165 patent and the term “therapeutically-effective amount” appeared 
in the ‘165 patent and was stipulated to have identical meaning in 
both patents.1438  Nevertheless, the court disagreed with the trial 
court’s conclusion that the ‘068 patent could claim protection under 
§ 121’s so-called safe harbor provision.1439
Under the safe harbor provision of § 121, 
[a] patent issuing on an application with respect to which a 
requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or 
on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not 
be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office 
or in the courts against a divisional application or against the 
original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the 
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on 
the other application.1440
Reviewing the statutory language, the legislative history, and 
Federal Circuit precedent, the court ultimately concluded that “the 
protection afforded by section 121 to applications (or patents issued 
therefrom) filed as a result of a restriction requirement is limited to 
divisional applications.”1441  Not only do both the statute’s literal 
language and the legislative history “refer[] specifically to ‘divisional 
application[s],’”1442 but there are also “plausible reasons” why 
Congress would have limited the safe harbor provision to divisional 
applications.1443  In particular, “[i]f the section had included CIPs, 
which by definition contain new matter, the section might be read as 
providing the earlier priority date even as to the new matter, contrary 
to the usual rule that new matter is not entitled to the priority date of 
the original application.”1444  Therefore, the court concluded, because 
the ‘068 patent was filed as a continuation-in-part application, rather 
than as a divisional application, it did not fall under the safe harbor 
provision, and as a result, it could be—and it was—invalidated by the 
‘165 patent.1445
In In re Basell Poliolefine Italia S.P.A.,1446 a majority of the Federal 
Circuit panel affirmed the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences’ (the “Board”) rejection, based on obviousness-type 
 
 1438. Id. at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 1439. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002–03. 
 1440. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1441. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1442. Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1443. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1444. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1445. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1446. 547 F.3d 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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double patenting, of claims directed to a method of polymerizing 
unsaturated hydrocarbons.1447  The claims at issue were contained 
within the ‘687 patent, which had derived from a 1955 application 
that was not issued until 2002, following a long series of continuations 
and divisionals.1448  Shortly after the ‘687 patent issued, the PTO 
initiated a Director-ordered reexamination, which reviewed all claims 
for double patenting, in view of several expired patents issued to one 
of the ‘687 inventors, and ultimately concluded that the ‘687 claims 
were unpatentable in light of the expired ‘987 patent.1449  The Board 
affirmed.1450
The Federal Circuit held, as an initial matter, that the Board did 
not err in applying a one-way test, rather than a two-way test, for 
double patenting because the patentees’ own actions or inactions 
were directly responsible for the delay in prosecution.1451  In 
particular, the patentees “did not present any claim resembling the 
claims at issue until 1964, nine years after . . . fil[ing] the first U.S. 
application in the chain of priority,” and the patentees had 
repeatedly submitted claims covering other inventions, urged the 
examiner to declare interferences for unrelated inventions, and filed 
numerous continuing applications without appeal.1452  The Federal 
Circuit majority then concluded that the patent claims at issue were 
not patentably distinct from the claims of the expired ‘987 patent.1453  
This was because both sets of claims could be read to cover the 
polymerization of ethylene with alpha-olefins of C4 to C6, using 
catalysts of titanium halides and aluminum alkyls.1454  Indeed, “the[] 
claims are both generic and specific to each other in interchangeable 
ways, involving the same groups of species.”1455  Therefore, the court 
held that the ‘687 claims were not patentable as a result of double 
patenting.1456
In dissent, Judge Newman argued that the PTO’s reexamination of 
the ‘687 claims occurred in violation of reexamination law as it then 
existed.1457  In particular, prior to November 2, 2002, reexamination 
“was available only on certain grounds not considered during the 
 
 1447. Id. at 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1448. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1449. Id. at 1374, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1450. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
 1451. Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1452. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1453. Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1454. Id. at 1377–78, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1455. Id. at 1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1456. Id. at 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031–32. 
 1457. Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
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initial examination.”1458  Nevertheless, Judge Newman asserted, the 
PTO ordered reexamination based on double patenting in June 
2002, even though the examiner had already considered the issue of 
double patenting during the initial examination of the claims.1459  
Judge Newman also argued that it was “unfair to chastise [the] 
patentee[s]” for the delay in issuing the patent, when “most of the 
delay was agreed by the PTO to be due to its procedures [for 
interferences].”1460  Finally, Judge Newman argued that the PTO’s 
own findings, as well as expert testimony, establish that the claims of 
the ‘687 patent were patentably distinct from those of the ‘987 
patent.1461
VI. UNENFORCEABILITY 
A. Inequitable Conduct 
A patent applicant’s duty of candor and good faith includes the 
duty to disclose information known to the applicant to be material to 
patentability.1462  Breach of this duty constitutes inequitable conduct 
and renders an entire patent unenforceable.1463  To prove inequitable 
conduct, an accused infringer must present clear and convincing 
evidence of at least a threshold level of materiality and intent to 
deceive the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).1464  Even if 
this showing is made, however, the district court must balance the 
equities to determine whether the applicant’s conduct was so 
egregious as to warrant holding the entire patent unenforceable.1465  
The district court may thus decline to render the patent 
unenforceable even in the face of clear and convincing evidence of 
materiality and intent to deceive.1466  The materiality prong may be 
proven with evidence that an applicant “made an affirmative 
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material 
information, or submitted false material information.”1467  
Information is material “when a reasonable examiner would consider 
 
 1458. Id. at 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
 1459. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
 1460. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 1461. Id. at 1381–82, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 1462. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009). 
 1463. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–66,  
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1464. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 1465. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 1466. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 1467. Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra 
Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
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it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent.”1468  “[I]nformation is not material if it is cumulative of other 
information already disclosed to the PTO.”1469
The deceptive intent prong requires that the “applicant had the 
specific intent to . . . mislead[] or deceiv[e] the PTO.”1470  Because 
direct evidence of deceptive intent is often not available, the Federal 
Circuit has held that intent may be inferred from indirect and 
circumstantial evidence.1471  This indirect and circumstantial evidence 
must still be clear and convincing, however, and an inference of 
deceptive intent drawn from such evidence must be “the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn.”1472  If the evidence is 
susceptible of multiple reasonable inferences, a district court must 
consider all inferences and render a judgment on the evidence “as 
informed by the range of reasonable inferences.”1473  A district court 
“errs in overlooking one inference in favor of another equally 
reasonable inference.”1474
In balancing the equities after threshold showings of materiality 
and deceptive intent, the district court may weigh the substance of 
the facts underlying those showings and all of the equities of the 
case.1475  In this balancing, the materiality and intent inquiries are not 
independent.  “The more material the omission or the 
misrepresentation, the lower [the] level of intent . . . required to 
establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”1476
While factual findings on the threshold issues of materiality and 
intent are reviewed for clear error,1477 the district court’s ultimate 
 
 1473. Scanner Techs., 528 F.3d at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1468. Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Symantec Corp. v. 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 1469. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal 
Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)). 
 1470. Id. at 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, 
Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) 
(alterations in original). 
 1471. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364,  
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710). 
 1472. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision 
Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
 1474. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Scanner 
Techs., 528 F.3d at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233). 
 1475. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 1476. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson 
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1668 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 1477. Reversal for clear error of a district court’s determination requires “a 
‘definite and firm conviction’ that a mistake has been made.”  Monsanto Co. v. Bayer 
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determination that an applicant committed inequitable conduct is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.1478
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Systems Corp.,1479 the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in finding materiality 
because it did not consider all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence.1480  The applicant had stated in a petition to make special 
that he made a “rigid comparison” of the claims of the application 
with the alleged infringing device when, in fact, he had never actually 
seen the device.1481  Reasoning that the applicant’s statement 
suggested that he had seen the device, the district court deemed the 
applicant to have made a false statement to the PTO.1482  The Federal 
Circuit found that, although it was reasonable for the district court to 
infer that “rigid comparison” meant a physical inspection of the 
infringing device, it was equally reasonable to infer that the applicant 
had made a comparison using the infringing device’s product 
literature, especially because the applicant cited the literature in its 
petition.1483  This alternative inference was also reasonable because 
product literature may provide just as much information as a physical 
inspection.1484  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district 
court failed to draw all reasonable inferences on the factual findings 
to show materiality.1485
In Scanner Technologies, the Federal Circuit also reaffirmed that “a 
false statement that succeeds in expediting the application is, as a 
matter of law, material for purposes of assessing the issue of 
inequitable conduct.”1486  Inequitable conduct may thus be shown in 
the absence of a misrepresentation bearing on the patentability of 
the claims in the application.1487
“An inference of intent to deceive is generally appropriate . . . 
when (1) highly material information is withheld; (2) ‘the applicant 
knew of the [prior art and] knew or should have known of [its] 
 
Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1233, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1364,  
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1478. Scanner Techs., 528 F.3d at 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (citing Modine 
Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1624 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 1479. 528 F.3d 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1480. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1481. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1482. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1483. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1484. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1485. Id. at 1377, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1486. Id. at 1375, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 1487. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
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materiality . . . ; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible 
[good faith] explanation’” for failing to disclose prior art to the 
PTO.1488  In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc.,1489 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s finding that one patent was unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct, concluding that the district court properly 
inferred deceptive intent.1490  First, the undisclosed prior art was 
material.  The feature (“use of a small, flow-restricting hole”) of the 
prior art devices that the applicant failed to disclose was similar to the 
use of capillaries to “restrict fluid flow” in the asserted patent.1491  
Second, intent to deceive was inferred from the high degree of 
materiality of the prior art to the patent, as confirmed by four 
statements made in the course of prosecution,1492 the applicant’s 
knowledge of the highly material, undisclosed prior art,1493 and the 
applicant’s lack of a good faith explanation.1494  In particular, the 
applicant’s conclusory testimony that he never intentionally misled 
the PTO in his career and that he did not knowingly withhold any 
information during prosecution was “entitled to no weight.”1495  
Although the applicant provided additional testimony that could at 
best be interpreted as an explanation that he believed the prior art to 
be cumulative, this did not provide a sufficient good faith 
explanation because it was a “[h]indsight construction of reasons why 
a reference might have been withheld.”1496  The applicant did not 
suggest that he believed the prior art was cumulative at the time of 
 
 1488. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313–14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 
1191, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original). 
 1489. 543 F.3d 1306, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1490. Id. at 1318, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.  The Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s finding of inequitable conduct as to the ‘609 patent for failure to 
prove deceptive intent.  See id. at 1318–19, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713–14 (finding 
that the statements indicating deceptive intent concerning the other patent were 
made after the issuance a “notice of allowability indicating that all claims of the ‘609 
patent would be issued”). 
 1491. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11. 
 1492. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711–12 (“(1) The prior art did not 
teach the claimed ‘extreme limitation in flow’ used ‘to provide a commercially 
practical container’ that prevents ‘the catastrophic discharge’ of toxic contents;  
(2) Existing safety measures were limited to ‘highly complex methods’ and ‘elaborate 
systems;’ (3) There was no indication in the prior art to use ‘severe flow restriction’ 
to overcome[] the problems of delivering highly toxic fluids from portable 
containers”; and (4) “[N]one of the prior art comes close to disclosing a restriction 
in the flow path from a pressurized container that has a diameter that does not 
exceed 0.2 mm.” (quoting Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 n.8 
(D. Del. 2006)) (alterations in original)). 
 1493. Id. at 1316–17, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712–13. 
 1494. Id. at 1317–18, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 1495. Id. at 1317, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citations omitted). 
 1496. Id. at 1317–18, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
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prosecution, and the applicant never stated that cumulativeness was 
the reason he failed to disclose the prior art.1497
Judge Lourie dissented regarding the inequitable conduct holding 
because the majority inferred intent but cited no evidence of intent 
to deceive, thereby “incorrectly conflat[ing] intent with materiality 
. . . . Non-citation of a reference does not necessarily justify an 
inference of intent to deceive.”1498
In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1499 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of intent to 
deceive in the patentee’s failure to disclose that the half-life 
comparisons between the claimed compound and the prior art were 
at different dosages.1500  On a prior appeal, the Federal Circuit 
remanded the question of deceptive intent, holding that the district 
court had failed to consider the reasonable inference that the failure 
to disclose different dosages in the applicant’s declaration may have 
been due to mere inadvertence, if making a comparison at different 
dosages was indeed reasonable.1501  On remand, the district court 
again found intent to deceive.1502  In its second appeal, the patentee 
presented a different justification for its failure to disclose the use of 
different dosages in its half-life comparisons.  The patentee argued 
that the dosage information was not material because the half-life 
comparisons using different dosages were intended to show a 
difference in properties, which was relevant to—and in response to—
an obviousness rejection.1503  The half-life comparisons were not 
intended to address the anticipation rejection, for which comparisons 
using equivalent dosages would be relevant.1504  The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument, relying in part on the patentee’s failure to 
“delineate between evidence intended to address the anticipation 
rejection and evidence intended to address the obviousness 
rejection.”1505  The court concluded that the district court properly 
found that the half-life comparisons were directed to both the 
anticipation and obviousness rejections, and “to the extent that they 
 
 1497. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 1498. Id. at 1329, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (citing  
M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1342–43,  
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 1499. 525 F.3d 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1500. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1501. Id. at 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116–17. 
 1502. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117. 
 1503. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117. 
 1504. Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1505. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119–20. 
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were intended to address the anticipation rejection, the failure to 
disclose dosage information evidenced intent to deceive.”1506
Judge Rader dissented, noting that inequitable conduct “has taken 
on a new life as a litigation tactic” that allows a trial court to dispose 
of a case “without the rigors of claim construction and other patent 
doctrines.”1507  In numerous cases, including Aventis, the district court 
has “elected to try [inequitable conduct] in advance of the issues of 
infringement and validity.”1508  Citing the Federal Circuit’s Kingsdown 
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc. opinion,1509 Judge Rader noted 
that inequitable conduct is “not a remedy for every mistake, blunder, 
or fault in the patent procurement process.”1510  In Aventis, the 
omission of dosage information was evidence of neglect, rather than 
culpable intent, because data were not concealed in the declaration 
but rather submitted without mention of the different doses.1511  
Furthermore, the chemist who made the declaration explained that 
the different dosage “did not come to his mind.”1512  Such negligence 
did “not rise to the level of intent to deceive.”1513
In Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.,1514 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding that the patentee’s ‘565 patent 
was unenforceable for inequitable conduct.1515  The Federal Circuit 
held that the failure to disclose notes related to a prior art abstract 
was material because the patentee made statements about the 
abstract in support of patentability that “directly contradict[ed]” the 
notes.1516  In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that 
it “do[es] not suggest that all internal documents of potential 
relevance must be submitted to the PTO as a matter of course.”1517  An 
inference of deceptive intent was also proper because the prosecuting 
 
 1506. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1507. Id. at 1349–50, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 1508. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122–23 (citing Frazier v. Roessel Cine 
Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 1509. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876,  
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
 1510. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (Rader, J., 
dissenting). 
 1511. Id. at 1351, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 1512. Id. at 1351–52, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 1513. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 1514. 514 F.3d 1229, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1515. Id. at 1231, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584. 
 1516. Id. at 1240, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.  The notes were taken by a Bayer 
employee while in front of a poster for which the prior art abstract was made.  Id. at 
1235, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.  The poster contained much more information 
than the prior art abstract itself.  Id. at 1235, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587. 
 1517. Id. at 1240, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591. 
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attorney was admittedly aware of the notes during prosecution, had 
discussed the notes with their author, and had conceded that the 
notes would have been important to the Examiner if they contained 
reliable information.1518  His explanation that he did not understand 
the notes after discussing them with the notes’ author lacked 
credibility.1519  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s 
holding that the patentee’s three other patents were unenforceable 
for inequitable conduct.1520  Although the patentee dismissed its 
infringement claims under these three patents and covenanted not to 
sue the defendant for infringement, the district court properly 
retained jurisdiction to rule on attorney fees and to make findings of 
inequitable conduct.1521
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1522 the Federal 
Circuit found that the district court’s factual findings on deceptive 
intent were clearly erroneous, and reversed the judgment of 
unenforceability.1523  The prosecuting attorney had received a letter 
that potentially disclosed prior art, yet had concluded that the 
content was not material to the patent application he was 
preparing.1524  Shortly after filing the patent application, the patentee 
replaced the attorney.1525  The defendant theorized that the patentee 
replaced its attorney because of concerns about the need to disclose 
the letter to the PTO.1526  However, because there was no evidence 
indicating that the patentee even knew the contents of the letter or 
that the letter was the reason that the patentee changed attorneys, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had clearly erred 
in accepting the theory that the patentees replaced the prosecuting 
attorney in order to prevent disclosure of the letter to the PTO.1527  
The fact that the applicant did not provide a credible alternative 
explanation for the attorney’s replacement was not sufficient to 
warrant an inference of deceptive intent.1528
 
 1518. Id. at 1241, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592. 
 1519. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592. 
 1520. Id. at 1243, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593. 
 1521. Id. at 1242–43, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592–93 (citing Highway Equip. Co., 
Inc. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1033 n.1, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1124 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 1522. 537 F.3d 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1523. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 1524. Id. at 1361–62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 1525. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1526. Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 1527. Id. at 1367–69, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008–09. 
 1528. Id. at 1368, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (citing M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, 
Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229, 
1235 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
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In Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,1529 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct 
because of the district court’s erroneous analysis of the deceptive 
intent prong and failure to consider materiality.1530  On materiality, 
the Federal Circuit held that the patentees’ failure to disclose one of 
the inventors’ experiments was not material because:  (1) the 
inventors had no obligation to report experiments that occurred 
after filing of the patent application; (2) the experiments were not 
necessary to practice the patented invention; and (3) the inventor 
performed the experiments as part of her continuing doctoral thesis, 
and not to accomplish the objective of the patents.1531  In its 
discussion of materiality, the Federal Circuit also noted that the 
inventor published the experiments in question, and publication “is 
an act inconsistent with an intent to conceal data from the 
USPTO.”1532  On the issue of intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit 
held that the district court’s analysis was clearly erroneous because 
the district court improperly focused on the inventor’s stated views at 
trial regarding the purposes of the patent system.1533  Such views and 
motives for applying for a patent are “generally irrelevant to a proper 
determination of inequitable conduct.”1534
In Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.,1535 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the judgment of the district court that the alleged infringers 
had failed to prove the patent unenforceable for inequitable 
conduct.1536  The patentee’s failure to disclose its own co-pending 
application for a compound it considered separately patentable was 
not material because, even if disclosure of the application led to a 
provisional obviousness-type double-patenting rejection, applicants 
routinely overcome such rejections.1537  The district court’s finding 
that the materiality of this potential situation was low was therefore 
proper.1538  The alleged infringer’s theory that the patentee intended 
to deceive the PTO by filing its two patent applications separately was 
also properly rejected by the district court as evidence not rising to 
the level of inequitable conduct.1539  A separate filing, “while not 
 
 1529. 536 F.3d 1247, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1519 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1530. Id. at 1253, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 1531. Id. at 1252–53, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523–24. 
 1532. Id. at 1252, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 1533. Id. at 1253, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 1534. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 1535. 533 F.3d 1353, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1536. Id. at 1355, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1537. Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457–58. 
 1538. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 1539. Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
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completely forthcoming,” was not deemed an attempt to hide from 
the PTO because similar applications are usually assigned to the same 
examiner in the same art unit.1540
In Symantec Corp. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,1541 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that the accused 
infringer failed to prove the materiality prong for inequitable 
conduct.1542  First, the Federal Circuit held that an inventor’s 
declaration that he was “an original, first and joint inventor” was not 
false simply because the inventor could not identify his contribution 
precisely fourteen years later.1543  The inventor and his co-inventor 
both testified in general terms that the inventor had come up with 
the idea for the invention.1544  Second, the Federal Circuit held that 
the inventor’s declaration that he had practiced in the field of 
computer software for ten years and become intimately familiar with 
the state of the art was not a misrepresentation simply because he was 
“a marketing person” and lacked technical expertise.1545  As the 
Federal Circuit noted, the “mere fact that he was not a technical 
person does nothing to refute” his familiarity with the state of the 
art.1546  Third, the Federal Circuit concluded that the inventor’s 
declaration that he reviewed and understood the contents of the 
specification, including the claims, when he did not fully understand 
the language of the claim contents, was not misleading.1547  A “failure 
to understand the meaning of the claims,” on the other hand, would 
“likely be considered material.”1548
B. Breach of Duty to Standards Setting Organization 
Breach of the duty to disclose relevant intellectual property rights 
to a standards-setting organization (“SSO”) before the adoption of a 
standard may also result in an unenforceability finding.1549  The 
 
 1540. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 1541. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1542. Id. at 1296–98, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459–61. 
 1543. Id. at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (citation omitted). 
 1544. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 1545. Id. at 1297–98, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460–61. 
 1546. Id. at 1298, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460–61. 
 1547. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 1548. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (quoting Symantec Corp. v. Computer 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 02-CV-73740-DT, 2008 WL 3950254, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 
2006)) (emphasis added). 
 1549. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1010, 89 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the need for this 
disclosure to avoid “patent hold-up” which occurs when a patent holder fails to 
disclose intellectual property rights to an SSO “prior to the adoption of a standard” 
and, therefore, prevents “industry participants from implementing the standard”). 
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existence of a disclosure duty is “a legal question with factual 
underpinnings.”1550
In Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,1551 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s unenforceability judgment, finding that the 
plaintiff breached its duty to disclose its patents to a video 
compression SSO known as the Joint Video Team (“JVT”).1552  
Although the language of the JVT policy did not expressly require 
disclosure by all JVT participants in all circumstances, and only 
explicitly required disclosure of members submitting technical 
proposals, the Federal Circuit concluded that participants 
understood the policy to impose a disclosure duty on all 
participants.1553  Turning to the scope of the disclosure duty, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the duty 
required JVT participants to disclose patents that “reasonably might 
be necessary” to practice the standard.1554  Finding that the plaintiff 
had breached that disclosure duty, the Federal Circuit addressed the 
question of whether the district court was within its authority to order 
the patents unenforceable against the world.1555  Although the district 
court had correctly concluded that the patents were unenforceable, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that its remedy ordering the patents 
unenforceable against the world was too broad and remanded the 
judgment with instructions to hold the patents unenforceable only 
against products that comply with the standard.1556
C. Improper Inventorship 
To show co-inventorship, the alleged co-inventor must “prove his 
contribution to the conception of the claims by clear and convincing 
evidence.”1557  An alleged co-inventor’s testimony alone is insufficient 
 
 1550. Id. at 1012, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon 
Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1087 n.3, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
 1551. 548 F.3d 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For discussion of 
this case’s implications regarding the award of attorney fees, see infra notes 1842–
1858 and accompanying text. 
 1552. Id. at 1008, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323. 
 1553. Id. at 1013–16, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328–29. 
 1554. Id. at 1017–18, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citation omitted).  By not 
disclosing these patents prior to the adoption of the standard, a patentee that has 
patent protection covering the standard can keep industry participants from using 
the standard unless they entered a license agreement.  Id. at 1020, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1325. 
 1555. Id. at 1019, 1024–26, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326, 1335. 
 1556. Id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337–38. 
 1557. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1295,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. 
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
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evidence unless it is sufficiently corroborated.1558  Whether an alleged 
co-inventor’s testimony is sufficiently corroborated is evaluated using 
a “rule of reason analysis,” which in turn requires an evaluation of all 
relevant evidence.1559
In Symantec Corp. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,1560 the 
alleged co-inventor sought to corroborate his declaration with the 
named inventor’s notes, which reflected a conversation between the 
named inventor and the alleged co-inventor.1561  However, the Federal 
Circuit held that the alleged co-inventor’s declaration lacked the 
requisite corroboration because the notes at most reflected only that 
the two had a discussion of the then-current state of the art and did 
not establish any contribution to the invention by the alleged co-
inventor.1562
D. Laches 
The laches defense, when established, bars a patentee’s claims for 
damages incurred prior to suit.1563  In order to invoke the defense of 
laches, a defendant must prove:  “(1) [that] the plaintiff delayed 
filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from 
the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its 
claim against the defendant; and (2) [that] the delay operated to the 
prejudice or injury of the defendant.”1564
A rebuttable presumption of laches arises when the patentee delays 
filing suit for more than six years after the date the patentee knew or 
should have known of the alleged infringer’s activity.1565  If the alleged 
infringer shows that the patentee’s delay in filing suit exceeds six 
years, then the burden shifts to the patentee to rebut the 
presumption by raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
either the reasonableness of its delay or the lack of prejudice to the 
 
 1558. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (citing Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461,  
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548). 
 1559. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (quoting Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1382, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1631 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)). 
 1560. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1561. Id. at 1295–96, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1562. Id. at 1296, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1563. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 1564. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. 
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (en banc)) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 1565. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035–36,  
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331). 
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alleged infringer.1566  Once the patentee makes such a showing, the 
burden shifts back to the alleged infringer to prove the elements of 
laches by a preponderance of the evidence.1567  The Federal Circuit 
reviews the district court’s determination on laches for an abuse of 
discretion.1568
In Serdarevic v. Advanced Medical Optics, Inc.,1569 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that the 
plaintiff’s inventorship claim was barred by laches.1570  The plaintiff 
filed an action asserting inventorship eight years after learning of the 
existence of the patents, thereby giving rise to a presumption of 
laches.1571  The plaintiff contended that laches should not bar her 
claim because her suit was filed within six years of the issuance of the 
reexamination certificate for one of the patents.1572  The Federal 
Circuit held that this “other litigation” excuse for the delay in filing 
suit did not prevent the application of the presumption of laches 
because the plaintiff was not engaged in the “other litigation,” which 
may have excused her delay.1573  In addition, the plaintiff did not 
identify any way in which the reexamination proceeding changed her 
inventorship claim.1574
The plaintiff attempted to rebut the laches presumption by 
justifying the delay in filing suit.1575  In particular, the plaintiff claimed 
that she was unfamiliar with the U.S. patent system.1576  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiff’s 
unfamiliarity with the U.S. patent system was not sufficient evidence 
to rebut the presumption of an unreasonable delay because she was 
represented by patent counsel who could have enabled her to file 
suit.1577
Finally, the plaintiff’s attempt to preclude the application of laches 
through an unclean hands claim also failed.  The plaintiff was unable 
 
 1566. Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 
1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035–38, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1331–33). 
 1567. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–33. 
 1568. Id. at 1039, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 1569. 532 F.3d 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1570. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1571. Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1572. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1573. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1574. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1575. Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1576. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1577. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
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to show that the defendant had engaged in “particularly egregious 
conduct” and was responsible for plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit.1578
In Symantec, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not 
err in dismissing a laches defense.1579  The court reasoned that—even 
if the plaintiff knew about an earlier product that was later re-
branded to be the infringing product—there was no evidence that 
the earlier product was the same or similar to the product in suit, and 
“laches would only apply if the products were the same or similar.”1580  
The Federal Circuit also held that the plaintiff’s earlier warning letter 
alleging willful infringement by the earlier product, which was sent 
before the defendant re-branded the earlier product, did not 
necessarily assume or concede that the two products were similar for 
purposes of the laches period of delay.1581
VII. NON-PATENT ISSUES 
A. Alternate Sources of Liability 
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,1582 the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that 
settlement agreements between the patent holders, brand-name 
manufacturers of the drug, and generic manufacturers to resolve 
Hatch-Waxman Act cases did not violate section 1 of the Sherman 
Act,1583 which prohibits “unreasonable restraints” of trade.1584  In the 
settlement agreements, the patent holder agreed to make payments 
to the generic manufacturers (“reverse payments”), who in turn 
agreed not to challenge the validity of the patent or to market a 
generic version of the drug containing the patented compound until 
after the patent expired.1585  The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
district court properly applied a “rule of reason analysis”1586 to 
 
 1578. Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486–87 (citation omitted). 
 1579. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1295,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1580. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458–59 (citing Watkins v. Nw. Ohio Tractor 
Pullers Assoc., Inc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1164, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545, 552–53 (6th Cir. 
1980)). 
 1581. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458–59. 
 1582. 544 F.3d 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1583. Id. at 1333, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1584. Id. at 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 1585. Id. at 1328–29, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1586. Id. at 1332, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.  The “rule of reason” analysis is a 
three-step process.  First, the plaintiff must show that the “challenged action had an 
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.”  The burden 
then “shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive redeeming virtues of 
the action.”  Finally, if defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must “show that the 
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determine whether the settlement agreements were unlawful and 
properly found that plaintiffs had failed to show that the 
“[a]greements had an anti-competitive effect on the market . . . 
beyond that permitted by the patent.”1587
The Federal Circuit observed that long-standing judicial policy 
favors settlement.1588  A settlement that protects a patent holder’s legal 
right to a monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the 
patented invention is not unlawful, even though it may have some 
adverse effects on competition.1589
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the “essence of the inquiry is 
whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary 
zone of the patent.”1590  The court thus agreed with the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits that, in the 
absence of sham litigation or fraud before the PTO, the court “need 
not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a 
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”1591
In Dominant Semiconductors SDN. BHD. v. Osram GMBH,1592 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment dismissing the alleged infringer plaintiff’s claims for unfair 
competition, intentional interference with contractual relations, 
interference with prospective economic advantage, and trade libel.1593  
The bases for plaintiff’s claims were its contentions that the 
defendant made false and misleading public infringement allegations 
about the plaintiff’s products and that the defendant filed its patent 
infringement complaint before the ITC in bad faith.1594  A plaintiff 
seeking to prove bad faith must prove that the allegations were 
objectively baseless, such that “no reasonable litigant could 
reasonably expect success on the merits.”1595  “[A]n objectively 
reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective 
 
same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means . . . less 
restrictive of competition.”  Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting Clorox Co. v. 
Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
 1587. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (citation omitted). 
 1588. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlorine Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333,  
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 
238 F.3d 1362, 1368, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1589. Id. at 1337, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 1590. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 1591. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 1592. 524 F.3d 1254, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1593. Id. at 1255–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481. 
 1594. Id. at 1258, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1595. Id. at 1260, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (quoting GP Indus., Inc. v. Eran 
Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604, 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
  
2009] 2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS  905 
                                                
intent.”1596  The Federal Circuit further suggested that “a successful 
outcome of the underlying litigation refutes a conclusion that the 
litigation was objectively baseless at the outset.”1597  The defendant’s 
evidence of success in its patent infringement claims before the ITC 
thus provided sufficient proof that its infringement claims were not 
objectively baseless.1598
B. Discovery Decisions 
“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties must be 
afforded adequate time for general discovery before being required 
to respond to a motion for summary judgment.”1599  A showing of 
necessity and diligence otherwise required for a Rule 56(f) request 
for additional discovery does not apply when parties do not initially 
have adequate opportunity for discovery.1600  In Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Bancorp Services, L.L.C.,1601 the Federal Circuit held 
that the district court erred in denying the patentee’s Rule 56(f) 
motion seeking additional discovery.1602  The district court 
erroneously reasoned that the patentee had not proven that the 
defendant’s deponents would testify contrary to their declarations if 
deposed.1603  However, the appropriate fact to consider was that the 
patentee had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct 
discovery.1604  Where, as in this case, there has not been an adequate 
initial opportunity for discovery, a Rule 56(f) request for additional 
discovery need not be accompanied by a strict showing of necessity 
and diligence.1605  The Federal Circuit remanded to permit 
reasonable discovery by the patentee to proceed.1606  
 
 1596. Id. at 1261, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (quoting Prof’l Real Estate 
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 57, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1645 (1993)). 
 1597. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 
62, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647). 
 1598. Id. at 1263, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 1599. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C., 527 F.3d 1330, 1336,  
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Iverson v. Johnson Gas 
Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 1600. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (citing Iverson, 172 F.3d at 530). 
 1601. 527 F.3d 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1602. Id. at 1332, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 1603. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145. 
 1604. Id. at 1337–38, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145. 
 1605. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citing Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana 
Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1311, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
 1606. Id. at 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
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C. Motions to Transfer 
On petition for a writ of mandamus in In re TS Tech USA Corp.,1607 
the Federal Circuit ordered the district court to transfer venue of a 
patent infringement case filed in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas to the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio.  In September 2007, plaintiff Lear 
Corporation filed suit against TS Tech in the Eastern District of Texas 
for infringement of a patent relating to pivotally attached vehicle 
headrest assemblies.1608  Lear’s complaint alleged that TS Tech had 
been making and selling infringing headrest assemblies to Honda, 
and that TS Tech induced Honda to infringe the patent by 
incorporating the headrest assemblies into Honda vehicles, which are 
sold throughout the United States, including in the Eastern District 
of Texas.1609
In December 2007, TS Tech filed a motion to transfer venue for 
convenience to the Southern District of Ohio, under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1404(a).1610  In support of transfer, TS Tech argued that the physical 
and documentary evidence was mainly located in Ohio and the key 
witnesses all lived in Ohio, Michigan, and Canada, and that none of 
the parties were either incorporated in Texas or had any offices in 
the Eastern District of Texas.1611  Lear opposed, arguing that the 
Eastern District of Texas was the proper venue because several 
Honda vehicles containing the allegedly infringing headrest 
assemblies had been sold in Texas.1612  In September 2008, the district 
court denied transfer, finding that TS Tech failed to demonstrate 
that the inconvenience to the parties and witnesses clearly 
outweighed the deference entitled to Lear’s choice of forum, and 
that because several Honda vehicles containing the allegedly 
infringing headrests had been sold in the venue, the Eastern District 
of Texas had a “substantial interest” in adjudicating the case.1613
TS Tech petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus 
ordering the district court to transfer the case.1614  Relying on the 
Fifth Circuit’s recent en banc decision granting a similar petition for 
a writ of mandamus in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.,1615 the Federal 
 
 1607. 551 F.3d 1315, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1608. Id. at 1318, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1609. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1610. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1611. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1612. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1613. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1614. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1615. 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
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Circuit granted TS Tech’s petition, finding that under the 
circumstances, the district court’s decision not to transfer was a “clear 
abuse of discretion” that produced a “patently erroneous result” and 
therefore justified the extraordinary writ.1616
The Federal Circuit confirmed that regional circuit law governs 
whether a motion to transfer a patent infringement case under  
§ 1404(a) should be granted, and that under Fifth Circuit law, a 
motion to transfer venue should be granted upon a showing that the 
transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the venue chosen 
by the plaintiffs.1617  From Volkswagen, the court identified both 
“public” and “private” factors, taken from forum non conveniens law, to 
consider when ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a).1618   
Applying those factors, the Federal Circuit held that the district 
court applied some of the relevant factors correctly, but that overall 
the analysis “contained several key errors.”1619  The district court’s first 
error was to give too much weight to Lear’s choice of forum.1620  As 
the Fifth Circuit had explained in Volkswagen, “the plaintiff’s choice 
of venue corresponds to the burden that a moving party must meet in 
order to demonstrate that the transferee venue is a clearly more 
convenient venue,” but it is not a separate factor to be considered in 
favor of the plaintiff on a motion for transfer.1621
The district court’s second error, according to the Federal Circuit, 
was that it “ignored Fifth Circuit precedent in assessing the cost of 
attendance for witnesses.”1622  The Fifth Circuit has adopted a “100-
mile” rule “which requires that ‘[w]hen the distance between an 
existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under  
§ 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to 
witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to 
 
 1616. In re TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319, 1322, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569, 1570 
(recounting the high burden that must be met for the granting of a writ of mandmus 
and finding that the petitioner had met that standard). 
 1617. Id., at 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1618. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568-69.  “The ‘private’ interest factors include: 
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory 
process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing 
witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious, 
and inexpensive.”  Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)).  “The ‘public’ interest factors to be considered 
are (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local 
interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the 
forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary 
problems of conflicts of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.”  Id., 89 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315). 
 1619. Id. at 1320, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1620. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1621. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.  
 1622. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
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be traveled.”1623  The Federal Circuit noted that witnesses would need 
to travel approximately 900 more miles to attend trial in the Eastern 
District of Texas than to do so in the Southern District of Ohio.1624
The third error identified by the Federal Circuit was the district 
court’s determination that the “relative ease to access of sources of 
proof” factor was neutral because “many of the documents were 
stored electronically.”1625  Again following the Fifth Circuit’s 
Volkswagen opinion, the Federal Circuit concluded that because all of 
the physical evidence, including the headrests and the documentary 
evidence, were far more convenient to the Southern District of Ohio, 
the district court’s conclusion that this factor was neutral was error.1626
Finally, the Federal Circuit identified the district court’s 
determination that the Eastern District of Texas had a “substantial 
interest” in having the case heard locally as a fourth error in the 
court’s analysis.1627  Based on the facts presented, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “there is no relevant connection between the actions 
giving rise to this case and the Eastern District of Texas. . . .  [T]he 
vehicles containing TS Tech’s allegedly infringing headrest 
assemblies were sold throughout the United States and thus the 
citizens of the Eastern District of Texas have no more or less of a 
meaningful connection to this case than any other venue.”1628  The 
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that “[b]ecause the district 
court’s errors here are essentially identical [to the errors identified by 
the Fifth Circuit in Volkswagen], we hold that TS Tech has 
demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to a writ.”1629
In addition, the Federal Circuit clarified that TS Tech was not 
required to seek reconsideration of the district court’s denial of its 
transfer motion before seeking a writ of mandamus because TS Tech 
has no reasonable expectation that the district court would reverse its 
prior ruling and because interlocutory review of a denial of a motion 
to transfer is unavailable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).1630
 
 1623. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 
204-05 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 1624. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1625. Id. at 1320-21, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 1626. Id. at 1321, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 1627. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 1628. Id.  89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 1629. Id. at 1322, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 1630. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.   
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VIII.  REMEDIES 
A. Permanent Injunction 
In the 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.1631 decision, the 
Supreme Court confirmed that a patentee-plaintiff must satisfy the 
following four-factor test before a court may grant a permanent 
injunction: 
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.1632
The Federal Circuit continued to refine the application of eBay to 
different factual circumstances in 2008.  In Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott 
Laboratories,1633 Innogenetics brought an action against Abbott for 
infringement of its patent relating to diagnostic tools that detected 
and classified hepatitis C virus genotypes which facilitated 
customizing treatments of patients with varying genotypes.1634  At the 
infringement trial, Innogenetics’ damages expert proposed an 
upfront “market entry fee” payment of $5.8 million and a running 
royalty of five to ten euros per test on the 190,000 tests Abbott had 
sold up to that point.1635  At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury 
trial found in favor of Innogenetics, and the court entered judgment 
of infringement and reasonable royalties in the amount of  
$7 million.1636
Innogenetics moved for a permanent injunction.1637  In granting 
Innogenetics a permanent injunction in addition to the $7 million 
damages award, the district court stated, “[i]t would denigrate the 
value of plaintiff’s patent rights to allow defendant to continue to sell 
plaintiff’s invention as its own in exchange for the same fee it would 
have paid without the lawsuit.”1638
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of 
a permanent injunction prohibiting the future sales of Abbott’s 
 
 1631. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 1632. Id. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–313 (1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 
542 (1987)). 
 1633. 512 F.3d 1363, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1634. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1635. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1636. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1637. Id. at 1369, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1638. Id. at 1380 n.8, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 n.8. 
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genotyping assay kits, finding that the lower court’s ruling was an 
abuse of discretion.  Counsel for Innogenetics argued that the jury’s 
damages calculation was a royalty for Abbott’s past infringement 
only.1639
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding on review of 
the trial record that, during the damages portion of the trial, 
Innogenetics’ damages expert factored in the cost of a license that 
would allow Abbott to continue selling the infringing product—and 
concluded that the jury’s award “include[d] both an up-front 
payment and an ongoing royalty payment.”1640  The court held that 
“[w]hen a patentee requests and receives such compensation, it 
cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably harmed by 
future sales” and that “this factor greatly outweighs the other eBay 
factors in this case.”1641  The court also noted that “[i]njunctive relief 
ought not to act as a form of ‘extra damages’ to compensate for 
litigation costs” and that “[i]f litigation costs were a factor, injunctive 
relief would be warranted in every litigated patent case.”1642  The 
Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court to “delineate 
the terms of the compulsory license.”1643
In Amado v. Microsoft Corp.,1644 plaintiff Amado filed a suit against 
Microsoft for infringement of his patent relating to a software 
program that combines the functionalities of spreadsheet and 
database software.1645  Following a 2005 jury verdict that Amado’s 
patent was valid and infringed, the district court granted Amado’s 
motion for a permanent injunction but stayed the injunction until 
“[s]even days after the resolution or abandonment of any appeal.”1646  
The district court rejected Amado’s motion to enforce the stay seven 
days after the mandate issued and, instead, interpreted the term 
“appeal” to include a petition for certiorari.1647  The district court 
granted Microsoft’s request for an extension of the stay following the 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari.1648  Microsoft then moved for 
permanent dissolution of the permanent injunction, arguing that the 
“Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay made the grant of 
 
 1639. Id. at 1380, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1640. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1641. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1642. Id. at 1380 n.8, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (citations omitted). 
 1643. Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 1644. 517 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1645. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 1646. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 1647. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. 
 1648. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. 
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injunction inappropriate.”1649  After applying the four-factor test for 
injunctive relief, the district court found “both an absence of 
irreparable harm and that the public interest would be disserved by 
granting an injunction,” and therefore dissolved the permanent 
injunction.1650
Amado appealed, arguing that the “mandate rule foreclosed 
Microsoft from challenging the injunction or the district court from 
modifying it.”1651  Although it agreed that the mandate rule would 
have foreclosed Microsoft from challenging the initial entry of the 
permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit rejected Amado’s 
argument that the district court abused its discretion when it 
modified the stay of the injunction once it was incorporated into the 
mandate from the Federal Circuit’s 2006 order.1652  The court noted 
that “district courts possess broad equitable authority to modify 
injunctions” and concluded that there was no abuse of discretion 
when the district court reconsidered the permanent injunction in 
light of eBay and, ultimately, decided to dissolve the injunction when 
it determined that it was “no longer equitable under the 
circumstances.”1653  The court also noted that it did not reach the 
argument of “whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of 
irreparable harm following a judgment of validity and infringement 
following eBay” because the district court in this case was “within its 
discretion to find an absence of irreparable harm based on the 
evidence presented at trial.”1654
In Voda v. Cordis Corp.,1655 plaintiff Voda alleged that Cordis had 
infringed three of its patents relating to catheter designs for 
interventional cardiology.1656  After the district court found that 
Voda’s patents were not invalid and were infringed, Voda moved for a 
permanent injunction.1657  Rather than attempting to prove 
irreparable injury to himself, Voda attempted to show the effect 
Cordis’s infringement had on its exclusive licensee of the patents-in-
suit.1658  The district court denied Voda’s motion for a permanent 
injunction, finding that Voda had failed to demonstrate irreparable 
 
 1649. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094. 
 1650. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095. 
 1651. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095. 
 1652. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094.  The Federal Circuit’s 2006 order 
affirming the district court’s final judgment, Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 185 F. App’x 
953 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), is also referred to as Amado I. 
 1653. Id. at 1358–61, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094–96. 
 1654. Id. at 1359 n.1, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 n.1. 
 1655. 536 F.3d 1311, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1656. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744–45. 
 1657. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1658. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755–56. 
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injury and failed to show that monetary damages were inadequate to 
compensate for Cordis’s infringement.1659  Voda appealed the district 
court’s denial of the permanent injunction.1660  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the denial of a permanent injunction, finding that Voda’s 
attempt to proof of injury to his exclusive licensee, rather than to 
himself, did not provide a basis for entry of a permanent 
injunction.1661  While affirming the denial of a permanent injunction 
of the facts of Voda, however, the court noted that “patent owners 
that license their patents rather than practice them ‘may be able to 
satisfy the traditional four-factor test’ for a permanent injunction.”1662
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,1663 plaintiff Broadcom filed an 
action against Qualcomm for infringement of three of its patents 
relating to baseband chips designed to work in cell phones on 3G 
networks.1664  A jury found that Broadcom’s patents were infringed 
and not invalid, and awarded Broadcom damages.1665  Subsequently, 
the district court held a bench trial on the issue of injunctive relief.1666  
In support of its motion for an injunction, Broadcom put forth 
evidence that it would be irreparably injured because it has a general 
policy not to license its patents and that monetary damages were 
insufficient because it would not have agreed to enter a licensing 
agreement with its direct competitor for strategic business reasons.1667
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the district court entered a 
permanent injunction against Qualcomm on all patents.1668  The 
permanent injunction barred Qualcomm’s future sales of products 
using Broadcom’s patents but included a “sunset” provision that 
allowed “continued sales pursuant to a mandatory royalty through 
January 31, 2009.”1669  In its analysis of the eBay factors, the district 
court found that (1) Broadcom had demonstrated irreparable harm 
because, even though it did not practice the claimed inventions, the 
competition for “design wins” in the baseband marketplace could 
 
 1659. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755–56. 
 1660. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1661. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756. 
 1662. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393, 78 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006)). 
 1663. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For discussion of 
this case’s implications regarding indirect infringement, see supra notes 882–889 and 
accompanying text. 
 1664. Id. at 686, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1665. Id. at 687, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1666. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1667. Id. at 702–04, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–58. 
 1668. Id. at 687, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1669. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
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have a competitive effect on firms;1670 (2) the lack of adequate remedy 
at law weighed in favor of an injunction with respect to all of the 
infringed patents;1671 (3) the permanent injunction would harm 
Qualcomm, but held that “with a sunset provision which ameliorates 
the negative effects on Qualcomm, the balance of hardships favors 
Broadcom”;1672 and (4) an immediate permanent injunction would 
adversely affect the public, network carriers, and handset 
manufacturers, but that the sunset provisions “balance[] the policy of 
protecting the patentee’s rights against the desirability of avoiding 
immediate market disruptions.”1673
The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a permanent injunction, 
noting that the “district court provided a well-reasoned and 
comprehensive opinion addressing injunctive relief.”1674  The court 
held that Broadcom demonstrated irreparable harm, “despite the fact 
that it does not currently practice the claimed inventions,” when it 
showed that Qualcomm competes indirectly with Broadcom in the 
baseband chip market.1675  The court distinguished this ruling from a 
prior decision:  whereas in Voda the alleged harm was to an “exclusive 
licensee,” in this case Broadcom did not “rely on harm to others, but 
rather allege[d] that its own commercial activities will be irreparably 
injured by Qualcomm’s infringing activity.”1676  
Likewise, in Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corporation,1677 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a district court’s decision to grant an injunction despite the 
defendant’s arguments that the eBay factors did not warrant one.  
Acumed asserted a patent directed to a proximal humeral nail 
(“PHN”)—a type of orthopedic nail used for the treatment of 
fractures of the upper arm—against one of Stryker’s PHN 
products.1678  In 2005, a jury found willful infringement and awarded 
damages, and in early 2006, the district court issued a permanent 
injunction.1679
While Stryker’s appeal was pending in 2006, however, the Supreme 
Court decided eBay,1680 and the Federal Circuit, in addition to 
affirming the jury’s verdict and damages award, remanded the case to 
 
 1670. Id. at 702–03, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–57. 
 1671. Id. at 703–04, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657–58. 
 1672. Id. at 704, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1673. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 1674. Id. at 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1675. Id. at 703, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1676. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1677. 551 F.3d 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1612 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1678. Id. at 1326, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.  
 1679. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 1680. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 
(2006). 
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the district court for reconsideration of the four-factor test for 
injunctive relief in light of eBay.1681
On remand, defendant Stryker responded to Acumed’s motion for 
a permanent injunction by submitting an opposition memorandum 
supported by the declarations of five physicians attesting to their use 
of Stryker’s product, and stating that it was less prone to nail “back-
out” than Acumed’s competing product.1682   Stryker also argued that 
Acumed’s prior licensing of the asserted patent barred a finding of 
irreparable injury.1683
The district court rejected Stryker’s arguments and again issued a 
permanent injunction.1684  On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the district court’s findings and determination were not an abuse 
of discretion.  First, the Federal Circuit rejected Stryker’s argument 
that Acumed’s prior licensing of the asserted patent precluded 
findings of irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law:  “While 
the fact that a patentee has previously chosen to license the patent 
may indicate that a reasonable royalty does compensate for an 
infringement, that is but one factor for the district court to 
consider.”1685   The court confirmed the district court’s analysis that 
the addition of Stryker as a licensee could still cause Acumed 
irreparable harm, stating that:  
[a]dding a new competitor to the market may create an irreparable 
harm that the prior licenses did not.  In this case, the fact that 
Acumed licensed the [asserted] patent under two particular sets of 
circumstances does not mean that the district court abused its 
discretion in not holding that Acumed must now grant a further 
license to Stryker and receive only a royalty as compensation.1686   
Second, the court rejected Stryker’s arguments that the balance of 
hardships counseled against an injunction because the evidence 
showed an injunction would cause a hardship for Stryker’s customers 
and patients and because Stryker had made significant expenditures 
in designing and manufacturing its infringing product.1687  “As a 
preliminary matter, the balance of hardship is only between a 
plaintiff and a defendant, and thus the effect on customers and 
patients alleged by Stryker is irrelevant under this prong of the 
 
 1681. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 
1489 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1682. Acumed, 551 F.3d at 1326, 1331, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613, 1617. 
 1683. Id. at 1327-28, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614. 
 1684. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-1615. 
 1685. Id. at 1328, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.   
 1686. Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 1687. Id. at 1329-30, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615-1616. 
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injunction test.”1688  The court also stated, “We also see no abuse of 
discretion in the court’s decision not to consider Stryker’s expenses 
in designing and marketing the [accused product], since those are 
expenses related to an infringing product.”1689
Finally, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the district court had 
not abused its discretion when it concluded that the public interest 
did not preclude an injunction.1690  The court concluded that the 
district court’s findings that there was “considerable dispute” at trial 
about whether Stryker’s evidence of a public health issue regarding 
screw back-out with Acumed’s competing product was the product of 
“biased experts,” and that Stryker had not proven that there was any 
public health problem with Acumed’s product were not an abuse of 
discretion.1691
However, while affirming the district court’s ruling, the Federal 
Circuit expressed that this presented a close case.1692  The court 
specifically indicated that its affirmance took into account that its 
review was under the abuse of discretion standard: 
Ultimately, this was a close case, especially with regard to the 
irreparable harm and lack of adequate remedy at law prongs of the 
four-factor test, in view of past licenses having been granted, and 
the public interest prong, in light of testimony that the accused 
product was a medically superior one.  Nonetheless, the standard 
of review, viz., abuse of discretion, compels our decision to affirm 
the district court.1693
B. Preliminary Injunction 
A preliminary injunction is entered before trial to protect a party’s 
rights while an infringement trial is pending.  Preliminary injunctions 
require an examination of the following four factors:  (1) likelihood 
of success on the merits, (2) harm to the moving party if the 
injunction is not granted, (3) the balance of hardships, and (4) the 
impact of the injunction on the public interest.1694
 
 1688. Id. at 1330, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1578 (2006)). 
 1689. Id. at 1330, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, 
Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 567 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 1690. Id. at 1330-31, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616-1617. 
 1691. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616-1617. 
 1692. Id. at 1332, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 1693. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 1694. See Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1347, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Whether a preliminary injunction should issue 
turns upon four factors:  (1) the probability that the movant will succeed on the 
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant should a preliminary 
injunction be denied; (3) the balance between this harm and the harm that granting 
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In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,1695 plaintiff Abbott brought an 
infringement action against Sandoz for infringement of its patents 
involving its extended release formulations of one its brand name 
antibiotic drugs.1696  In granting Abbott a preliminary injunction 
against Sandoz, the district court found that (1) Abbott had 
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving infringement of its 
patents;1697 (2) Abbott would suffer irreparable harm despite the 
existence of generic producers already in this market because the 
generic producers “do not negate the market share and revenue loss 
upon Sandoz[’s] entry  while the litigation proceeds”;1698 (3) the 
balance of hardships weighed in favor of Abbott because “Abbott will 
lose much more if this Court did not enjoin Sandoz’s infringing 
conduct than if the Court enjoins Sandoz and it is subsequently 
found that the ‘718 patent is invalid or unenforceable”;1699 and  
(4) while the public interest may be served by the availability of less 
expensive forms of successful medicines, the court also recognized 
“the public interest in creating beneficial and useful products and the 
cost involved in that process” and, thus, enforcing the Abbott 
Laboratories patent would also serve the public interest.1700
On appeal, Sandoz argued that the district court had abused its 
discretion by granting the preliminary injunction because Sandoz 
had raised a “substantial question” as to the validity of the patent at 
issue as well as Abbott’s “inequitable conduct” in obtaining the 
patents.1701
Affirming the grant of preliminary injunction,1702 a panel majority 
of the Federal Circuit found that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against Sandoz. 
 The correct standard is not whether a substantial question has 
been raised, but whether the patentee is likely to succeed on the 
merits, upon application of the standards of proof that will prevail 
at trial.  The question is not whether the patent is vulnerable; the 
 
the injunction will cause to the other parties litigant; and (4) the public interest.”) 
(quoting Pretty Punch Shoppettes, Inc. v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1563, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 1695. 544 F.3d 1341, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1696. Id. at 1343–44, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65. 
 1697. Id. at 1361, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1698. Id. at 1361–62, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1699. Id. at 1362, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1700. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179–80. 
 1701. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 
1166 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Sandoz assigns legal error to the district court’s rulings that 
Abbott is likely to prevail on the issues of validity, infringement, and inequitable 
conduct, and states that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the 
equities and granting the injunction.”). 
 1702. Id. at 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1186. 
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question is who is likely to prevail in the end, considered with 
equitable factors that relate to whether the status quo should or 
should not be preserved while the trial is ongoing.  The 
presentation of sufficient evidence to show the likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits is quite different from the presentation of 
substantial evidence to show vulnerability.1703
The majority opinion also provided an overview of the law granting 
preliminary injunction to address the issues raised by Judge Gajarsa’s 
dissent.1704  Writing for the majority, Judge Newman noted that “[no] 
circuit has held that it suffices to raise a ‘substantial question’” as to 
whether or not a defendant is likely to prevail on the merits.1705  The 
court went on to hold that “[r]aising a substantial question may avoid 
dismissal on the pleadings, but contrary to the view of the dissent, 
establishing that there is an issue for trial is not the same as 
establishing the likelihood of prevailing at trial.”1706
In his dissent, Judge Gajarsa found that there was “no legal basis 
for the granting of the preliminary injunction and its issuance is an 
abuse of discretion.”1707  Judge Gajarsa focused on the preliminary 
injunction factor of “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits” 
and argued that there were “substantial questions of both validity and 
enforceability of the ‘718 patent preventing a finding of likelihood of 
success on the merits.”1708  The dissent found that the district court 
erred when it failed to “properly consider and weigh the ample 
evidence produced by Sandoz that clearly established a substantial 
question of invalidity and rendered the patent vulnerable to an 
invalidity challenge at trial.”1709  Furthermore, the dissent argued that 
the district court had abused its discretion by finding the “concededly 
false statement” made by Abbott to be immaterial and thus failing to 
find a substantial question of inequitable conduct on Abbott’s part.1710
In Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp.,1711 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for preliminary 
injunction based on a Lanham Act counterclaim.1712  The patents at 
issue in Judkins involved a process for manufacturing window 
coverings.1713  On HT’s motion for a preliminary injunction, HT 
 
 1703. Id. at 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81. 
 1704. Id. at 1363–68, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–84. 
 1705. Id. at 1368, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184. 
 1706. Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184. 
 1707. Id. at 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1186. 
 1708. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 1709. Id. at 1372, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1187. 
 1710. Id. at 1379–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 1711. 529 F.3d 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1712. Id. at 1336, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354. 
 1713. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354. 
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alleged that Judkins had “violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act1714 
by sending HT’s customers and potential customers letters stating 
that an HT product infringed its patents” and that Judkins had acted 
in bad faith because he knew that his patent was unenforceable.1715
The district court denied HT’s motion for preliminary injunction 
holding that “HT could not establish bad faith or overcome the 
presumption of the patent’s validity by clear and convincing evidence 
and therefore could not show the requisite likelihood of success on 
the merits.”1716
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of HT’s 
request for a preliminary injunction.1717  Plaintiff Judkins obtained his 
‘120 patent for the process after the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences granted priority for his patent application over a patent 
assigned to a competitor and soon filed a suit against HT for 
infringement of its ‘120 patent.1718  The court rejected HT’s argument 
that the district court had erred when it failed to find that an earlier 
settlement was collusive and thus indicative of bad faith on Judkins 
assertion of the ‘120 patent; instead, the court deferred to the court’s 
judgment and declined to make an assumption on the district court’s 
diligence.1719  The court also rejected HT’s arguments that the district 
court clearly erred by questioning the substance of the finding in an 
earlier litigation, applying a presumption of validity, and failing to 
use the “objective baselessness” standard of bad faith.1720
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid 
Printing Solutions, L.L.C.1721  The patents at issue in DuPont were 
directed to a process for preparing a flexographic printing plate from 
a photosensitive element for use in the process.1722  In opposition to 
DuPont’s motion for a preliminary injunction, defendant MacDermid 
argued that DuPont could not show a likelihood of success on the 
merits because DuPont’s patent “was invalid under Section 102(b) 
because the invention was on sale or in public use before the critical 
date . . . of February 27, 2001, or one year before the filing date of the 
 
 1714. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 1715. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354. 
 1716. Id. at 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355. 
 1717. Id. at 1344–45, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361. 
 1718. Id. at 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355. 
 1719. Id. at 1341, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358. 
 1720. Id. at 1341–42, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357–59. 
 1721. 525 F.3d 1353, 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
[hereinafter DuPont]. 
 1722. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
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non-provisional application.”1723  The district court agreed and denied 
DuPont’s motion for a preliminary injunction because DuPont had 
not shown that MacDermid’s asserted invalidity defenses lacked 
substantial merit.1724
On appeal of the preliminary injunction, the Federal Circuit found 
that the district court had abused its discretion in finding that a 
“substantial question” as to the validity of the patent existed because 
the “non-provisional application was entitled to the filing date of the 
provisional application as a matter of law.”1725  The court vacated and 
remanded the case for consideration because the district court had 
not reached “the parties’ remaining arguments as to validity and 
enforceability as well as the remaining preliminary injunction 
factors.”1726
In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.,1727 Proctor & 
Gamble (“P & G”) filed an action against Kraft for infringement of its 
patent for a plastic container, intended to replace conventional metal 
cans for marketing and storing ground coffee, and moved for a 
preliminary injunction.1728  While the motion for preliminary 
injunction was pending, the district court granted Kraft’s motion to 
stay, effectively denying P & G’s motion for preliminary injunction.1729  
P & G appealed.1730  The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the 
lower court had “abused its discretion by effectively denying P & G’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction without considering and 
balancing the required factors.”1731  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
district court’s refusal to hear P & G’s arguments regarding 
likelihood of success without first construing the claims, as well as its 
refusal to consider arguments regarding irreparable harm and the 
balance of hardships on the basis that such arguments would only be 
considered if Kraft’s motion for a stay were not granted.1732  The court 
remanded the matter to the district court for a full evaluation of the 
preliminary injunction factors.1733
 
 1723. Id. at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735. 
 1724. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736. 
 1725. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 1726. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 1727. No. 2008-1105, 2008 WL 5101824, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 
5, 2008). 
 1728. Id. at *1, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 1729. Id. at *1, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086–87. 
 1730. Id. at *2, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 1731. Id. at *4, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 1732. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088–89. 
 1733. Id. at *6, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
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C. Damages 
In TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp.,1734 plaintiff TiVo 
brought a suit against Echostar in the Eastern District of Texas for 
infringement of claims related to its patent on technology that 
enables television users to “time-shift” television signals thereby 
enabling users to digitally record and replay the program on the 
user’s television set.1735  The district court entered judgment on the 
jury award of $73,991,964 in damages for TiVo ($32,663,906 in lost 
profits and $41,328,058 in reasonable royalties), and Echostar 
appealed.1736  Even though it reversed the verdict of infringement as 
to two of the four claims on which the jury had found infringement, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the damages awarded by the district 
court “[b]ecause the damages calculation at trial was not predicated 
on the infringement of particular claims, and because we have 
upheld the jury’s verdict that all of the accused devices infringe the 
software claims.”1737  The Federal Circuit also noted that the district 
court’s injunction was stayed pending the appeal and, once the 
appeal becomes final, the district court can make a determination of 
additional damages that TiVo may have sustained while the stay of the 
permanent injunction has been in effect.1738
1. Lost profits 
In order for a patent owner to recover lost profits as opposed to a 
reasonable royalty, the patent owner must “prove a causal relation 
between the infringement and its loss of profits.  The patent owner 
must show that ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have made the 
infringer’s sales.”1739
In American Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc.,1740 American Seating 
filed an action against USSC alleging that two of USSC’s wheelchair 
tie-down devices, the VPRo I and the VPRo II, infringed its patent for 
a wheelchair restraint system for use in mass transit vehicles.1741  The 
jury returned a verdict including an award of lost profits from 
convoyed sales of non-patented products to American Seating.  The 
district court granted in part USSC’s motion for remittitur by setting 
 
 1734. 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed Cir. 2008). 
 1735. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1736. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1737. Id. at 1312, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 1738. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 1739. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218,  
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 1740. 514 F.3d 1262, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1741. Id. at 1265–66, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
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aside a portion of the verdict related to convoyed sales, because “the 
record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to American 
Seating, was insufficient as a matter of law for the jury to find that the 
patented tie-down system and unpatented passenger seats were part 
of a single functional unit.”1742  The district court reduced the original 
jury award of $2,326,129 in lost profits to $676,850.1743  American 
Seating appealed the district court’s decision setting aside a portion 
of the jury’s verdict and USSC cross-appealed the district court’s 
confirmation of the “jury’s award of lost profit damages for sales of 
the non-infringing VPRo II.”1744
The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s conclusions that American Seating failed as a matter of 
law to meet its burden of establishing a functional relationship 
between passenger seats and the patented restraint system, and the 
jury properly awarded damages for lost profits on USSC’s deliveries 
of the VPRo II predicated upon offers to sell the infringing VPRo 
I.1745
The court also noted that “[b]ecause it is clear that no interrelated 
or functional relationship inheres between the seats and the tie-down 
restraint system on a passenger bus, the district court was correct that 
the jury had no basis to conclude that lost profits on collateral sales of 
passenger seats were due American Seating.”1746
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.,1747 Cohesive 
Technologies brought three related actions accusing Waters of 
infringing its patents relating to high-performance liquid 
chromatography (“HLPC”), a process for separating, identifying, and 
measuring compounds contained in a liquid.1748  Following a bench 
trial, the district court concluded that Cohesive was not entitled to 
lost profits as a result of infringement, because Waters had acceptable 
noninfringing substitutes.1749  The Federal Circuit vacated the lower 
court’s ruling that Cohesive was not entitled to lost profits because it 
was “unclear whether the other product available, standing alone, 
would have been an acceptable substitute.”1750  Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit did not understand what the district court meant in 
its differentiation between a “fully-acceptable substitute” and a 
 
 1742. Id. at 1268–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
 1743. Id. at 1266, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1744. Id. at 1269–70, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687–88. 
 1745. Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
 1746. Id. at 1269, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687. 
 1747. 543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1748. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905–06. 
 1749. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. 
 1750. Id. at 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
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“reasonably acceptable substitute.”1751  The court remanded for 
“reconsideration based upon its determination of (1) whether the  
25 mm columns infringe under the correct claim construction; and 
(2) whether the 2.1 x 20 mm columns are acceptable noninfringing 
substitutes.”1752
2. Reasonable royalty 
In Monsanto Co. v. David,1753 Monsanto brought an infringement 
action against David, a commercial farmer, for infringement of its 
patents involving genes used in soybean seeds.1754  Monsanto claimed 
that David had planted soybean seeds with the patented genes in 
2003 that were improperly saved from the previous year’s harvest.1755  
The district court entered judgment against David for willfully 
infringing Monsanto’s patent and for breach of the technology 
agreement by planting saved seed from the prior year’s harvest and 
awarded Monsanto reasonable royalty damages of $226,214.40.1756  
David appealed the district court’s judgment.1757
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s reasonable royalty 
calculation of $55.04 per infringing seed unit but vacated the district 
court’s calculation of seed density of 107.5 pounds per acre.1758  The 
Federal Circuit found it significant that there was confusion 
concerning the 120 pound per acre density estimate that David had 
offered during his trial testimony.1759  Based on the transcript and 
David’s “extensive previous testimony,” which showed that David had 
never estimated planting the Monsanto seed at more than seventy-five 
pounds per acre, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 120 pound 
density figure that David referenced was for conventional seed, not 
seed utilizing Monsanto’s patented genes.1760  While noting the 
district court’s “difficult task of determining the total soybean acreage 
planted by David in 2003 and the density of seed used in those fields” 
in order to assess the number of infringing seed units planted by 
David, the court nevertheless found that the district court’s 
determination was “clearly erroneous” because it had based its 
 
 1751. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. 
 1752. Id. at 1373–74, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917–18. 
 1753. 516 F.3d 1009, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1963 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1754. Id. at 1011–12, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965–66. 
 1755. Id. at 1012, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1756. Id. at 1013, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1757. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1758. Id. at 1019–20, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971. 
 1759. Id. at 1019, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971. 
 1760. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970–71. 
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calculation on the use of an anomalous 120 pound density figure.1761  
Thus, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling on this 
issue and remanded for further fact-finding concerning the soybean 
density issue.1762
In Amado v. Microsoft Corp.,1763 the district court awarded plaintiff 
Amado a post-verdict royalty equivalent to $0.12 per infringing unit 
for products sold during the stay of a permanent injunction against 
Microsoft.1764  The district court reached $0.12 by trebling the pre-
verdict reasonable royalty of $0.04, reasoning that post-verdict sales 
should be considered willful infringement.1765  Reviewing the award 
on appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that willfulness “is not the 
inquiry when the infringement is permitted by a court-ordered 
stay.”1766  The court vacated the district court’s award because it “did 
not expressly consider that Microsoft’s infringing sales took place 
following the grant of an injunction that was stayed.”1767  The Federal 
Circuit remanded the matter for reconsideration because the court 
was “unable to determine whether the district court’s award of $0.12 
was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.”1768
In addition, Microsoft argued that any damages awarded to Amado 
must be adjusted in light of Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,1769 which 
held “that liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) does not extend to the 
installation of software onto a computer abroad when the copies of 
that software are made abroad, because in such case the copies are 
not ‘supplied’ from the United States within the meaning of that 
statute.”1770  Based on AT & T, Microsoft argued that “[a]ny damages 
awarded to Amado should . . . be limited to products manufactured 
and or sold in the United Sates.”1771  Though the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “Microsoft is entitled to assert the AT & T decision,” 
the court was “unable to determine whether the infringing products 
sold by Microsoft were provided in such a way as to not be ‘supplied 
from the United States’ as required to extinguish § 271(f) liability.”1772  
Thus, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court “to decide 
 
 1761. Id. at 1018–19, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970. 
 1762. Id. at 1019, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971. 
 1763. 517 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1764. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. 
 1765. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1096. 
 1766. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. 
 1767. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. 
 1768. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. 
 1769. 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007). 
 1770. Amado, 517 F.3d at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 1771. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 1772. Id. at 1364, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
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the applicability of AT & T” along with its reconsideration of the 
“proper disbursement of funds from escrow.”1773
3. Costs 
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Communications Systems, Inc.,1774 
plaintiff Zenith brought an action against PDI for infringement of its 
patents relating to televisions and wired remote controls used in 
hospital rooms.1775  Among its other summary judgment rulings, the 
district court denied PDI’s motion for costs without further 
explanation and PDI cross-appealed.1776  The Federal Circuit agreed 
with PDI that “Seventh Circuit law requires the district court to 
provide some explanation of its decision regarding costs.”1777  
However, the court noted that because the court vacated and 
remanded several of the district court’s summary judgment rulings, it 
was “in no position to opine on whether PDI should ultimately be 
deemed the prevailing party for purposes of recovering costs.”1778  The 
court held that PDI could move again for costs and that the district 
court’s “conclusion on that issue should be accompanied by an 
explanation in accordance with Krocka[ v. City of Chicago]1779.”1780
4. Marking 
In Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway Equipment Co.,1781 
the Supreme Court held that “under the predecessor statute to the 
notice provision of 35 U.S.C. § 287, a patentee who fails to mark his 
patented article with the appropriate patent number could only 
recover damages for infringement occurring after actual notice was 
provided the infringer.”1782  In DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc.,1783 the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court misapplied Wine Railway 
because it failed to recognize “that a patentee may indeed recover 
damages for infringement that continues after actual notice is 
provided.”1784
 
 1773. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 1774. 522 F.3d 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1775. Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514–15. 
 1776. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. 
 1777. Id. at 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 1778. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 1779. 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 1780. Zenith, 522 F.3d at 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 1781. 297 U.S. 387, 28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299 (1936). 
 1782. DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1687, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1783. 537 F.3d 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1784. Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
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DSW brought an action against Shoe Pavilion for infringement of 
its patents for a system of storing and displaying a large selection of 
footwear for customer self-service.1785  The district court granted 
summary judgment for Shoe Pavilion, citing Wine Railway and 
holding that “no damages for infringement are recoverable by a 
plaintiff unless the infringing activity continues after notice is 
provided to the infringer.”1786  The district court excused post-notice 
infringement because “Shoe Pavilion took reasonable steps and 
timely removed all of the infringing shoe displays.”1787  The Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, stating that the trial 
court had “erred in concluding that Shoe Pavilion’s reasonable steps 
and good faith efforts to bring its infringing activity to a timely end 
equated to an immediate cessation.”1788  The court held that the 
“district misapplied the standard expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Wine Railway”1789 and that “a patentee may indeed recover damages 
for infringement that continues after actual notice is provided” 
regardless of how diligently the infringer takes steps to stop 
infringing.1790  The court reiterated that “the law offers an infringer 
no exception to liability for the time it takes to terminate infringing 
activities, no matter how expeditious and reasonable its efforts.”1791
IX. PENALTIES 
A. Enhanced Damages for Willful Infringement 
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense; therefore, the 
nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether 
enhanced damages are warranted.1792  The Patent Act does not 
provide any standard for the award of enhanced damages.1793  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held that an award of enhanced 
damages requires a showing of willful infringement.1794
In 2007, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its earlier 
precedent and changed the standard for a finding of willful 
infringement “from one of an affirmative duty of care to one of 
 
 1785. Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688. 
 1786. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1787. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1788. Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1789. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1790. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1791. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1792. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1868 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 1793. Id. at 1368 n.3, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868 n.3. 
 1794. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
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objective recklessness.”1795  Thus, to support an award of enhanced 
damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.1796
In Minks v. Polaris Industries, Inc.,1797 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a jury’s finding of willfulness in a trial that occurred before 
In re Seagate Technology, LLC1798 must be reversed in light of that 
decision, and concluded that it did not.1799  In Minks, the owner of a 
patent directed to an electronic governor system for internal 
combustion engines sued Polaris Industries, a manufacturer of all-
terrain vehicles (“ATVs”), for infringement.1800  Approximately one 
year before filing suit—and after the parties had exchanged several 
communications regarding Minks’s patent rights—Minks sent a letter 
informing Polaris of its belief that Polaris’s ATVs infringed Minks’s 
patent.1801  At the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the jury was 
given a willfulness instruction that Polaris argued on appeal was plain 
error in light of Seagate, but to which Polaris did not object at trial.1802  
The jury found that Polaris willfully infringed Minks’s patent.1803  The 
district court subsequently granted enhanced damages and attorney 
fees.1804
When a jury instruction is not objected to at trial, the appeals court 
will review the instruction only for “plain error.”1805  The Federal 
Circuit in Minks applied the regional circuit’s plain error review 
standard: 
 Under [the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit’s] plain error review, an appellate court must not correct an 
error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there 
is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.  
If all three of those conditions are met, the court may exercise its 
discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error 
 
 1795. Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102, 
1114 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1796. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, , 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870. 
 1797. 546 F.3d 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1798. 497 F.3d 1360, 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 1799. Id. at 1379–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114–15. 
 1800. Id. at 1367–69, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104–06. 
 1801. Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1802. Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 1803. Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1804. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.  However, the district court subsequently 
granted Polaris’s motion for a reduction in damages and reduced Minks’s original 
award.  Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1805. Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
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seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.1806
Affirming the jury’s finding of willfulness, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that it did not need to decide whether the instruction 
given to the jury constituted plain error, because Polaris failed to 
offer any argument or to cite any evidence to establish that any 
alleged error affected its substantial rights or affected the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings—the third and 
fourth elements of the Eleventh Circuit’s plain error standard.1807  
Specifically, Polaris made no argument that the jury would not have 
found willfulness if it was instructed differently, arguing instead that 
the jury’s willfulness finding “affected its substantial rights because it 
resulted in the imposition of enhanced damages and attorney 
fees.”1808  The Federal Circuit also stated that it did not think Polaris 
could have shown that the alleged error in the jury instruction 
affected its substantial rights because the trial court’s order granting 
enhanced damages stated that it was “fairly clear” that deliberate 
copying had taken place and that “the case was not close.”1809  Based 
on that record, the Federal Circuit stated “it appears that error in the 
jury instruction was not prejudicial because the jury may very well 
have arrived at the same result.”1810  The Federal Circuit also stated 
that there had been no argument that the outcome of the case might 
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings,” and affirmed the jury’s willfulness verdict.1811
B. Award of Attorney Fees 
Section 285 of the Patent Act provides that “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”1812  Under that section, the trial court must first 
determine whether the particular case is “exceptional,” a 
determination that must be based on clear and convincing 
evidence.1813  If the court finds that it is, the trial court must then 
 
 1806. Id. at 1379–80, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114 (quoting United States v. 
LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 930 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 1807. Id. at 1380–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114–15. 
 1808. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1809. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (quoting Minks v. Polaris Indus., 
Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 788418, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2007)). 
 1810. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1811. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (quoting United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 
914, 930 (11th Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). 
 1812. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 1813. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1682, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006)). 
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determine, as a matter of discretion, whether to award attorney 
fees.1814  However, “[i]n order to provide a basis for meaningful 
review” of the decision to award attorney fees under section 285, the 
court of appeals requires the trial court not only to make the ultimate 
finding that the case is exceptional, “but also to articulate the more 
particular factual findings from which the finding of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ follows.”1815
In Innovation Technologies, Inc. v. Splash! Medical Devices, LLC,1816 the 
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded an award of attorney fees 
under § 285 because the district court did not provide sufficient 
factual findings to allow for appellate review.1817  In that case, more 
than one year after filing suit and following extensive discovery (but 
prior to a Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.1818 hearing), 
Innovation executed a covenant not to sue Splash on the patent at 
issue and moved to dismiss its infringement suit with prejudice.1819  
Splash subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to § 285.  The 
district court granted the motion in a one-paragraph order stating in 
relevant part: 
 This case qualifies as an “exceptional” case under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 285 justifying an award of attorney’s fees to Splash as the 
prevailing party.  Splash has shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that Innovation knew or, on reasonable investigation, 
should have known, that its claims of infringement were baseless.  
It appears to me that the lawsuit was filed solely for the purpose of 
harassing a small competitor.1820
The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he three conclusory statements 
quoted above—which merely stated that this is an exceptional case, 
that Innovation knew or should have known that its claims of 
infringement were ‘baseless,’ and that it ‘appear[ed]’ that the suit 
was filed ‘solely’ to ‘harass’ a small competitor,” were inadequate to 
allow the Federal Circuit to perform its review function.1821
On remand, the district court was provided with latitude to select 
the bases for its conclusion that the case was exceptional: 
 
 1814. See id. at 1329, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (noting the “limited 
circumstance in which an award of attorney fees is appropriate”). 
 1815. Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582, 226 
U.S.P.Q. 821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 
124, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 707, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 1816. 528 F.3d 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1817. Id. at 1351–52, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224. 
 1818. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 1819. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1820. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (quoting Order Granting Splash’s Motion 
for Attorney’s Fees, No. 07-1424 (C.A. Fed. Mar. 22, 2007)) (emphasis added). 
 1821. Id. at 1351, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224. 
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 Of course, the district court need not necessarily make findings 
on all of [the points raised by the parties].  Findings on those issues 
upon which the court bases its new determination of the 
“exceptional case” issue are all that is required.  The detail 
necessary . . . is a matter largely within the district court’s 
discretion.1822
If the district court awards attorney fees based on its exceptional 
case finding, it must also explain the reasons for the conclusion that 
such an award is warranted.1823
Over a dissenting opinion, the Federal Circuit held that the trial 
court’s findings of inequitable conduct and litigation misconduct 
could justify an exceptional case finding in Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, 
Inc.1824  In a 2000 complaint, Nilssen accused Osram of infringing 
twenty-six patents relating to fluorescent light bulbs and ballasts used 
in combination with fluorescent light bulbs.1825  Over the next five 
years, Nilssen informally removed several of those patents from the 
case while attempting to assert additional patents through a variety of 
means, all without formally releasing Osram from infringement 
liability on any of the patents.1826  By the time of trial, Nilssen formally 
reduced the number of patents being asserted to eleven.1827
Following a bench trial on inequitable conduct, the district court 
held that the asserted patents were unenforceable because Nilssen 
had misclaimed small entity status and improperly paid small entity 
maintenance fees, failed to disclose to the patent examiner litigation 
related to the patent applications, misclaimed the priority of earlier 
filing dates, withheld material prior art, and submitted misleading 
affidavits to the Patent and Trademark Office.1828  In a 2007 decision, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s inequitable conduct 
ruling.1829
In addition, Nilssen engaged in litigation conduct, which the 
district court found was relevant to the exceptional case finding.  
Nilssen had refused to provide a witness for a deposition absent a 
court instruction to do so, claiming that its own unverified 
interrogatory responses had no legal effect at trial, claimed reliance 
on tax counsel’s advice as a defense to inequitable conduct after 
 
 1822. Id. at 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224. 
 1823. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224. 
 1824. 528 F.3d 1352, 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1825. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 1826. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 1827. Id. at 1355, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162–63. 
 1828. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 1829. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1811, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
  
930 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:747 
                                                
having asserted attorney-client privilege over such advice, and had 
produced documents late.1830
On Osram’s post-trial motion for attorney fees, the district court 
concluded that the case was exceptional and awarded Osram its 
attorney fees.1831  The district court identified three reasons for 
finding exceptionality:  “Nilssen’s inequitable conduct, the frivolous 
nature of the lawsuit, and [Nilssen’s] litigation misconduct.”1832
In reviewing the district court’s exceptional case determination, 
the Federal Circuit first clarified that there is no per se rule of 
exceptionality in cases involving inequitable conduct but, in 
appropriate cases, a finding of inequitable conduct can constitute a 
basis for the award of attorney fees.1833  The Court then rejected 
appellant Nilssen’s argument that the district court’s exceptional case 
finding should be reversed because Nilssen’s inequitable conduct was 
“benign,” stating “[i]f certain conduct has been held to be 
inequitable, and we have affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 
it was here, it is hence per se not benign.”1834
The Court explained that the inequitable conduct determination 
was not the sole basis for the district court’s award of attorney fees 
and that the findings regarding Nilssen’s litigation misconduct also 
supported the exceptional case finding.1835  The Federal Circuit 
declined to independently address Nilssen’s arguments that each 
instance of litigation misconduct found by the district court was 
either harmless oversight of a litigation formality or a permissibly 
rough litigation tactic. 
 As an appellate court, we are ill-suited to weigh such evidence.  
All of the instances described above are context-specific, and the 
district court found that, taken in context, they amounted to 
litigation misconduct . . . . [W]e are not left with the firm 
conviction that a mistake was committed.  Furthermore, it ill 
behooves an appellate court to overrule a trial judge concerning 
litigation misconduct when the litigation occurred in front of the 
trial judge, not the appellate court.1836
Finally, the Court stated that the abuse of discretion standard of 
review was central to its decision to affirm the district court’s grant of 
attorney fees.1837
 
 1830. Nilssen, 528 F.3d at 1355–56, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 1831. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 1832. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 1833. Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1834. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65. 
 1835. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 1836. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 1837. Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
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Dissenting, Judge Newman stated that the majority’s decision 
“promotes unexceptional trial procedures and non-culpable 
prosecution errors into an ‘exceptional case’ of such severity as to 
warrant the award of attorney fees.”1838  First citing the “American 
Rule” that “one should not be penalized for merely defending or 
prosecuting a lawsuit,” her opinion reviewed in detail the Federal 
Circuit’s 2007 decision upholding the finding of inequitable conduct 
and argued that the findings in that opinion did not justify the 
majority’s conclusion.1839  Judge Newman also argued that the panel 
majority’s analysis was a departure from Federal Circuit precedent 
because the majority held that “the nature of the grounds on which 
inequitable conduct [is] found is not relevant to the attorney fee 
determination.”1840  Her dissent concluded that the panel majority’s 
holding “enlarges the scope of ‘exceptional case’ to include less than 
egregious aspects of patent prosecution and litigation practice, with 
no evidence or charge of bad faith or prejudice.”1841
In Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,1842 the Federal Circuit held that 
Qualcomm’s litigation misconduct, standing alone, was sufficient to 
justify an award of attorney fees under § 285.1843  In response to 
Qualcomm’s complaint of patent infringement alleging that 
Broadcom products, which utilized the H.264 video compression 
standard, infringed patents owned by Qualcomm, Broadcom raised a 
defense that Qualcomm’s patents were unenforceable because 
Qualcomm failed to disclose the patents to a Joint Video Team 
(“JVT”) standards-setting organization during discussions leading to 
the adoption of the H.264 video compression standard.1844  
Throughout discovery and the trial, Qualcomm represented that it 
did not participate in the JVT during the development of the relevant 
standard and, therefore, had no duty to disclose its patents to that 
body.1845  During cross-examination on one of the last days of the 
 
 1838. Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1839. See id. at 1361–63, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167–68 (quoting Summit Valley 
Indus., Inc. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 724 (1982)) 
(stating that the majority had truncated its explanation of the underlying facts). 
 1840. Id. at 1364, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 1841. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 1842. 548 F.3d 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  For discussion of 
this case’s implications regarding breach of duty to a standards setting organization, 
see supra notes 1551–1556. 
 1843. See id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337–38 (concluding that Broadcom 
should receive attorney fees related to the exceptional case determination). 
 1844. See id. at 1008–09, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–24 (summarizing the district 
court’s conclusion that Qualcomm’s patent was unenforceable because of its 
inequitable conduct). 
 1845. Id. at 1009, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
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infringement trial, however, a Qualcomm witness acknowledged that 
she possessed emails relating to the JVT that Qualcomm previously 
claimed did not exist.1846  Ultimately, it was revealed that Qualcomm 
possessed over 200,000 pages of emails and electronic documents 
demonstrating that Qualcomm had participated in the JVT from as 
early as January 2002.1847  The district court later concluded that 
Qualcomm “knowingly attempted in trial to continue the 
concealment of evidence.”1848  It also determined, based on the late-
produced evidence, that Qualcomm engaged in a “carefully 
orchestrated plan . . . to achieve its goal of holding hostage the entire 
industry desiring to practice the H.264 standard” by concealing from 
the JVT the existence of the asserted patents, and held numerous 
Qualcomm patents unenforceable.1849
Following trial, the district court granted Broadcom’s motion for 
attorney fees, basing its exceptional case determination both on 
Qualcomm’s “bad faith participation” in the JVT and Qualcomm’s 
“litigation misconduct . . . during discovery, motions practice, trial, 
and post-trial proceedings.”1850
On appeal, Qualcomm argued that the district court’s grant of 
attorney fees should be vacated because it was based in part on 
Qualcomm’s bad faith participation in the JVT and that “a patentee’s 
bad faith business conduct toward an accused infringer prior to 
litigation” should not be factored into an award of attorney fees 
under § 285.1851  The Federal Circuit held that the district court’s 
findings regarding Qualcomm’s bad faith participation in the JVT 
were not clearly erroneous, and that the district court’s litigation 
misconduct findings were sufficient standing alone to support the 
exceptional case determination.1852  Accordingly, “in the 
circumstances of the present case it was not error for the district 
court to additionally consider the related JVT misconduct, which was 
an important predicate to understanding and evaluating the 
litigation misconduct.”1853
 
 1846. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 1847. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 1848. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (quoting Order on Remedy for Finding of 
Waiver, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1245 (S.D. Cal. 
2007) (Civ. No. 05-CV-1958-B(BLM))). 
 1849. Id. at 1009–10, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 1850. Id. at 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324–25 (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-1958, 2007 WL 2261799 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)). 
 1851. Id. at 1026–27, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 1852. Id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 1853. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
  
2009] 2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS  933 
                                                
In Minks v. Polaris Industries, Inc.,1854 based on a jury’s finding of 
willful infringement, the district court determined that the case was 
exceptional under § 285 and awarded Minks attorney fees.1855  The 
district court determined that a “reasonable fee” was $234,663.00, but 
awarded only half that amount on the basis that Minks’s damages 
theory was “economic nonsense” and that the reduction was 
warranted to offset “the great deal of time during trial [that] was 
wasted by Plaintiff attempting to evade the basic laws of economics 
and common sense.”1856
On Minks’s appeal of the reduced attorney fees award, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.1857  “[W]e detect no abuse of discretion in the award 
of attorney fees.  Even on appeal, Minks remains unable or unwilling 
to articulate a coherent damages theory.”1858  
Finally, in Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,1859 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of an exceptional 
case and award of $16,800,000 in attorney fees against generic drug 
manufacturer defendants.  The court found no abuse of discretion in 
the district court’s finding that the totality of circumstances, 
including the lack of a good faith basis for Paragraph IV ANDA 
certifications and numerous instances of litigation misconduct, 
merited the award.1860   
The district court’s award was supported in part by the fact that 
defendants Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. and Genpharm, Inc. (collectively, 
“Alphapharm”) and Mylan Laboratories, Inc., Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and UDL Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, 
“Mylan”) had changed their invalidity arguments from those initially 
presented in their Paragraph IV certification letters.1861  In particular, 
the district court found Alphapharm’s certification letter to be 
“baseless” and Mylan’s to have been “filed in bad faith and with no 
reasonable basis . . . .”1862  On appeal, defendant-appellants were 
joined in amicus curiae by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, 
in arguing that “ANDA filers should be allowed to litigate the best 
available theories at trial,” regardless of whether the theories were 
 
 1854. 546 F.3d 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1855. Id. at 1375, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 1856. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110 (quoting Order, Minks v. Polaris Indus., 
Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 1725211, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2007)). 
 1857. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 1858. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 1859. 549 F. 3d 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1860. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220. 
 1861. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220. 
 1862. Id. at 1385, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221 (internal quotations omitted). 
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initially included in the certification letters.1863  Amicus and the 
defendant-appellants argued that affirming the district court’s 
decision would “have a chilling effect on future ANDA patent 
challenges.”1864   
The Federal Circuit found this “chilling” argument unpersuasive.  
The court noted that, in making a Paragraph IV certification, ANDA 
filers are required by statute to “include a detailed statement of the 
factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent 
is invalid.”1865  The court did not find that the district court’s opinion 
had limited ANDA filers to only those theories of invalidity raised in 
certification letters.1866  The district court’s finding of an exceptional 
case was supported by the specific circumstances of the case, namely 
“baseless certification letters compounded with litigation 
misconduct.”1867
X. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 
A. Administrative Law 
Congress established the inter partes reexamination procedure in 
the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”).1868  Inter 
partes reexamination allows third parties to have an expanded role in 
the reexamination of issued patents by allowing the third party “to 
participate in the reexamination by submitting written comments 
addressing issues raised in the patent owner’s response to an office 
action, appealing a decision in favor of patentability, and 
participating as a party to an appeal taken by the patent owner.”1869  
The AIPA includes the following provision establishing its effective 
date:  “Subject to subsection (b), this subtitle and the amendments 
made by this subtitle shall take effect on the date of the enactment of 
this Act and shall apply to any patent that issues from an original 
application filed in the United States on or after that date.”1870
In Cooper Technologies Co. v. Dudas,1871 the Federal Circuit considered 
the meaning of the phrase “original application” in § 4608 of AIPA.1872  
 
 1863. Id. at 1386, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. 
 1864. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. 
 1865. Id. at 1390, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225 (quoting 21 U.S.C.  
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2006). 
 1866. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 1867. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225. 
 1868. Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4001–4808, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-552 to -591 (1999). 
 1869. Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1332, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 
1706 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1870. § 4608, 113 Stat. at 1501A-572 (emphasis added). 
 1871. Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
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The Federal Circuit concluded that the PTO interpretation of 
“original application” as encompassing “utility, plant and design 
applications, including first filed applications, continuations, 
divisionals, continuations-in-part, continued prosecution applications 
and the national stage phase of international applications” is 
reasonable and is entitled to Chevron1873 deference.1874
In Cooper, third party Thomas & Betts Corporation requested an 
inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,984,791 owned by 
appellant Cooper Technologies Company.1875  Cooper responded that 
inter partes reexamination was not available because the original 
application that resulted in the ‘791 patent was filed before 
November 29, 1999, the effective date of the AIPA.1876  The PTO 
determined that the application resulting in the ‘791 patent, though 
a continuation of an earlier application, was an “original application” 
for the purposes of the AIPA and, thus, was subject to inter partes 
reexamination.1877  The reexamination went forward over Cooper’s 
objection and the Patent Office issued an initial office action 
rejecting all claims of the patent as invalid.1878
Cooper sued the Director of the PTO in U.S. district court.1879  The 
district court found that the PTO’s interpretation was “fully 
consistent with the term [original application]’s established meaning 
in patent law” and granted summary judgment in favor of the PTO.1880  
The district court, however, declined to address the question of the 
level of deference accorded to the PTO’s interpretation of “original 
 
 1872. Id. at 1335–37, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709–11. 
 1873. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), 
the Supreme Court set forth the legal analysis for determining whether to grant 
deference to a government agency’s interpretation of its own statutory mandate.  
Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first ask “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”  Id.  If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at 
an end; the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”  Id. at 843.  If, however, “the statute in question is ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable,” Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005), “a court must defer to the agency’s 
construction of a statute governing agency conduct.”  Id. 
 1874. Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1331–32, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706 (quoting Rules to 
Implement Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,756, 76,757 
(Dec. 7, 2000)). 
 1875. Id. at 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1876. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1877. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1878. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1879. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1880. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, No. 
1:07-CV-853, 2007 WL 4233467, at *4, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468–69 (E.D. Va. Nov. 
30, 2007)). 
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application,” finding instead that the outcome would be the same 
regardless of the level of deference owed to the PTO.1881
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the appropriate level of 
deference for the PTO’s interpretation of the AIPA.1882  The Federal 
Circuit found that, because the PTO was merely clarifying or 
explaining existing law, its reading of the term “original application” 
was “interpretative” rather than “substantive” and, therefore, within 
the PTO’s authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2.1883  Because the PTO was 
acting within its authority to administer statutory provisions relating 
to the “conduct of proceedings in the Office,” the Court found that 
the PTO’s interpretation was entitled to analysis under the Chevron 
framework.1884  Finding that Congress had not directly spoken on the 
issue—that the PTO expressly interpreted “original application” 
shortly after the AIPA was enacted and that Congress did not amend 
the “original application” language when it amended the AIPA—the 
Federal Circuit determined that the PTO’s interpretation of section 
4608 was permissible.1885
In Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.,1886 the Federal Circuit 
also considered the level of deference owed to a determination of the 
PTO.1887  In the lower court, Technology Licensing Corp. (“TLC”) 
filed a complaint against Videotek, Inc. alleging infringement of two 
TLC patents.1888  A magistrate judge found that the asserted claim of 
one patent was indefinite and of the other patent was valid but not 
infringed.1889  Both parties appealed the magistrate’s ruling to the 
Federal Circuit.1890  TLC separately filed a reissue application 
regarding one of the asserted patents, U.S. Patent No. 5,754,250.1891  
After the oral argument but before the Federal Circuit issued its 
opinion, the PTO reissued the ‘250 patent with the original claims 
unchanged.1892  The Court declined to consider the effect of the 
PTO’s grant of a reissue,1893 finding instead that “judicial efficiency 
 
 1881. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1882. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1883. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1677, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 1884. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) 
(2006)). 
 1885. Id. at 1340–43, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713–15. 
 1886. 545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1887. Id. at 1330–31, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875–76. 
 1888. Id. at 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1889. Id. at 1323–24, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–72. 
 1890. Id. at 1325, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1891. Id. at 1330, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1892. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865. 
 1893. Id. at 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
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and the policy of repose counsels against our re-weighing of the 
evidence to add an additional deference-thumb to the scale, or, even 
more disruptive, our asking the trial court to reopen the entire 
invalidity question to reweigh the intangible worth of additional 
deference.”1894
In In re Swanson,1895 the Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the PTO’s 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (the “Board”) 
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 303(a), which permits the PTO to grant 
a reexamination request only if it determines that “a substantial new 
question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned 
is raised by the request.”1896  While the PTO’s “interpretation of 
statutory provisions concerning ‘the conduct of proceedings in the 
Office’” may be owed deference, the Board’s statutory interpretation 
is entitled to none.1897
B. PTO Procedures 
In re Swanson also considered the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) for 
the first time since a 2002 amendment specifying that “[t]he 
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not 
precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was 
previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”1898  
The Federal Circuit determined that, under amended § 303(a) as 
revised, a “substantial new question of patentability” could exist even 
if a federal court had previously considered the question.1899  “[A] 
‘substantial new question of patentability’ refers to a question which 
has never been considered by the PTO.”1900
In prior infringement litigation between Abbott Laboratories, an 
exclusive licensee of Mr. Swanson’s patent, and Syntron Bioresearch, 
Inc., the alleged infringer, both the district court and the Federal 
Circuit had determined that a prior art reference known as “Deutsch” 
did not anticipate asserted claims of a patent-in-suit.1901  Despite the 
rulings of the Article III courts, the Federal Circuit held that the 
 
 1894. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1895. 540 F.3d 1368, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1896. Id. at 1374–75, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200–01 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) 
(2006)). 
 1897. Id. at 1374 n.3, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206 n.3 (quoting 35 U.S.C.  
§ 2(b)(2)(A) (2006)) (distinguishing Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 87 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 1898. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) 
(2006)). 
 1899. Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 1900. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 1901. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
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question of whether Deutsch was an anticipatory reference could still 
raise a substantial new question of patentability sufficient to initiate a 
reexamination.1902  The Federal Circuit stated that a “court’s final 
judgment and the examiner’s rejection are not duplicative—they are 
differing proceedings with different evidentiary standards for 
validity.”1903  In civil litigation, a challenger must prove invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence.1904  During patent examinations and 
reexaminations, however, an applicant need only prove validity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.1905  Thus, the fact that an Article III 
court had determined the validity of the asserted claims did not 
preclude the PTO from coming to a contrary conclusion under its 
own, different evidentiary standards for determining validity.1906
Nor was the fact that the examiner had already considered the 
Deutsch reference during the initial examination a bar to the PTO 
considering the reference again on re-examination.1907  The initial 
examiner relied upon Deutsch only as a secondary reference in an 
obviousness rejection of a broader claim.1908
 In light of the extremely limited purpose for which the examiner 
considered Deutsch in the initial examination, the Board is correct 
that the issue of whether Deutsch anticipates the method disclosed 
in claims 22, 23, and 25 was a substantial new question of 
patentability, never before addressed by the PTO.1909
In Burandt v. Dudas,1910 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Director of the 
PTO, where the Director’s decision to deny a patent holder’s request 
for reinstatement of his patent after failure to pay the maintenance 
fee was “neither arbitrary or capricious, nor an abuse of 
discretion.”1911  By operation of an assignment agreement, inventor 
Burandt assigned the patent at issue to his employer, Investment 
Rarities, Inc. (“IRI”).1912  IRI failed to pay the first of three statutorily 
 
 1902. Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 1903. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 1904. See id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (recalling that in an earlier court 
proceeding, “Syntron had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the ‘484 patent was invalid”). 
 1905. See id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (noting that in the examiner’s 
proceedings, a preponderance of evidence supported invalidity). 
 1906. Id. at 1377–79, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203–04. 
 1907. See id. at 1381, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (agreeing with the Board that a 
substantial new question of patentability had been raised under § 303(a)). 
 1908. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 1909. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
 1910. 528 F.3d 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1911. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40. 
 1912. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
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mandated maintenance fees.1913  Consequently, the patent expired.1914  
Seven years later, Burandt, who had been suffering from a mental 
illness, contacted the PTO and learned that his patent had expired.1915  
Burandt gained legal title to the expired patent and sought to 
reinstate it by sending a maintenance fee payment to the PTO.1916  
The PTO denied Mr. Burandt’s attempts to reinstate his patent.1917  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Director 
of the PTO.1918
Section 41(c)(1) of 35 U.S.C. provides that “[t]he Director may 
accept payment of any maintenance fee . . . at any time after the six-
month grace period if the delay is shown to the satisfaction of the 
Director to have been unavoidable.”1919  “[I]n determining whether a 
delay in paying a maintenance fee was unavoidable, one looks to 
whether the party responsible for payment of the maintenance fee 
exercised the due care of a reasonably prudent person.”1920  The 
district court noted that IRI was responsible for the payment of 
maintenance fees and there was no evidence that IRI had exercised 
due care in paying the maintenance fee.1921  Reviewing the Director’s 
action under an arbitrary and capricious standard, the Federal 
Circuit agreed.1922  Burandt’s mental illness and destitute financial 
condition were irrelevant to the inquiry, because IRI, not Burandt, 
was the legal owner of the patent at the time the maintenance fees 
were due.1923
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game 
Technology,1924 appellant Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. 
filed the national stage application of an international patent 
cooperation treaty application one day late.1925  As a result, the PTO 
notified Aristocrat that the application had been abandoned.1926  
Aristocrat filed a petition to revive the application pursuant to  
 
 1913. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1914. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1915. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1916. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1917. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1918. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (citing Burandt v. Dudas, 496 F. Supp. 2d 
643, 653 (E.D. Va. 2007)). 
 1919. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1) (2006). 
 1920. Burandt, 528 F.3d at 1333, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137 (quoting Ray v. 
Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1921. Id. at 1331–32, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1922. Id. at 1332–33, 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137, 1139. 
 1923. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 1924. 543 F.3d 657, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1925. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1926. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
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37 C.F.R. § 1.137(a),1927 which the PTO granted because the delay in 
filing was “unintentional.”1928
Shortly after the revived application issued as U.S. Patent  
No. 7,056,215,1929 Aristocrat filed suit against International Game 
Technology and IGT (collectively “IGT”) for infringement of the 
patent.1930  IGT asserted that the ‘215 patent was invalid because it 
had been “improperly revived” by the PTO because the PTO required 
Aristocrat to show only “unintentional delay” instead of 
“unavoidable” delay, which IGT asserted was the proper standard.1931  
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in IGT’s 
favor.1932
The Federal Circuit considered only the threshold issue of whether 
“improper revival” of an abandoned patent application could be 
asserted as an invalidity defense in a suit involving the infringement 
or validity of a patent.1933  Overturning the district court’s holding, the 
Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that ‘improper revival’ is not a 
cognizable defense in an action involving the validity or infringement 
of a patent.”1934  Not only was “improper revival” not a recognized 
defense under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (which catalogues “defenses available 
in an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”),1935 
but the court noted that “[t]here is good reason not to permit 
procedural irregularities during prosecution, such as the one at issue 
here, to provide a basis for invalidity.  Once a patent has issued, the 
procedural minutiae of prosecution have little relevance to the metes 
and bounds of the patentee’s right to exclude.”1936
Although it declined to find patents invalid for “procedural 
irregularit[ies]” in Aristocrat, the Federal Circuit stressed that any 
irregularity during prosecution that involves inequitable conduct are 
“redressible under that framework.”1937
In In re DBC,1938 the Federal Circuit affirmed a final decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, rejecting as obvious 
claims directed to a “nutraceutical composition” from the fruit of the 
 
 1927. 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(a) (2008). 
 1928. Aristocrat, 543 F.3d at 659–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 1929. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1930. Id. at 660, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 1931. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (quoting Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. 
Int’l Game Tech., 491 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924–29 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). 
 1932. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460. 
 1933. Id. at 660–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 1934. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 1935. Id. at 661–62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 1936. Id. at 663, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
 1937. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462–63. 
 1938. 545 F.3d 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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mangosteen tree.1939  Appellant DBC raised for the first time, on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the issue of whether two members of 
the panel that heard DBC’s appeal from the patent examiner’s 
rejection had been appointed in violation of the Appointments 
Clause1940 of the Constitution.1941  However, by not “rais[ing] its 
objection to the manner of appointment to the Board itself,” DBC 
waived the issue.1942  A party must object to an agency before attacking 
the agency action in court because “it gives [the] agency an 
opportunity to correct its own mistakes” and “it promotes judicial 
efficiency.”1943
Nor did the Federal Circuit entertain the merits of the 
constitutionality of the appointment of the administrative patent 
judges under the Appointments Clause—an issue raised by Professor 
John F. Duffy of the George Washington University Law School in a 
2007 law review article.1944  Duffy contended that legislation that 
delegated the power to appoint administrative patent judges to the 
Director of the PTO instead of the Secretary of Commerce was 
unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 
because that power is reserved to “the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”1945  The court, however, 
remarked that Professor Duffy’s article was “not an intervening 
change in law or facts, nor was it based on any legal or factual 
propositions that were not knowable to DBC when it was proceeding 
before the Board.”1946  For that reason, there was nothing that 
prevented DBC from raising the issue to the Board on its own.1947  
Moreover, the court found there was no cause to rule on the merits 
where DBC had not challenged the propriety or competence of the 
administrative patent law judges and where Congress had already 
passed remedial legislation re-delegating the power of appointment 
to the Secretary of the Treasury.1948  
Finally, the Federal Circuit in Hyatt v. Dudas,1949 addressed how 
specific the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) must 
 
 1939. Id. at 1382–83, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130. 
 1940. Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 1941. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 1942. 545 F.3d. at 1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. 
 1943. Id. at 1378–79, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127–28 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 
548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006)). 
 1944. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Constitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY-O 
PAT. L.J. 21, 21, http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjournal/files/Duffy.BPAI.pdf. 
 1945. Duffy, supra note 1944, at 21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 1946. In re DBC, 545 F.3d at 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1947. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1948. Id. at 1380–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129. 
 1949. 551 F.3d 1307, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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be when addressing groups of claims in patent applications.  In Hyatt, 
the BPAI had been confronted with 2,400 claims in twelve related 
applications from inventor Gilbert Hyatt.1950  The PTO examiner had 
rejected all of the claims, most commonly based on the written 
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1).1951  On appeal, the 
BPAI did not review each claim independently, but simply reviewed 
twenty-one of the claims that Hyatt had discussed in the “Summary of 
the Invention” sections of his briefs to the BPAI.1952  On the basis of 
this review of twenty-one claims, the BPAI affirmed the examiner’s 
rejections of all claims.1953  The Federal Circuit held the BAPI’s 
method was erroneous and in violation of PTO Rule 1.192(c)(7).1954  
That rule allows the BPAI, when addressing multiple claims, to select 
and review just one representative claim for each “ground of 
rejection.”1955  The Federal Circuit, on the contrary, held that a 
“ground of rejection” could not simply be “the statutory requirement 
for patentability that a claim fails to meet” but had to be “the precise 
reason why the claim fails that requirement.”1956  Thus, the court held 
that the BPAI could not consider as a group claims rejected for lack 
of written description “unless the claims share a common limitation 
that lacks written description support.”1957
C. International Trade Commission 
1. Jurisdiction 
In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,1958 the International 
Trade Commission (“ITC”) ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to 
investigate and resolve charges of infringement where the imported 
drug, under development and subject to the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) safe-
harbor statute, had not been sold in the United States and was not 
the subject of an existing contract for sale.1959  Recognizing that “[t]he 
Commission’s assignment is to prevent and remedy unfair acts flowing 
from infringement,” the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s 
 
 1950. Id. at 1309, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466. 
 1951. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466. 
 1952. Id.  Hyatt first sought review in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, with that court finding that the BPAI’s method to be 
erroneous.  Hyatt v. Dudas, Nos. 04-1802, 04-1138, 04-1139, and 05-0310, 2006 WL 
2521242 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2006). 
 1953. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1954. Hyatt, 551 F.3d at 1309, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1955. Id. at 1311, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7)). 
 1956. Id. at 1312, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469. 
 1957. Id. at 1313, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469. 
 1958. 519 F.3d 1343, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 1959. Id. at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190. 
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determination.1960  The ITC’s jurisdiction is “properly invoked” 
“[w]hen it has been shown that infringing acts are reasonably likely to 
occur.”1961
2. Scope of authority 
Upon finding a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the ITC has the 
authority to issue two types of exclusion orders:  a limited exclusion 
order (“LEO”), directed to products imported by a respondent, or a 
general exclusion order (“GEO”), directed to all infringing articles, 
regardless of whether the importer is a party to the investigation.1962  
The ITC has long used LEOs to exclude not only a respondent’s 
infringing article, but also any downstream product (whether or not 
manufactured or imported by that respondent) that incorporates the 
infringing article.1963
In Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission,1964 
complainant Broadcom Corporation sought an LEO against 
infringing baseband processor chips manufactured by Qualcomm 
Corporation, the only named respondent in this investigation, as well 
as cellular telephones, PDAs and other wireless communications 
devices that contained the infringing chips.1965  After having found a 
violation of § 1337 in the liability phase of the investigation, the ITC 
addressed the appropriate remedy in a separate phase.1966  Companies 
with a stake in the outcome of the investigation, including 
downstream manufacturers of infringing products, like cell phone 
manufacturers and wireless service providers, intervened to argue 
against an exclusion order that extended to downstream products.1967  
Following hearings on the appropriate remedy, the ITC issued an 
LEO excluding 
[h]andheld wireless communications devices, including cellular 
telephone handsets and PDAs, containing Qualcomm baseband 
processor chips or chipsets that are programmed to enable the 
 
 1960. Id. at 1352–53, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194–95 (emphasis added). 
 1961. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 1962. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006). 
 1963. See, e.g., Elec. Connectors, USITC Pub. 2981, Inv. No. 337-TA-374 (July 1996) 
(issuing a limited exclusion order to prohibit the unlicensed importation of 
infringing products); Microsphere Adhesives, USITC Pub. 2949, Inv. No. 337-TA-366 
(Jan. 1996) (ruling that a limited exclusion order should cover downstream products 
that contain infringing components in order to ensure proper relief); Aramid Fiber, 
USITC Pub. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194 (Mar. 1984) (stating that a protective order 
should be issued in order to avoid serious harm to a party).   
 1964. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1965. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60. 
 1966. Id. at 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 1967. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
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power saving features covered by claims 1, 4, 8, 9, or 11 of U.S. 
Patent No. 6,714,983, wherein the chips or chipsets are 
manufactured abroad by or on behalf of Qualcomm 
Incorporated.1968
The Federal Circuit determined that the ITC had exceeded its 
statutory authority by issuing an LEO that excludes from the United 
States downstream products of manufacturers that were not named as 
respondents in the investigation.1969  According to the Federal Circuit, 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), the statute from which the ITC derives its 
authority to exclude articles that infringe on a valid U.S. patent, 
“permits LEOs to exclude only the violating products of named 
respondents.”1970
Section 1337(d) provides the following: 
(d) Exclusion of articles from entry 
(1) If the Commission determines, as a result of an 
investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this 
section, it shall direct the articles concerned, imported by any 
person violating the provision of this section, be excluded 
from entry into the United States . . . 
(2) The authority of the Commission to order an exclusion 
from entry of articles shall be limited to persons determined 
by the Commission to be violating this section unless the 
Commission determines that— 
(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is necessary 
to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to 
products of named person; or 
(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is 
difficult to identify the source of infringing products.1971
Analyzing § 1337(d) under the Supreme Court’s familiar Chevron 
framework,1972 the Federal Circuit determined that the statute “speaks 
unambiguously to the precise question at issue in this case.”1973  In 
order to give meaning to each of the statute’s clauses, LEOs must be 
limited to “named respondents that the Commission finds in 
 
 1968. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060–61 (quoting Baseband Processor Chips, 
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 2007)).  
 1969. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 1970. Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (emphasis added). 
 1971. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006). 
 1972. See supra note 1873 (summarizing the test for whether to grant deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory mandate). 
 1973. Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
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violation of section 337.”1974  Doing otherwise would render 
superfluous the sections of the statute concerning GEOs.1975
The Federal Circuit rejected the Commission and Broadcom’s 
argument that so limiting the scope of the remedy under a LEO 
would allow “unnamed, difficult-to-identify importers of infringing 
articles” to escape enforcement.1976  A party fearing circumvention of 
an LEO can seek a GEO, as long as the party is able to meet the 
heightened requirements of § 1337(d)(2)(A) or (B).1977  The Federal 
Circuit noted that Broadcom’s “strategic decision” to name only 
chipmaker Qualcomm as a respondent, even though Broadcom knew 
the identities of the handset manufacturers who incorporated those 
chips, put the company in a difficult position to argue about the 
danger of unknown infringers circumventing an LEO.1978  Broadcom 
did not seek a GEO, so it was not entitled to the exclusion of 
“downstream products” of those who are not “persons determined . . . 
to be violating [Section 337].”1979
 
 
 1974. Id. at 1356, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068. 
 1975. See id. (discussing the distinct circumstances in which LEOs and GEOs should 
be applied). 
 1976. Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1977. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1978. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1979. Id. at 1357–58, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
